

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20 is the keystone manual for Special Forces (SF) doctrine. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities, organization, command and control (C2), employment, and sustainment operations across the operational continuum. This manual is a continuation of the doctrine established in Joint Publications (JPs) 3-05 series and FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces Doctrine* (currently published as FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*). The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) publications for SF include FM 3-05.202, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations* (currently published as FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*), and FM 3-05.204, *Special Forces Special Reconnaissance Operations* (currently published as FM 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*). See Figure Preface-1, page v, for the Army special operations forces (ARSOF) doctrinal and training publications architecture.

The focus of this manual is on the operational level of SF operations. The subordinate publications explain the *how* of SF operations. Although FM 3-05.20 focuses primarily on the SF group and battalion, it addresses SF units from the Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA) to the United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC[A]).

Commanders and trainers should use this manual and other related publications in conjunction with theater mission letters, command guidance, unit mission-essential task lists (METLs), and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to plan and conduct mission-specific training. The key to ARSOF mission success is to plan and practice operations before executing an assigned mission.

This manual contains numerous acronyms, abbreviations, and terms. Users should refer to the Glossary at the back of this manual for their meanings and definitions.

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.




Figure Preface-1. ARSOF Doctrinal and Training Publications Architecture

Chapter 1

Introduction to Special Forces

There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.

President John F. Kennedy
1962

SF, along with other ARSOF, conducts special operations (SO) across the operational continuum. SO are actions that specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces take to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas of the world. SF represents the United States (U.S.) Army's only unconventional warfare (UW) capability. SF applies this UW capability in synchronization with other joint, Army, and interagency capabilities to achieve dominance across the operational continuum. The complex post-Cold War global security environment presents unprecedented UW opportunities and a growing unconventional threat. SF's distinctive UW capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces. This chapter provides insights into the nature of SF, discussing the values, competencies, roles, and character of SF units and soldiers. The chapter closes with the fundamental criteria that guide the employment of this unique and highly flexible force.

NOTE: The basic element of SF is the SFODA, a 12-man detachment. SF companies and battalion headquarters (HQ) have similar detachments, known as Special Forces operational detachments B (SFODBs) and Special Forces operational detachments C (SFODCs), respectively (see Chapter 3). Generically, these units are referred to as Special Forces operational detachments (SFODs).

THE EVOLUTION OF SPECIAL FORCES

1-1. The origin of SF can be traced back through history to such units as Darby's Rangers, Merrill's Marauders, the 1st Special Service Force, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). All of these units, with the exception of the OSS, were designed along conventional lines to conduct specific missions. The OSS stood out as truly unconventional in organization and mission, and SF draws its heritage from the unconventional aspect of the OSS. Since its very

inception, SF has focused on UW, working with and through foreign indigenous forces.

1-2. The OSS had a twofold mission that encompassed intelligence activities and UW. During World War II (WW II), the OSS operated in both the European and China-Burma-India theaters, conducting guerrilla warfare with indigenous forces trained, organized, equipped, and—to varying degrees—led by OSS personnel. Examples of such missions include the Jedburgh teams in Europe and Detachment 101's operations in Burma. OSS personnel received extensive training in languages and cultures. They also received training in both conventional and guerrilla tactics, as well as the skills necessary to operate for extended periods in denied territory with little or no external support. Detailed planning and mission-specific preparation characterized such requirements. The OSS established liaison at the theater level through a Strategic Services officer who coordinated the actions of indigenous forces influenced by OSS operational detachments and passed intelligence to and from assets in denied areas.

1-3. At the conclusion of WW II, the OSS was disbanded and its functions were moved to other agencies or were discarded. In response to the growing threat posed by Communist aggression and subversion in Europe and Asia, the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities and to conduct Presidential-directed covert activities. UW capabilities in the military rapidly degenerated due to force-structure reductions, the loss of skilled UW experts who returned to civilian life, and the decision by military leaders to focus on the maintenance of conventional forces. Most senior military officers did not understand UW tactics and let the newly created CIA take on this responsibility.

1-4. The 1950s ushered in a new recognition of the value of military forces specifically prepared to operate within foreign cultures to develop and employ resistance elements. In Korea, the Army lacked the trained personnel, doctrine, and organizational capabilities required to use the resistance potential available in North Korea. Ad hoc structures manned with inexperienced and untrained personnel had little success. Despite the apparent lack of interest in UW, some military visionaries (notably Major General Robert A. McClure, Colonel Russell Volckmann, and Colonel Aaron Bank) in the Army's Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare continued to emphasize its need. They advocated the development of a U.S. Army capability designed to train, organize, equip, and employ foreign personnel against an adversary as an integral part of U.S. military operations. The Korean experience, coupled with the rising threat of the Soviet Union in Europe, finally provided leverage necessary for the military UW advocates to substantiate their case. The Army authorized the formation of the first SF and psychological operations (PSYOP) groups.

1-5. From the mid-1950s through the 1960s, SF experienced continual and sometimes rapid growth. President John F. Kennedy's interest in UW and his understanding of the threat posed by Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation" led to increased emphasis on UW capabilities. President Kennedy's emphasis on expanding U.S. capabilities to respond to Communist guerrilla movements resulted in the development of national policy, doctrine, and force structures to respond to the increasing threat to U.S. national

security posed by Communist expansion. The Army responded to the President's concern, reorienting SF to include support to indigenous forces fighting against Communist-inspired insurgencies. This emphasis on assisting a host nation (HN) against an internal threat developed into the SF mission of foreign internal defense (FID).

1-6. Following Vietnam, the Army refocused on conventional warfighting, principally against the clearly defined threat of a massive Soviet invasion in Europe. As the Soviet grasp on Eastern Europe tightened and Army estimates of effective resistance potential in that region diminished, the Army and SF began to seek other means to engage selected high-value targets. SF's UW skills, particularly the ability to penetrate deep into denied territory, were a significant asset. SF could operate for extended periods with little or no external support and reliably achieve success in critical and complex missions. This capability led to an operational concept that expanded the tasks of unilateral sabotage, subversion, and other activities of SF-advised indigenous forces. Two roles of SF carried over from the Vietnam era. One role was SF as a reconnaissance force capable of providing otherwise unobtainable intelligence, known as special reconnaissance (SR). Another role was SF as a direct action (DA) force capable of unilaterally creating effects of operational and strategic significance.

1-7. Although the principal focus of the Army shifted to conventional war in Europe, the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union demanded that the Army confront a variety of threats and seize an array of opportunities throughout other parts of the world. From counterinsurgency to counterdrug operations, SF continued to provide and adapt the full range of its historical capabilities to U.S. interagency efforts to thwart the Soviets and advance U.S. interests throughout the world. The emergence of one threat in particular, terrorism, demanded special attention. SF units were tasked to apply the full range of their UW, FID, DA, and SR capabilities to this very specific threat, requiring refined doctrine with unique TTP. The complexity of this mission and the highly specialized training it requires led to the development of a new principal mission, combatting terrorism (CBT).

1-8. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the global security environment has become increasingly complex, significantly less stable, and potentially more dangerous than in the past. Currently, no nation can qualify as a "peer" competitor with the United States in conventional warfare. However, an expanding number of countries have the capability to challenge the United States through asymmetric attacks using unconventional tactics to exploit critical U.S. vulnerabilities. Recent operations, ranging from the war with Iraq to peacekeeping in Bosnia, have demonstrated the new and complex challenges facing the United States and its allies. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction [WMD]) has expanded the range of asymmetric capabilities against the United States. The development of information-based attack capabilities by U.S. adversaries has expanded the range as well. In response to the evolving international security environment, SF has two additional principal missions—counterproliferation (CP) (dealing primarily with WMD) and information operations (IO).

1-9. SF today reflects an illustrious history and continues to adapt to meet new challenges. Fully understanding how best to apply the SF operations doctrine presented in this manual depends on a fundamental understanding of the nature of SF. The evolution of SF roles and missions continues and will be discussed in the following chapters. As this evolution continues, the unique and special value of the SF contribution to the Army's quest for dominance in full-spectrum operations remains defined by a fundamental focus on the varied and invaluable skills associated with UW.

SPECIAL FORCES APPLICATIONS IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

1-10. In the rapidly changing, technologically advanced environment that will typify the 21st century, SF soldiers provide unique capabilities to adapt to new challenges. While other ARSOF may share the primary missions of SF (less UW), the SF role in each of these missions is unique and defined by UW as the core SF mission. SF UW capabilities expand the range of options open to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and provide an adaptable and regionally attuned military capability that can rapidly respond to crises in any area of the world. SF is a separate combat arms branch, which is the force of choice for dynamic, ambiguous, and politically volatile missions that require timely solutions to complex problems. When employed early, SF units can often achieve U.S. objectives by operating through, and with, indigenous forces. When successful, this negates the requirement for larger conventional forces and greatly reduces the risk of U.S. casualties. Even when all objectives are not achieved through surrogate or indigenous forces, the SF units will be able to assist in shaping the environment for a deployment of conventional forces. Since almost all future conflicts will be fought as coalitions, the deployed SF units will be critical in providing support to the coalition forces before deployment of U.S. forces, as well as during the execution of conventional operations. The maturity, core values, warrior ethos, technical and tactical competency, and flexibility inherent in every SF soldier are seldom found elsewhere. All SF personnel must promote the organization by educating the conventional and joint forces on the capabilities and limitations of SF, while ensuring that their performance and presentation are professional in every respect.

1-11. Every SF soldier maintains a high degree of proficiency in military occupational specialty (MOS) skills, in TTP, and in cultural awareness, including a language capability. Each SF soldier is multifunctional and multicapable. While he is trained as a specialist in a primary MOS, he is cross-trained in each of the SF specialties. Advanced skills are also taught within SF to enhance the operating capabilities of the force. Each SF unit conducts extensive area and country studies. From such missions as Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and PROVIDE HOPE in Iraq, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia and Haiti, to full combat operations like Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT STORM in Kuwait, SF is usually the first force on the ground and the last to leave. SF units based in the continental United States (CONUS) and forward-deployed units are continuously engaged in overseas regions in peacetime to—

- Deter aggression.
- Support regional stability.

- Gain familiarity with overseas operating environments.
- Promote combined training among the forces of friendly countries.
- Provide timely initial-response capabilities.

1-12. SF commanders have the ability to take advantage of their regionally oriented focus with intelligence databases, enhanced planning capabilities, and highly specialized training. These SF capabilities provide a first line of deterrence to enhance the geographic commander in chief's (CINC's) peacetime engagement strategy.

1-13. After Operation DESERT STORM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (CINC, United States Central Command) referred to SF soldiers as "the glue that held the coalition together." In humanitarian assistance (HA) operations, SF soldiers have provided a low-visibility but invaluable service. In Operation SAFE HAVEN in Panama, for example, SF organized refugee camps. In relief operations such as Operation SEA ANGEL, SF performed disaster relief for Bangladesh, and in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, SF provided relief for the Kurds in northern Iraq.

1-14. When planning for any SF mission, the impact of the urban environment must be considered. Any SF mission can be conducted as an urban operation. Future SF operations will be conducted in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken cities of the world. SF will operate elsewhere, but not so often, and rarely as reluctantly. Cities always have been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever before. A growing percentage of the world's population will reside in urban areas in the future. If current global demographic trends continue, the world will see the growth of huge urban masses. The proximity of the disenfranchised to the ruling elite may have significant impact since this situation has the potential to spark further unrest and sporadic violence.

1-15. SF faces a challenging future in an era of dynamic political and economic change, constrained resources, new and demanding roles, and rapid technological advancement. On short notice, SF can answer the nation's call with a flexible, cross-cultural, rapid-response capability ranging from one soldier to multiple, task-organized battalion-sized forces. Future challenges and crises will require special operations forces (SOF) with regional orientation, language proficiency, advanced interpersonal skills, and rapid response—all qualifications of SF soldiers. No other force gives the NCA and the geographic CINCs such flexibility in the international arena.

REGIONAL ORIENTATION

1-16. Each SF group is oriented to a specific region of the world, which is within the area of responsibility (AOR) assigned by the Unified Command Plan to the geographically apportioned unified commands. These commands include United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Each SF group orients toward specific AORs. Within each group, individual battalions and operational detachments have an even more well-defined focus

within their AORs. Orientation helps commanders focus their personnel and training toward the peculiarities of the region. Examples are language training, cultural familiarization, movement techniques, and military skills in various climates. Regional orientation is also the basis for the development of intercultural communication skills. Area orientation begins with formal qualification training in the different phases of the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and is reinforced through continued training and repeated deployments to an assigned AOR.

1-17. When necessary, an SF group may be tasked by higher HQ to perform operations outside its designated AOR. For example, the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st SFG[A]) performed coalition support team duties in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

CORE COMPETENCIES

1-18. SF possesses distinguishing core competencies, many derived from the UW mission. These competencies have evolved over the years due to changing mission requirements and focus by the geographic CINCs to dictate the needs of SF training. These SF core competencies, discussed below, make SF the force of choice for complex, difficult, high-risk, and politically sensitive missions.

WARFIGHTING

1-19. SF soldiers are the epitome of the professional soldier. From hand-to-hand combat to the maneuver tactics of conventional forces, SF soldiers are expert warriors and masters of the profession of arms. The SFODA is fully versed in light infantry TTP up to and including the battalion level. SF soldiers are experts at integration of fire and maneuver skills. Their patrolling skills—carried out in unilateral, combined, or joint operations—include all aspects of combat patrolling. SF soldiers are tactically competent and have advanced training in operations, intelligence, medical skills, engineering, communications, and heavy and light weapons. They also have a working knowledge of the employment of PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA).

TRAINING

1-20. SF soldiers are masters in the art and science of training. They are fully competent to assess unit and individual requirements, develop and implement programs to address identified needs, and evaluate the results of those programs. Most important, these assessments, programs, and evaluations are focused on the actual mission needs of the force to be trained.

PHYSICAL FITNESS

1-21. SF soldiers maintain a high level of fitness. This level of fitness directly correlates to the SF soldier's combative skills, which he adopts as a discipline and as a means of self-defense.

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS

1-22. Since its activation, SF has focused on developing and employing foreign forces and other assets, such as international organizations, in support of U.S. policy objectives. As a result, SF has recognized the ability to

influence foreign audiences by managing the content and flow of information through effective intercultural communications as fundamental to mission success. Beginning with the SFQC, SF soldiers are trained and educated in these complex communications skills. SF competency in intercultural communications rests on four pillars: interpersonal skills, nonverbal skills, language proficiency, and area and cultural orientation.

Interpersonal Skills

1-23. Interpersonal skills are critical to SF operations. They require the ability to listen with understanding, the ability to maintain an open mind, and the sensitivity to observe and grasp the essential components of a given situation. SF soldiers combine the ability to overcome ethnocentricity and to treat foreigners as equals, while also communicating and teaching across intercultural barriers. SF soldiers use their interpersonal skills to get the desired action from a foreign counterpart.

Nonverbal Skills

1-24. Over half of human communication is nonverbal. Understanding gestures and behavior can be very difficult when they also have an intercultural dimension. When gestures, behavior, and language are complementary, the complete picture evolves. Some nonverbal forms of communication are demeaning, derogatory, or even inflammatory. These gestures vary from culture to culture. Nonverbal communication requires an understanding of the gestures applicable to each culture. The SF soldier's regional orientation permits him to focus on the nonverbal "vocabulary" of a specific region and to train to be sensitive to nonverbal communication.

Language Proficiency

1-25. Language proficiency is a key element in intercultural communications. Each prospective SF soldier is tested for language aptitude. To be qualified in his MOS, each SF soldier must attend language school. This schooling is, however, just a start point. SF soldiers continue to improve their language skills through unit-sponsored training, repeated deployments into the region of orientation, and self-study. As a result, each SFOD possesses personnel with varying degrees of proficiency in one or more foreign languages.

Area and Cultural Orientation

1-26. SF units are regionally oriented to ensure they have the resident skills and cultural understanding necessary to communicate with and influence their foreign counterparts. Regional orientation permits SF soldiers to develop a thorough understanding of the cultural and religious history and the social, political, and economic dynamics of given population groups. This understanding of the operational area extends to the physical factors of geography and climate within the specified region. These physical factors influence not only the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of the indigenous populace but also the actual conduct of military operations. Formal training and cultural immersion during repeated deployments are the vehicles for developing this orientation and understanding. One aspect of such area and cultural orientation is that it promotes and nurtures a strong set of personal

and professional relationships formed over the years between SF soldiers and their military and civilian counterparts in the target region. These relationships are often key to mission success.

PROBLEM SOLVING

1-27. The nature of UW and other SF missions often defies templated or “schoolhouse” solutions. A hallmark of the SF soldier is the ability to analyze a situation, then adapt and apply U.S. doctrine, TTP, equipment, and methods in a culturally sensitive and appropriate manner to resolve difficult issues in nonstandard situations.

CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

1-28. SF maintains proficiency in a wide variety of low-visibility and clandestine infiltration and exfiltration techniques. Although SF is a ground-oriented force, it is competent in air, sea, and land infiltration and exfiltration methods using both military and civilian modes of transportation. These techniques are not limited to doctrinal and routinely practiced methods. They also include mission-specific, improvised techniques. This competency permits SF to operate in places that other forces consider to be denied areas.

INTERAGENCY, JOINT, COMBINED, AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-29. SF has unique capabilities to fill the operational void between civilian-dominated or civilian-led activities and military operations. Working with foreign militaries that often are involved in functions or activities that are the exclusive function of civilian agencies in the United States positions SF to assist with interagency programs in foreign nations. Because SF routinely operates as part of a joint SOF team, within a joint SOF command structure, it is well prepared to facilitate joint operations among any combinations of force types. SF possesses the unique ability to enable combined operations. From its UW origins, SF maintains the full range of skills, organization, and training to integrate foreign forces, regular or irregular, into a combined operation effectively.

POLITICAL AWARENESS

1-30. Sometimes referred to as “warrior-diplomats,” SF soldiers maintain a keen appreciation of the political aspects of their operational environment. They must understand U.S. policies, goals, and objectives and be able to articulate them in a manner that convinces their foreign counterparts to support them. Similarly, they must understand the political context within which their counterparts operate.

AUSTERE OR HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS

1-31. SF has developed the ability to operate for extended periods in hostile, remote, and austere environments with little or no external support. SF’s ability to operate in these environments provides one of the means to maintain low visibility during SF operations.

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

1-32. The complex, one-of-a-kind nature of assigned missions has driven SF to develop procedures for adapting military and civilian technology in innovative ways. Coupled with nonstandard procurement procedures, this competency permits SF to apply creative solutions to mission requirements. This skill has also enabled SF to perform well in the rapidly evolving IO mission area.

ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY


1-33. SF conducts its missions and activities, either unilaterally or through indigenous or surrogate forces, throughout the range of military operations. SF executes its operations in every environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile), with applications in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW). SF gives the NCA and geographic CINCs an additional means to resolve emerging crises, achieve U.S. objectives, and pursue U.S. strategic goals. Additionally, SF can help shape the environment while preparing for future operations. SF can support the joint force commander (JFC) at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Figure 1-1, page 1-10, addresses full-spectrum operations for SF.

1-34. SF has capabilities throughout all environments within full-spectrum operations. Although primarily ground-oriented, SF maintains additional capabilities—in the air for infiltration and exfiltration and in waterborne operations for infiltration, exfiltration, and limited water-based interdiction requirements. SF operations include a variety of offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions that assist in attaining joint force dominance in any environment.

1-35. In war, SF normally conducts SO that support the theater campaign and major operations of subordinate forces within the geographic CINC's AOR. Such operations are conducted in support of the U.S. Ambassador in a foreign country or in conjunction with joint operations being conducted in accordance with (IAW) a command relationship established by the designated JFC. In either situation, SF offers unique military options unavailable from any other source. This characteristic is particularly evident in situations requiring subtle, indirect, or low-visibility applications for their solution. SF's small size, unique capabilities, and limited self-sufficiency give the United States a variety of feasible and appropriate military responses. Due to SF's small physical signature and cultural awareness, these responses do not entail the same degree of liability or risk of escalation normally associated with the employment of an inherently larger and more visible conventional force.

OPERATIONAL LEVELS

1-36. Just as SF operations may support other component (conventional) forces of a joint force, conventional forces may also support SF operations. In either situation, the conduct of SF operations must support the JFC's goals, objectives, and concept of operations at every level—whether strategic, operational, or tactical. Campaign and contingency planning must address SF as part of joint, multinational, and interagency operations. SF is most successful when integrated early into operations.



Legend:
 MTW - Major Theater War
 PME - Peacetime Military Engagement
 SSC - Small-Scale Contingency

Figure 1-1. Full-Spectrum Operations

1-37. The strategic level of operations focuses on the broadest and highest aspects of national and theater policy. Decisions at this level reflect national and multinational goals, integrate the instruments of national power, provide forces, and determine constraints and restraints necessary for the effective use of available forces. The NCA and the geographic CINCs determine the strategic national objectives and the strategic geographic objectives. They also determine the manner of military means to use to meet these objectives. The NCA or the CINCs may directly or indirectly (through subordinate commanders) integrate and employ SF in pursuit of these objectives.

1-38. The operational level of operations focuses on theater campaigns and major operations. JFCs determine operational objectives that lead to the attainment of strategic objectives in the theater. These objectives are obtained through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations, which in turn guide tactical events. A geographic CINC, subordinate unified commander, joint task force (JTF) commander, Service component commander, or functional component commander can request SF as part of the joint force organization to achieve these operational goals.

1-39. The tactical level of operations focuses on battles and engagements. Decisions at this level apply combat power to create advantages while in contact with or close to the enemy. SF may support tactical actions (offense, defense, stability, and support actions) designed to have significant effect in obtaining operational objectives.

SPECIAL FORCES IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

1-40. The role of many geographic CINCs' strategies for peacetime SF operations is to prevent conflict through early intervention or to deter a crisis. SF may provide the tools for the theater CINC's peacetime campaign strategy to gain or maintain U.S. access to strategically important foreign countries, to demonstrate U.S. commitment or resolve, or to contribute otherwise to collective security. SF routinely deploys on FID, security assistance (SA), and HA missions as military advisors and trainers to improve HN internal security. SF maintains strategic capabilities that help convince hostile powers to respect U.S. national interests and to refrain from acts of international aggression and coercion.

SPECIAL FORCES IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT

1-41. SF often operates within a nation for many years before escalation from peace to crisis. SF soldiers conduct a variety of missions based upon the geographic CINC's campaign plan. Early use of SF to preempt or resolve a crisis can preclude the need to involve U.S. conventional forces or can help set the conditions for successful rapid and decisive operations.

1-42. In conflict, the commitment of conventional combat forces may be premature, inappropriate, or infeasible. The risk of further escalation to an unacceptable level may also increase. In these situations—when political, economic, and other nonmilitary means are inadequate to respond to a conflict—SF gives the NCA options for discriminant engagement that preclude or limit the need to employ conventional combat forces. The low

visibility of SF operations helps the United States and its allies to maintain diplomatic flexibility. SF operations may also allow other powers (friendly, neutral, and hostile) to accept the outcome of multinational operations because they avoid the publicity of a more obvious use of military force.

1-43. SF may conduct FID to help a nation combat insurgency, terrorism, or transnational criminality. In the past, the objective of most SF FID missions was to support an ally or a friendly government against an insurgency or a similar internal threat. Today, however, the objective may be to establish or strengthen an alliance between the United States and an HN facing an external or transnational threat. Regardless of the threat, the primary FID mission for SF during conflict is to train, advise, and assist the HN military and paramilitary forces and, when required, accompany them on operations.

1-44. SF conducts UW across the operational continuum. The United States may undertake long-term operations in support of selected resistance organizations. When directed, SF advises, trains, and assists indigenous resistance organizations. Direct U.S. military involvement is rare and subject to legal and policy constraints. Indirect support from friendly territory may also occur.

1-45. SF may engage in DA or SR operations before open hostilities to enhance effects-based targeting efforts. These operations are low-visibility operations of limited U.S. involvement and may include subversion and sabotage. They are politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of military forces under conditions short of war. Such employment may also require a large, highly visible buildup of military forces over extended periods. SF soldiers participate in contingency missions unilaterally or in conjunction with other military forces or government agencies. These activities continue the theater CINC's IO campaign planning as a transition from the theater engagement plan (TEP) to war deterrence in the form of flexible deterrent options. Additionally, these actions shape and prepare the battlespace for transition to war, if required.

SPECIAL FORCES IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

1-46. The broad distribution of SF missions and training activities during peacetime or periods of uncertainty also makes SF widely available to precede conventional forces into a hostile area. Either already present or able to move quickly because of its proximity, SF can usually be in a crisis area well before conventional forces. When tasked appropriately, SF can provide real-time information and intelligence to deploying forces to help set the conditions for conventional force operations.

1-47. During war or crises, SF performs its missions at the strategic and operational level to influence deep, close, or rear operations. SF is optimally designed to conduct and support theater deep operations beyond the forward limits of conventional land forces. Such operations may extend into the homeland of a hostile power or into the territory of hostile states that threaten lines of communications (LOCs) in the friendly strategic rear. These operations may impact throughout the theater of war. During war, the strategic role of SF focuses on the long-term capacity of the hostile power to

continue hostilities. This role has two aspects. First the NCA, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), may direct a unified commander to conduct SO in pursuit of national strategic objectives. For example, SF may deploy into denied territory to support resistance forces and to collect and report information of national strategic importance. SF can also accomplish other missions with decisive strategic implications but with limited near-term effect on conventional military operations.

1-48. SF also supports the geographic CINC's theater campaign plan by conducting deep operations in pursuit of theater strategic military objectives. The geographic CINC may employ SF to interdict the advance of hostile forces to gain more time for employing conventional forces. SF may perform SR tasks at the theater strategic level to identify hostile capabilities, intentions, and activities of importance to the theater CINC. SF can be employed to delay, disrupt, or harass the hostile reinforcing forces or divert them to secondary areas of operations (AOs) to alter the momentum and tempo of hostile operations.

1-49. SF conducts SO as strategic economy-of-force operations in secondary AOs. These operations can include FID missions in the strategic rear of the theater of war.

1-50. At the operational level, SF deep operations support the theater CINC and his component commanders. At this level, SF operations have a near-term effect on current theater operations. By attacking hostile operational follow-on forces, SF disrupts the combined arms operations of those forces and breaks their momentum, creating opportunities for friendly decisive action. SF operations can also attack or secure, on a limited scale, critical node facilities of operational significance.

1-51. In theater deep operations, for example, SF can conduct UW, DA, SR, CP, or IO beyond the reach of conventional forces. In the close battle, SF can facilitate C2 among multinational and coalition partners operating with U.S. conventional forces. However, SFODs have limited firepower, tactical mobility, real-time communications, and combat service support (CSS) capabilities and cannot conduct sustained close-combat operations. SFODs gain mobility and protection advantages through stealth and the use of restrictive terrain. They gain firepower advantage through surprise and intensive training. SF missions generally rely on detailed premission preparation that is unsuitable for fluid close operations. SF normally will not conduct a DA or an SR mission of strategic or operational significance in the corps' main battle area. The priority of the mission, however, and the nature of the target must justify the diversion of SF assets to a mission more suitable for the reconnaissance and surveillance assets of conventional land forces.

1-52. In war, SF can conduct operations in friendly rear areas. Friendly rear security forces may be nonexistent, particularly when U.S. forces are operating in liberated or occupied territory. The key to conducting SF rear operations is to maintain an offensive posture rather than be reactionary. SF does not defend base clusters or perform military police (MP) functions. It organizes, trains, and supports (or directs) indigenous tactical combat forces to locate and destroy hostile insurgent forces in contested areas. SF does not conduct unilateral rear operations except as an extreme measure. In rear

operations, SF may conduct FID to teach and assist HN security forces or to participate in CBT in response to a rear area terrorist or insurgent threat.

1-53. In war, SF supports the strategy of the NCA and the CINCs in a variety of ways. However used, SF soldiers act as a force multiplier for the CINC. They bring with them the intercultural skills and interpersonal relationships vital to mission success.

SPECIAL FORCES IN POSTHOSTILITIES OPERATIONS

1-54. The goal of every military operation is victory. Whether the operation is delivering supplies to a unit or executing an elaborate campaign plan, mission success is the aim. Military victory does not, however, assure achievement of the desired political end state. Rapidly extracting forces, securing vital interests, or resolving the conflict may produce nothing except a vacuum and an ensuing anarchy. Mission planners must, therefore, consider consolidation and demobilization operations during posthostilities operations. Working together, CA, PSYOP, and SF soldiers can facilitate the early redeployment of conventional forces by helping stabilize friendly governments and by improving the capabilities of their armed forces to defend themselves.

1-55. In posthostilities operations, SF supports stability operations, assists in the restoration of the HN infrastructure, and assists in the reconstruction of national systems through civil-military operations (CMO). The conduct of FID and HA promotes these objectives. The involvement of SF is long-term and ongoing throughout the range of military operations until the military mission is complete. SF facilitates both nation assistance and conflict resolution as opposed to simple conflict termination by enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of the supported government.

OVERT, LOW-VISIBILITY, COVERT, AND CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

1-56. SF conducts its operations in either an overt, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine manner. These terms refer to the amount of secrecy or concealment warranted in the conduct of the operation. SF conduct of overt, low-visibility, covert, and clandestine operations depends on employing small units that conduct themselves in an unobtrusive manner, with minimal support requirements, and avoid obvious operational signatures.

1-57. Operations carried out in an overt manner are conducted openly and without concealment. SF conducts overt operations when the open fact of their presence ties in with national strategy.

1-58. Operations planned and conducted to avoid unnecessary public attention are categorized as low-visibility. Most SF activities are low-visibility operations. This reflects the low-profile, low-risk operations (relative to conventional forces) that characterize the bulk of SF activities. Security classifications, compartmentalization, and clandestine or covert techniques are not employed to achieve low visibility during operations. The presence of

SF units operating unilaterally or in conjunction with indigenous or coalition forces may or may not be clandestine or covert but may remain low-visibility.

1-59. Some SF operations may involve actions where the emphasis is on concealing only the identity of who conducted the operation rather than the action itself. These operations are covert operations, often involving special authorization and governed by carefully delineated operational and oversight procedures. An operation may be both clandestine and covert at the same time.

1-60. Certain aspects of UW and other SF missions require that operations take place without revealing that the activity is occurring or has occurred. Emphasis is placed on the concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. Operations conducted in this manner are referred to as clandestine operations. An operation may be both clandestine and covert at the same time. Covert or clandestine operations may also take place in conjunction with overt or low-visibility missions. For example, an SFODA may conduct a UW mission that is low visibility in nature, yet conduct operations within that UW mission carried out in a clandestine or covert manner.

SPECIAL FORCES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1-61. SF uses the principles of war and current joint and Army doctrine as the basis for collaborative mission planning and execution. No priority exists among the principles, and they should be viewed as a collective whole, not independently. Military power is not limited to acts of violence and overt hostilities to achieve strategic objectives. This perspective is especially true for SF. The principles of war apply to the full range of SF operations, specifically where the use of force is more selective and where restraint and nonlethal aspects of power are dominant.

1-62. Joint and Army doctrine articulates the manner in which the United States Armed Forces will conduct joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Doctrine does not address military strategy or provide strategic guidance. Current joint and Army doctrine focuses on coordinated, rapid, and decisive actions designed to defeat an enemy through strikes against critical centers of gravity. The traditional goal of military power in war has been to generate maximum combat power at the decisive time and place to defeat hostile military forces. The traditional dynamics of military power are often unsuitable in MOOTW, where nonmilitary aspects may dominate military operations or where no clearly defined enemy or battlefield exists. In such an operational environment, the focus of military operations is very different from the focus of conventional warfighting. SF supports both the traditional application of military power in war and the range of actions required in MOOTW.

1-63. SF adapts the principles of war to the mission differently than do conventional commanders as a critical component of the common operational picture. SF commanders must influence (rather than dominate) their operational environment. SF soldiers create favorable political and military conditions to promote U.S. goals. They must routinely apply military power indirectly through foreign military and paramilitary forces. Direct applications

involve the surgical use of organic combat power while applying the following principles of war in regard to SF: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.

OBJECTIVE

1-64. *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.* Objectives assigned to SF may often be as political, economic, or psychological as they are military. In war and protracted conflict, SF objectives usually focus on hostile military vulnerabilities. In other situations, assigned SF objectives can lead directly to accomplishing national or theater political, economic, or psychological objectives.

OFFENSIVE

1-65. *Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.* SF operations focus offensive capability at the operational level. Although hostile action may force SF soldiers to assume a tactical defensive posture, SF primarily conducts operations using offensive capabilities.

MASS

1-66. *Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place.* In contrast to conventional forces, SF cannot hope to bring overwhelming combat power against a target except at the lowest tactical level. SF soldiers normally do not seek dominance in the size of the force or in firepower. SFODAs must sometimes accept the higher risk associated with not massing in the conventional sense. They must compensate for their lack of combat power through the use of such combat multipliers as surprise, advanced training, and unconventional tactics. The use of indigenous or surrogate forces can magnify the effect of these multipliers. This use of combat multipliers may equate to relative superiority—a condition that exists when an attacking force gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy. The attacking force achieves relative superiority at a pivotal moment in an engagement. Once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained to guarantee victory. Relative superiority favors small forces. If lost, relative superiority is difficult to regain. SFODAs concentrate their combat power indirectly so the effects of their actions impact at decisive times and places. SFODAs must not be at the margin of their operational capabilities during mission execution. Care must be taken not to fragment the efforts of SFODAs by committing them against targets that are tactically attractive but operationally or strategically irrelevant.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

1-67. *Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.* Economy of force is the reciprocal of massed effects and ensures that no effort is wasted. It requires the acceptance of prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority and overwhelming effect. The employment of SF is often as a strategic economy-of-force measure to allow the concentration of other forces elsewhere. Specifically designed, SF can divert hostile forces into secondary theaters. This tactic prevents hostile concentration against the friendly main

effort. SF is particularly effective when employed in combination with indigenous or surrogate forces as a force multiplier.

MANEUVER

1-68. *Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.* SF soldiers do not maneuver against an enemy in the classic sense. Once committed, SFODAs often lack the tactical mobility and reinforcement capability of the opposing forces. With respect to SF, maneuver implies the ability to apply combat power in an unconventional manner. Maneuver often involves SF's ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas to gain a position advantage. When indigenous or surrogate forces participate in SF operations, this participation rapidly expands the flexibility and impact of those operations far beyond the numbers of SF involved. SFODAs can then attack hostile vulnerabilities, focusing combat power where the enemy least expects it and in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. They must anticipate hostile reactions and pre-position combat power to counter those reactions. This characteristic of SF dictates that SF commanders accept calculated high risks to achieve decisive results. Indecision and hesitation may result in a lost opportunity, mission failure, or needless loss of life. When conducting operations with non-SOF personnel, close coordination and cooperation must occur to ensure mission success and unity of effort.

UNITY OF COMMAND

1-69. *For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.* For a discussion of specific ARSOF coordination elements at corps level and below, see Appendixes A, B, and C. To achieve unity of effort, SF soldiers organize with clear, uncluttered chains of command. In this manner, a single commander has the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal. SF personnel, however, often conduct operations with multiple U.S. Government agencies. In such cases, the Department of Defense (DOD) plays a supporting role and requires cooperation rather than command of other agencies. As a result, coordination and cooperation replace unity of command. During combined operations with indigenous military forces, SF commanders must stress the requirement for cooperation between indigenous military and civilian organizations. SF soldiers also assist in synchronizing indigenous objectives with those of the United States.

SECURITY

1-70. *Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.* In SF, security often dominates rather than supports operations. Because of the nature of SO, a breach in security can affect mission success, as well as national credibility and legitimacy. SF must emphasize security throughout mission planning and execution and after the mission is completed. As a result, SF may require compartmentation and deception measures. Active and passive counterintelligence (CI) efforts must minimize the potential for hostile penetration or accidental disclosure of sensitive information.

SURPRISE

1-71. *Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.* SF achieves surprise by exploiting indirect approaches. SF operations often require bold, imaginative, and audacious action, especially when SF units are tasked to apply combat power directly and with surgical precision. In other SF operations, surprise may have a more subtle meaning. SF soldiers often conceal not only their capabilities and intentions but also their activities. Indirect SF operations exploit the enemy's misunderstanding of the operational environment. These operations can create unsettling conditions within a hostile power's environment without revealing the source. The effects of surprise are maximized when the hostile power cannot define the means of the disruption and, therefore, cannot implement effective countermeasures.

SIMPLICITY

1-72. *Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.* Although SF soldiers often use sophisticated and unorthodox methods and equipment, their plans and procedures must be simple and direct. A complex, inflexible plan that relies on precise timing is not likely to withstand changing situations and the stress and confusion that accompany its execution.

ARMY VALUES

1-73. The Army has made extensive efforts to lend focus to core values for all soldiers. These values (Figure 1-2) form the basis for standards of conduct for the whole force.

Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.

Duty: Fulfill your obligations.

Respect: Treat people as they should be treated.

Selfless Service: Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own.

Honor: Live up to all the Army values.

Integrity: Do what's right—legally and morally.

Personal Courage: Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

Figure 1-2. Army Values

SPECIAL FORCES CORE VALUES

1-74. SF also has its own set of values (Figure 1-3, page 1-19) that builds on the Army's values. SF core values focus on SF as warriors.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES TRUTHS

1-75. ARSOF truths (Figure 1-4, page 1-19) are timeless in nature. They address in some form each of the values prescribed by the Army.

Warrior Ethos. Special Forces is a fraternity of warriors, the ultimate professionals in conducting special operations when the cause of freedom is challenged. The SF warrior tradition originates from SF's early roles in unconventional warfare and is exemplified by the SF motto, "De Oppresso Liber."

Professionalism. SF soldiers provide the nation with a broad range of capabilities to address challenges to our national security and national interests. SF soldiers interface with high-level military commanders, country teams, ambassadors, and heads of state. Through their actions and their range of technical and tactical skills, SF soldiers serve worldwide as operational and strategic assets.

Innovation. SF soldiers are creative and inventive in accomplishing their missions through the judicious application of conventional and unconventional problem-solving. They solve problems imaginatively, developing the right solutions outside the constraint of institutional norms.

Versatility. SF soldiers adapt quickly to rapidly changing environments, consistently operating and easily transitioning across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peace to war. SF is truly a capability-based organization, providing the widest range of capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.

Cohesion. The cohesion within an SF detachment enables it to withstand the most violent shocks and stresses of combat and to perform its duties under demanding circumstances, without definitive guidance, while accomplishing the commander's intent.

Character. SF soldiers understand the operational environment. They can be trusted to do the right thing and never to quit. SF soldiers recognize the political implications inherent in their missions. Knowing the cost of failure, they succeed against all odds.

Cultural Awareness. SF soldiers use interpersonal skills to work with all foreign cultures, gaining the trust, confidence, and cooperation of the people by winning their hearts and minds. SF soldiers have a situational awareness that enables them to deploy worldwide and accomplish their missions in ambiguous and complex situations.

Figure 1-3. SF Core Values

Humans are more important than hardware. People—not equipment—make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment available. Yet, the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people.

Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people carefully selected, well-trained, and well-led are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be fully capable.

ARSOF cannot be mass-produced. It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized ARSOF missions. Integration of mature, competent individuals into fully capable units requires intense training in the ARSOF schools and the units. Hastening this process only degrades the ultimate capability.

Competent ARSOF cannot be created after emergencies arise. Creation of competent, fully mission-capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable ARSOF elements on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available ARSOF units in peacetime.

Figure 1-4. ARSOF Truths

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES

1-76. SO imperatives, discussed below, prescribe key operational requirements. SF soldiers incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution.

UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-77. SF soldiers do not dominate their environment. They must assess and understand all its aspects (political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military) before acting to influence it. The conditions of conflict can change based on a variety of military, friendly, and enemy factors. SF personnel must identify friendly and hostile decision makers, the objectives and strategies of those decision makers, and their means of interacting. They must influence friendly decision makers to make sure they understand the implications and consequences of SO mission requirements. SF commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing situations. They must anticipate changes in their environment to exploit fleeting opportunities.

RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

1-78. SF must not expect a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. The role of SF is frequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive military and nonmilitary activities to occur. SF must consider the political effects of its military activities.

FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES

1-79. SF soldiers often participate in interagency activities. SF commanders must strive for unity of effort (synchronization), yet recognize the difficulty of achieving such unity. They must expect ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity of command. When unity of command is lacking, SF commanders must promote unity of effort by requesting clear mission statements and intent. SF must actively and continually coordinate its activities with all relevant parties.

ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY

1-80. SFODAs are a limited resource and are not easily replaced. Their missions often have multiple operational implications; therefore, mission planners and taskers must carefully select *when, where, and how* employment occurs.

CONSIDER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

1-81. SFODAs must look at each problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context. They must then develop a long-term approach to solving the problem. They must accept legal and political constraints, such as restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. Commanders must not jeopardize the success of national and theater long-term objectives by their desire for immediate or short-term effects. SO policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with the national and theater priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency

can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national and international levels.

ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1-82. Significant legal and policy considerations exist with SO, particularly in peacetime operations. In modern conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining domestic and international support. Without this support, the United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict international legal definition. It also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. The people of the nation and the international community determine credibility. Credibility is based on the collective perception of the reliability of the cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the support of indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community. SFODAs must make sure their legal advisors review all aspects of their mission. SF soldiers must understand the laws of armed conflict and the ROE as they apply to their mission. They must be alert to human rights violations possibly committed by their foreign counterparts. SF soldiers must know what procedures to follow should such violations occur. Finally, they must understand that their behavior, both on duty and off, may have profound effects on their mission accomplishment.

ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

1-83. All SO have significant psychological effects, regardless of the overall objective. In some SO missions, however, the specific objective itself is to produce a desired psychological effect. To control psychological effects, SF soldiers must blend PSYOP TTP into their activities.

APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY

1-84. When participating in combined operations, the primary role of SF is to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported indigenous forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. SF must avoid taking charge when supporting a foreign government or group. The foreign government or group must assume authority and responsibility for the success or failure of the combined effort. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the supported government.

DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS

1-85. SF must maintain its operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. It must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.

ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT

1-86. SF soldiers conduct peacetime operations around the world and must prepare to continue this effort in the future. The U.S. response to conflict varies from case to case. SF leaders must recognize the need for persistence,

patience, and continuity of effort. They should not begin programs that are beyond the economic or technological capacity of the HN to maintain without U.S. assistance. U.S.-funded programs can be counterproductive if the population becomes dependent upon them. SO policy, strategy, and programs must, therefore, be durable, consistent, and sustainable.

PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE

1-87. SFODs normally cannot infiltrate denied territory and develop an ambiguous situation. They do not have the combat power or the reinforcement and support capabilities to deal with unanticipated hostile reactions. The success of SO missions often depends on detailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligence products. SF priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IRs) impose great demands on supporting intelligence capabilities. SFODs must identify their IRs in priority and distinguish mission-essential requirements from nonessential requirements. Without realistic priorities, the intelligence community can quickly become overly committed in attempting to satisfy SF PIR and IRs.

BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION

1-88. Security concerns often dominate SO. Too much compartmentalizing, however, can exclude key personnel from participating in the planning cycle. SF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security may compromise a mission. Excessive security, however, can cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION CRITERIA

1-89. SO mission criteria were developed during Operation DESERT STORM to make sure SOF assets were committed only to the missions that supported the theater campaign, were appropriate and feasible, and had an expected outcome that justified the risk. SF commanders still apply the following criteria to assess proposed SF missions:

- *Is the mission appropriate for SOF?* The best use of ARSOF is against key strategic or operational targets that require ARSOF-unique skills and capabilities. If the targets are tactical, the use of ARSOF is not appropriate. Commanders should not assign ARSOF if the targets are not of strategic or operational importance. Commanders should not use ARSOF as a substitute for other forces.
- *Does the mission support the theater geographic combatant commander's campaign plan?* If the mission does not support the JFC's campaign plan, more appropriate missions are probably available for ARSOF.
- *Is the mission operationally feasible?* During course of action (COA) analysis, the ARSOF commander must realistically evaluate his force. Planners must understand that ARSOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. They should not assign missions that are beyond SOF capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

- *Are the required resources available to conduct the mission?* Some ARSOF missions may require support from other SOF or conventional forces. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed ARSOF. Support may include tactical mobility, intelligence, communications, and logistics. Although a target may be vulnerable to ARSOF, lack of support may affect the chance for success or may invalidate the use of ARSOF.
- *Does the expected outcome justify the risk?* Some operations that ARSOF can execute make only a marginal contribution to the JFC's campaign plan and present great risk to personnel and materiel. Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of ARSOF. They must make sure the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent with the mission. Risk assessment considers not only the potential loss of ARSOF units and equipment but also the risk of adverse effects on U.S. diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

Chapter 2

Special Forces Missions

The U.S. Army organizes, trains, and equips SF to perform its principal missions of UW, FID, DA, SR, CBT, CP, and IO. Through the conduct of these seven principal missions and related collateral activities, Army SF operations support the accomplishment of United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM's) specified joint SOF core missions of UW, FID, DA, SR, CBT, CP, IO, CA, and PSYOP. SF missions are dynamic and constantly evolving in response to political-military considerations, technology, and other considerations. A change in national security policy, national military strategy, global or regional social structure, or technology may radically alter the manner in which SF conducts its principal missions and collateral activities.

This chapter provides an overview of current doctrine for each SF mission. Although discussed separately, the missions are all interrelated and reflect the inherent modifications and additions to training, organization, and equipment needed to meet the operational requirements of the geographic CINCs fully. While addressed only within the UW section of this chapter, evasion and recovery (E&R) is an implied task and an integral part of the planning that goes into every SF mission.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

2-1. UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR). When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. UW includes the military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or an occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. SF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and, when required, accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however, the political and psychological implications remain.

2-2. SF's broad range of activities generates a set of core competencies that must be applied in innovative ways to meet changing operational requirements. Operational and strategic planners and commanders, as well as SF personnel, must guard against limiting UW to a specific set of circumstances or activities defined by their personal experience or professional reading. The most prevalent example is the common, but mistaken, belief that UW equals guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW encompasses both insurgency and guerrilla warfare, but it is not synonymous with or limited to those activities.

2-3. Current and future relevance of UW is highlighted by concerns over adversarial use of asymmetric threat capabilities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the absence of a symmetric conventional threat, much more attention has been devoted to the asymmetric, or unconventional, capabilities of potential adversaries. Combined with advances in technology, changing world demographics (to include increased urbanization), and increased political resistance to conventional military enterprise, unconventional capabilities have become increasingly viable, effective, and politically acceptable. Just as the UW forces of potential adversaries have gained in relevance and importance, so has Army SF—the UW force of the United States. SF provides an effective capability to counter the emerging unconventional threat, as well as an increasingly viable and effective offensive asymmetric option for employing U.S. military power.

PHASES OF EXECUTION

2-4. UW, like all of the SF principal missions and collateral activities, is normally planned and executed in five phases. The phases are predeployment, deployment, employment, redeployment, and postdeployment. These phases have long been the standard within the SO community and are self-explanatory. In UW, these phases are continuous in nature and can overlap. SF may conduct activities associated with any or all of these phases simultaneously. When conducting UW, the following phases take on unique aspects:

- **Predeployment.** The preparation and development of the joint special operations area (JSOA) occur during the UW predeployment phase. Preparing and developing the JSOA occur as a continuous process, conducted throughout full-spectrum operations. The process is integrated into day-to-day SF activities. During predeployment for UW, SF units conduct area assessment to focus regional orientation. SF units develop supporting plans to CINC theater engagement plans, concept plans (CONPLANS), and operation plans (OPLANS) and may develop required contacts and infrastructure within the JSOA. Due to the sensitivity of some of the UW predeployment activities, the plans must be fully coordinated with, and authorized by, the appropriate authorities, most commonly other government agencies (OGAs). Many UW predeployment activities may be conducted by OGAs, or in conjunction with them, in response to SF-identified requirements. In some instances, OGAs may lack the resources to meet identified requirements. SF may then be tasked to conduct the activity in close coordination with the OGAs. Many UW predeployment activities

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conducted by SF are incidental to other principal missions (such as FID) and collateral activities (such as HA and coalition support), or they are in combined training exercises supporting the CINC's theater engagement plan. Unless specifically authorized, however, these UW predeployment activities do not involve SF varying from the mission taskings of the CINC's theater engagement plan. The UW aspects of these activities represent the SF mind-set. Preparation for UW includes designating JSOAs within a CINC's geographic AOR. Designating JSOAs may also take place outside predeployment activities. These JSOAs are based on CINC guidance, an initial assessment of CINC requirements, and a variety of geographic, demographic, and political-military considerations. SFODs are assigned to JSOAs to develop the level of area orientation required to perform UW effectively. SF commanders and planners determine the resource requirements allocated to a specific JSOA on the initial assessment and CINC priorities. Continual area assessment refines the initial assessment. JSOAs and SF allocations are adjusted periodically to accommodate changing CINC priorities, the refined assessments, and changing conditions.

- **Employment.** During the employment phase of UW, SF continues with the development of the JSOA and performs operational UW mission taskings. These taskings may include any of the activities mentioned in the UW definition and discussed later in this section. They may also include unforeseen operational mission taskings that fully exploit the UW-related capabilities of SF and the unique force-positioning and activities arising from or required by the conduct of UW, such as sabotage, subversion, and UAR. The nature of UW is such that—depending upon the duration of the employment phase, resources available, and nature of the conflict—SF may conduct multiple UW activities simultaneously or sequentially. As a final aspect of employment, SF performs UW activities to facilitate transition to a stable and politically acceptable set of conditions. Examples of specific actions include demobilizing or reorienting indigenous and surrogate forces, providing foreign HA, or evaluating newly established security forces.
- **Postdeployment.** Postdeployment activities overlap the preparation and development of the JSOA and seamlessly transition back to the process. SF updates all records and imagery contained in area studies and assessments to reflect the data and information collected during employment within the JSOA.

2-5. SF may perform UW in support of, and in synchronization with, conventional operations, or may conduct UW independently. UW may be conducted in any environment and at any point throughout the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, SF performing UW provides a unique and versatile capability for the Army's efforts to achieve dominance in full-spectrum operations.

2-6. A CINC, in conjunction with policy makers, may exercise the option to achieve specific objectives through UW without conventional forces. This option can be executed due to resource, political, or other considerations. SF

operations in El Salvador during the 1980s are an example of this scenario. In this instance, UW operations are conducted during what would appear to all but the UW participants to be operations to promote peace, never progressing through operations to deter aggression and resolve conflict or actual combat. SF participation in such independent UW operations is often in support of an OGA and within very specific constraints.

2-7. UW may be conducted in support of conventional operations. Synchronizing UW with future conventional operations requires that conventional unit commanders and JTF planners fully understand—

- The relationship of UW to the spectrum of conflict.
- The Army's goal of dominance throughout full-spectrum operations.
- The continuous activities associated with interagency operations to promote peace.

2-8. While operations carried out to promote peace, deter aggression, and resolve conflict are ideally suited to the protracted, long-duration nature of UW, the lethality of modern conventional forces, among other factors, has generally decreased the duration of conventional operations. This shortened duration of conventional employment has led many conventional planners to dismiss UW in support of conventional operations as infeasible. This mistaken dismissal of UW stems from a failure to recognize and leverage the opportunities SF offers under these conditions. By properly executing SF capabilities before large-scale involvement of conventional forces during operations to promote peace, deter aggression, and resolve conflict, SF can support and facilitate subsequent conventional operations.

2-9. Recent operational experience has provided lessons indicating the value of UW as an added dimension to conventional force operations. These lessons come from positive experience where the use of UW was feasible and provided a significant benefit to conventional operations and from negative experience where inadequate UW preparation and resources existed to exploit UW opportunities.

2-10. SF UW operations can enhance the efficiency of conventional operations. SF has enabled the United States to involve indigenous forces and governments in coalition operations. These operations have been executed to recover downed aircrews, enhance situational awareness, provide conventional commanders and policy makers with ground truth, and enable SF to act as force multipliers in a variety of ways. SF contributions to these operations have outweighed the investment of resources.

2-11. Effective and timely application of UW can dramatically enhance future conventional operations. As the number and geographical dispersion of potential asymmetric adversaries increase, the difficulties inherent in rapidly responding to crises with conventional forces increase as well. Both recent operational experience (for example, Kosovo or Kuwait) and future war-gaming results indicate that adversaries are likely to conduct offensive operations into contiguous territory. The adversaries will also likely attempt to consolidate gains rapidly and present the United States and its allies with few options for response. These types of offensive actions give the United States and its allies the option of abiding with the adversary's action or

mounting a significant and resource-intensive operation against an entrenched enemy.

2-12. While the Army's organizational and operational plans for the future reduce strategic deployment timelines, the burdens of time and distance cannot be totally negated. Even air component operations started in advance of deploying ground and sea forces require, or are enhanced by, pre-positioned personnel recovery, force protection (FP), target acquisition, battle damage assessment (BDA), and air defense suppression capabilities. The time between an adversary's initial offensive actions and the point at which an overwhelming conventional response can be mounted is a critical period. During this period, the only available U.S. capability to preclude enemy consolidation is SF performing UW, either unilaterally or with indigenous resistance forces.

INDIGENOUS AND SURROGATE FORCES

2-13. The term indigenous means *native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region*. The term surrogate refers to *someone who takes the place of or acts for another*. A surrogate also simply means *a substitute*.

2-14. U.S. military thought and doctrine with respect to indigenous or surrogate forces employed in UW have evolved significantly since WW II. During and immediately following the Korean war, the focus was on resistance forces. Doctrinal change was required to respond to the changing world situation and to the operational application of UW capabilities in the intervening years since the Korean war. The 1990 version of FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces*, addressed insurgent groups as indigenous or surrogate forces for UW. The FM also formally introduced the concept of UW conducted independently of conventional operations.

2-15. Joint doctrine states that resistance movements are oriented at disrupting the civil order and stability of either a legally established government or an occupying power and that an insurgency is dedicated solely against a constituted government. For clarity in referring to SF UW operations, resistance movements generally fall into one of two categories, insurgent or partisan. While the insurgent is dedicated solely against a constituted government, the partisan is dedicated solely against an occupying power. In SF terms, the essential difference between insurgent and partisan groups is, therefore, the orientation of their aggression. The partisan is organized against an occupying power (like the French Resistance of WW II organized against Nazi occupation). The insurgent is oriented against an existing government (like the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces [FARC] against the Colombian Government). Although both forms of resistance may operate independently of external support and sponsorship, partisan groups normally rely heavily upon such support and readily accept direction from the external sponsor's conventional command structure. As a rule, insurgent groups are more independent and difficult to control; however, they present the option of offensively employing UW capabilities in the absence of conventional conflict. The Communist-inspired wars of national liberation, prevalent in the 1960s and the 1970s, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) are examples of

insurgent groups sponsored and supported externally, even though the conflict itself was initiated internally.

2-16. The United States often chooses to respond militarily to crises within the framework of a coalition rather than to respond unilaterally. These coalitions consist of standing or rapidly formed conventional forces that operate in the context of an alliance formed to achieve a specific common purpose. The choice to act as part of a coalition rather than unilaterally reflects certain political and operational realities. A coalition can politically enhance the legitimacy of U.S. military operations and secure international support. Tangible evidence that other affected nations are willing to commit their forces and to reduce the U.S. share of operational costs strengthens domestic support. Like resistance forces described previously, these coalition forces have their own interests, goals, and objectives but are united with the United States to achieve a specific purpose. From a U.S. point of view, these coalition forces and resources are surrogates and act as substitutes for U.S. troops and resources, reducing U.S. commitment. This force-multiplier effect is similar to that achieved by U.S. support to resistance groups. Coalitions can then either replace or augment standing international forces.

2-17. Coalition support activities require the United States to assess, integrate, support, direct, and employ these forces rapidly. Without the benefit of formal treaty arrangements and the interoperability derived from agreements and combined training, working relationships must be established with these coalition forces to assess and integrate them into multinational operations. Because SF personnel are trained to work with surrogates and are oriented to work with forces indigenous to a variety of regions around the globe, the Army has turned to SF to perform this function. The UW skills and core competencies that permitted SF to integrate and influence the activities of resistance groups successfully have proved readily adaptable to such coalition forces. Those skills exercised by SF working with coalition forces also reinforce SF UW skills. Accustomed to operating with forces possessing distinct capabilities, unique mixes of equipment, specific cultures and military doctrines, and their own agenda, SF has achieved success in this new application of UW. The conventional coalition forces trained, organized, equipped, advised, and led in varying degrees by SF and U.S. allies represent the newest evolution in UW-related surrogate forces.

2-18. SF units conducting UW as part of coalition support operations are task-organized as Special Forces liaison elements (SFLEs). These elements collocate with military forces of coalition partners and provide essential U.S. command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) links to the coalition partners. They can assess, train, organize, equip, advise, and lead coalition forces according to the terms of the specific coalition and the operational situation. SFLEs advise their foreign counterparts on U.S. military intentions and capabilities. They can also provide training, secure communications among the force, and downlinks to global positioning systems. The SFLEs also confirm the situation on the ground, assist in fire support planning, and enable overall coordination between U.S. forces and their coalition partners. They facilitate multinational operations by military units not trained for interoperability with U.S. forces.

2-19. In addition to the three broad categories of insurgents, partisans, and coalition forces, SF performing UW must work with and through independently operating insurgents and clandestine organizations. These organizations offer force-multiplying capabilities, particularly in support of specific UW activities, such as UAR. Personal reward or gain can motivate these groups to cooperate with U.S. and coalition operations. Insurgents and clandestine organizations can also view U.S. and coalition operations as supporting their current organizational goals, or they can be genuinely sympathetic toward the aims of the coalition.

2-20. UW can be characterized as support to the military and paramilitary aspects of a resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. SF units do not create resistance movements or coalitions. They provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance movements and international coalitions. When conducted with conventional operations, the intent of UW from the U.S. military perspective is to augment committed U.S. forces or to reduce the level of U.S. forces required in achieving operational and strategic objectives. UW accomplishes this goal by developing and sustaining surrogate forces and synchronizing their activities with those of the United States and its allies. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus is primarily on military objectives. When conducted independently, the ultimate objective of UW is political change. Military activity increases with the success of efforts to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or an occupying power. These military activities are a tool to eliminate an occupying force or to replace an existing government.

2-21. Partisan and insurgent resistance organizations consist of four elements: area command, guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground. The area command is the organizational structure established within the JSOA to command and control resistance forces. The guerrilla force is the overt military or paramilitary arm. The auxiliary is the clandestine support element of the guerrilla force. The underground is a cellular organization that conducts clandestine subversion, sabotage, and intelligence-collection activities in areas denied to or unsuitable for the guerrilla force. The organization of coalition forces is generally similar to conventional models, although each region or country presents unique challenges, effectively managed only through the regional orientation of dedicated SF UW forces. The nature of indigenous insurgent, partisan, or coalition forces and the operational environment determine UW TTP.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

2-22. Guerrilla warfare refers to those military and paramilitary operations most often employed by small indigenous and often irregular units operating against superior forces in hostile territory. Guerrilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power. They may also destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities. Indigenous insurgent and partisan forces trained, organized, equipped, advised, and led by SF are the element of choice to execute tactical guerrilla operations. When required by political, security, or military considerations, SF elements conducting UW can unilaterally employ such tactics against specific targets. Employing SF in this manner may involve risks to the overall UW mission

but may reduce or eliminate the risks of infiltration and exfiltration by SF conducting DA.

EVASION AND RECOVERY

2-23. SF plans and conducts the full spectrum of coordinated actions involving E&R. SF soldiers prepare for E&R in support of their own forces, as they can become evaders while conducting UW missions, other SF principal missions, or collateral activities. SF conducts E&R operations through self-recovery or interaction with recovery forces and operational recovery planners. E&R is conducted to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. All aspects of E&R are a part of the broader category of personnel recovery (PR).

UNCONVENTIONAL ASSISTED RECOVERY

2-24. UAR is a subset of nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) conducted by SOF. UW forces conduct UAR operations to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control. UAR includes establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms (UARMs) and unconventional assisted recovery teams (UARTs). The term UARM refers to an entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held territory that operate in a clandestine or covert manner to return designated personnel to friendly control and most often consists of established indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. UARTs consist primarily of SOF personnel directed to service existing designated areas of recovery (DARs) or selected areas for evasion (SAFEs) to recover evaders.

2-25. UARTs can operate for an extended time in denied or sensitive areas and may operate unilaterally or in conjunction with a UARM. SF conducting UAR missions may act as a UARM, a UART acting unilaterally, or a UART receiving personnel from an existing UARM, or a UART assisting in moving personnel into a UARM.

2-26. Establishing UARMs is a sensitive and time-consuming process. Recent operational experience in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans has refocused attention on this critical aspect of the UW mission. Responding to a crisis with air power before or independently of ground operations has highlighted the requirement to conduct UW operations before and during engagement to ensure that effective mechanisms to recover downed aircrews are in place. Operations must be thoroughly coordinated with OGAs. These activities require proper authorization and strict adherence to very specific procedures followed under appropriate oversight. The theater special operations command (SOC) is normally the theater executive agent for UAR and as such plans, coordinates, and directs all UAR activities in the theater through the unconventional assisted recovery coordination center (UARCC). The theater SOC may task the SF group to conduct and support these compartmented and sensitive SO activities.

SUBVERSION

2-27. Subversion undermines the political, military, economic, or psychological strength of a nation or occupying power. Subversion attacks the

internal or international legitimacy of targeted governments or powers and their actions. The true objective of military and paramilitary operations employing guerrilla techniques is often subversion rather than defeat of an adversary's military forces. All elements of the resistance organization can contribute to the subversion effort. The clandestine nature of subversion often dictates that the underground perform the bulk of subversive activity. SF conducts subversion through surrogates or unilaterally. Subversion is a form of effects-based targeting on human terrain.

SABOTAGE

2-28. Sabotage injures or obstructs the national defense of a nation by willfully damaging or destroying any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, including human and natural resources. It may also refer to actions taken to injure or obstruct the military capability of an occupying power. Sabotage may be the most effective or the only means of attacking specific targets beyond the capabilities of conventional weapons systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum of manpower and material resources. SF conducts sabotage through surrogates and unilaterally. Sabotage is also a form of effects-based targeting performed by SF.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

2-29. Intelligence activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and enemy forces. SF must perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations or sustaining and protecting themselves and the UW force, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces. These activities may be unilateral or conducted through surrogates. Collection is by technical and nontechnical methods. Nontechnical methods are often more effective because of the uncertain nature of the UW environment. The use of nontechnical collection methods by the SF is especially effective because of the SF's links to indigenous insurgent or partisan organizations. SF intelligence activities may require coordination with OGAs and with national-level oversight.

OTHER DIRECT OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

2-30. UW forces are well suited to conduct or support offensive IO. Acting either unilaterally or through surrogates, SF and surrogate forces often have access to critical information facilities or nodes not vulnerable to penetration by other means. This access provides SF with the capability to do the following:

- Conduct targeted physical destruction operations against critical adversary information nodes.
- Allow placement and remote activation of expendable directional jammers.
- Permit use of specialized technologies to disable or destroy key information nodes or links.

2-31. SF and its surrogates can also accomplish the following:

- Conduct attacks against critical infrastructure systems supporting adversary C4I systems.
- Gather intelligence on adversary C4I systems.
- Employ designators or tags to guide air-launched munitions to key targets.

2-32. UW forces are uniquely positioned to gauge and report IO effects in denied territory. They can provide essential information and assessments pertaining to the effects of IO attacks on facilities as well as the physical and psychological impact of these attacks on the populace and the adversary's government and military forces.

2-33. The ability of UW forces to operate in hostile environments provides a unique capability for use in CP. The potential for indigenous and surrogate forces to operate with relative freedom and access to otherwise-denied facilities and areas can create the conditions necessary for successful CP operations.

THE CONTEMPORARY UW ENVIRONMENT

2-34. The contemporary global environment affects all aspects of UW operations. The U.S. role in global affairs involves the employment of U.S. forces in military operations on a day-to-day basis. The need to have UW mechanisms (such as UARMs) in place when warfighting begins and the protracted nature of UW requires that UW is viewed as a continuous activity.

2-35. Global urbanization is another environmental factor impacting UW operations. Urbanization dictates a shift in SF emphasis from rural UW to all aspects of overt, low-visibility, covert, and clandestine UW operations. The urbanized strategic environment provides a fertile environment for UW. The battleground where UW will be conducted is no longer just the inaccessible terrain of rural areas. It is also located within the increasing urban sprawl occurring worldwide. Urbanization may require the development of new skills and core competencies.

2-36. In addition to global urbanization, other trends emphasize the continued viability of UW. Universal access to information technology, the increased availability of high-technology weaponry, the breakup of Cold War-era alliances and security structures, and the resurgent nationalism of formerly repressed cultures and peoples all provide fertile ground for UW.

2-37. SF can conduct UW in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. One means of controlling the environment is to select the location and nature of operations. SF can be inserted into denied territory or conduct stay-behind operations during an occupation to support and synchronize resistance activities. As an alternative, cadre from resistance forces may be exfiltrated from a denied area (or formed from elements existing outside the denied area) and prepared by SF in a more permissive setting. This cadre is then reinserted into the operational area, with or without supporting SF, to prepare the remaining forces and conduct operations. In some instances, cultural and political factors may make direct contact between U.S. SF and resistance forces impractical. U.S. SF may

conduct UW functions through a third party who provides direct support (DS) to the UW force. Each of the three methods described present policy makers with unique options.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-38. The SF FID mission evolved naturally from UW. Joint and Army doctrine defines FID as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions or programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. To SF however, FID has a broader meaning that encompasses a myriad of internal, external, and transnational threats. SF, as the Army's asymmetric or unconventional capability designed to instigate, support, and synchronize indigenous forces, is the natural choice to assist U.S. allies in confronting such threats.

2-39. SF normally conducts FID as part of a joint, combined, and interagency effort. SF's principal function in FID is to organize, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces to combat the threat. The intent is to improve the tactical and technical proficiency and professionalism of these forces to enable them to defeat the threat without direct U.S. involvement. The capabilities SF employs to perform its FID mission are those inherent to its UW mission. Only the perspective changes—from that of a resistance fighter to that of an existing government struggling to defeat an internal threat.

2-40. The expanded societal role of many HN militaries supported by SF FID efforts uniquely positions SF to act as a catalyst and to facilitate interagency FID efforts. The pervasive presence of the military in many developing countries can frustrate the FID efforts of other U.S. Government agencies not accustomed to coordinating their activities with or even through a military counterpart. SF provides a focal point for such coordination and can be instrumental to the success of the interagency effort.

2-41. Another role of SF in FID is to synchronize U.S. assistance with HN military efforts and ensure that HN military policies, goals, and actions are compatible with and mutually support U.S. national interests. SF personnel supporting U.S. Government FID activities use their cross-cultural communications skills and regional expertise to articulate U.S. policy and positions effectively in a manner that is most likely to gain HN support for U.S. national goals and objectives.

2-42. FID operations are commonly executed as part of the U.S. military's activities carried out in support of a CINC's theater engagement plan. FID operations include participation in an HN's counterinsurgency programs; efforts to curb lawlessness, such as drug or illegal arms trafficking; or actions to counter various forms of subversion, such as terrorism. Inherent in a FID campaign is the accompanying IO campaign to support the FID strategy, bolster and support the legitimate government, fortify opposition against the insurgents, and support the theater commander's strategy.

2-43. In MOOTW, SF FID operations are multifaceted and can encompass a combination of missions. Internal defense and development (IDAD) are all

measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID operations may also encompass counterinsurgency (COIN)—those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. The U.S. FID strategy assumes that the HN government is responsible for defeating any threat to its own control and legitimacy. The primary U.S. objective is to support a level of HN internal security that permits economic, political, and social growth through balanced development programs. For a detailed discussion of U.S. support to COIN, see JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, and FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*.

2-44. In a major theater war, SF may conduct FID missions to counter insurgents or armed resistance organizations opposing friendly military forces in the strategic rear of the theater. (For a detailed discussion of FID operations, see FM 3-05.202 [currently FM 31-20-3].)

2-45. An SF FID mission may require assets ranging from a single SFODA to a reinforced SF group. Depending on the political and military situation and the supported CINC's priorities, SF participation in a FID mission may be as small as one SFODA under the tactical control (TACON) of the U.S. security assistance organization (SAO) in the HN. In a higher priority situation with a more advanced threat, an SF company or battalion may establish an operational base (in or out of country) and exercise TACON of SFODAs for the SAO. If an entire SF group deploys, the Special Forces operational base (SFOB) commander and staff primarily focus on synchronizing SF activities with the activities of the HN and other U.S. agencies. The forward operational base (FOB) elements prepare, deploy, control, and support security assistance force (SAF) operational units. The overall operational commander (if not the SF commander) may assign missions to FOBs on either a functional or a regional basis. In addition to supporting SF tactical military operations, the overall operational commander must be able to support intelligence, PSYOP, CA, populace and resources control (PRC), and other operations.

DIRECT ACTION

2-46. SF DA operations are normally short-duration operations with a limited scope requiring an SFODA to infiltrate a denied area, attack a target, and conduct a preplanned exfiltration. They may include long-term, stay-behind operations. DA operations achieve specific, well-defined, time-sensitive results of strategic or operational significance. They normally occur beyond the range (or other operational capabilities) of tactical weapons systems and conventional maneuver forces. They may require the area-specific knowledge of regionally oriented SF or other SF-unique skill sets developed in support of UW. SF DA operations may be unilateral or multinational, but they always occur under a U.S. chain of command. SF DA operations typically involve the—

- Attack of critical target nodes.
- Interdiction of critical LOCs or other target systems.

- Capture, rescue, or recovery of designated personnel or materiel (to include support to CP).
- Emplacement of devices in support of IO.

2-47. The SF DA mission evolved from SF's capability to perform unilateral subversion and sabotage as part of the UW mission. Commanders at the operational and strategic levels may task SF to perform DA missions when engagement by conventional forces is not feasible. When a DA mission tasking is appropriate for SF, and SF forces conducting UW are unable to employ surrogate forces or to conduct unilateral sabotage or subversion against a target, an SF DA mission will be initiated. DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted by SF to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target, or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or materiel. DA missions are inherently risky, require time to adequately plan and prepare, and are resource intensive. The requirement to infiltrate into and exfiltrate from denied territory accounts for much of the risk and resource expenditure.

2-48. SF can conduct DA operations across the full spectrum of conflict at the operational or strategic level in support of the JFC and component commanders. In DA operations, SF can—

- Employ sniper, direct assault, raid, or ambush tactics.
- Emplace mines and other munitions.
- Conduct terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions or other standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms.
- Conduct sabotage.
- Conduct PR operations.

2-49. SF DA operations are characterized by surgical precision. SF DA operations typically leave a smaller signature than conventional operations and can create effects disproportionate to the size of the committed force. A need for precision, combined with requirements for other SF-unique capabilities, may make SF the force of choice for a myriad of DA tasks, including support to IO and CP missions. Due to the small size and limited firepower of SFODs, DA mission success depends on the synergistic effect of speed, stealth, surprise, violence of action, and oftentimes the cover of darkness.

2-50. Operational differences exist between SF and Rangers in DA operations. SF DA operations typically are carried out in company or lesser strength, require unconventional tactics and techniques, area orientation, and language qualification. Ranger DA operations typically require conventional tactics and specialized Ranger techniques in platoon or greater strength. Occasionally, a DA operation may require a mix of SF and Rangers. SF may serve as an advance party for an operation requiring Ranger combat power, or a Ranger force may provide security for an SF DA operation.

DIRECT ACTION IN URBAN TERRAIN

2-51. Increased global urbanization increases the probability that SF will conduct a significant portion of its DA missions in urban terrain. All SF have

inherent capabilities to conduct DA as an integral part of military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT)—the most basic form of operation conducted in urbanized terrain. MOUT is primarily characterized by the fact that conventional forces customarily perform MOUT. Within MOUT, the mission, conditions, and ROE determine the types of forces used (whether conventional or SOF) and the actions on the objective. SF can be tasked to perform any of its principal missions or collateral activities in urban terrain throughout the operational continuum—from counterterrorism (CT) operations during peacetime to high intensity operations in wartime. Specific SOF units have clearly defined METLs that mandate specialized capabilities, equipment, and munitions to accomplish SOF missions.

2-52. Special Forces advanced urban combat (SFAUC) represents a higher level of MOUT in TTP requirements. SFAUC encompasses precision combative techniques used on urban or complex terrain. SFAUC techniques include SOF-unique explosive breaching; advanced marksmanship, including selective and discriminatory target engagement; unarmed (hand-to-hand) combat; special tactics; and preplanned or emergency assault methods using special, nonstandard equipment and SF-unique TTP. SFAUC is characterized by offensive operations where clearing built-up areas is necessary, but minimal collateral damage is a primary consideration and noncombatants may be present. Highly advanced detailed planning, synchronization, integrated assault skills, special-purpose weapons and equipment, and advanced marksmanship are additional key characteristics of SFAUC operations.

2-53. Close quarters battle (CQB) is a level of capability beyond SFAUC. CQB involves sustained combative TTP employed by SF and special mission units (SMUs) using special-purpose weapons, munitions, and explosives to recover specified personnel, equipment, or material. Characteristics of CQB include surprise, speed, violence of action, and the application of precise discriminatory engagement of targets to gain specific, short-term objectives. CQB requires a personnel selection process, highly advanced detailed planning, synchronization, and integrated assault skills. These skills include advanced marksmanship, explosive entry techniques, and special TTP to gain surprise. CQB may be conducted in peacetime operations in highly sensitive environments. Prevention of collateral damage is a critical consideration.

DIRECT ACTION AND PERSONNEL RECOVERY

2-54. PR is an umbrella term that encompasses all activities to locate, identify, recover, restore to friendly control, and repatriate selected personnel isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. SF performs specific functions as part of their principal missions of UW and DA that contribute to the overall theater PR effort. SF conducts UAR under the UW mission area and recovery operations under DA. Recovery operations are operations to locate, recover, and return personnel or material held captive, isolated, or threatened in areas sensitive, denied, or contested to friendly control. SF recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning,

rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. SF can be tasked to plan and conduct the following DA missions in support of PR to—

- Rescue allied prisoners of war (PWs) and U.S. or other selected personnel detained by a hostile power or terrorist group.
- Conduct combat search and rescue (CSAR) to locate, identify, and recover downed aircrews.
- Recover vital military, intelligence, scientific, or other equipment captured by a hostile power or terrorist group.

2-55. SF may be tasked to conduct CSAR missions. CSAR is a collateral activity for SF. SF has an inherent ability to conduct CSAR based on capabilities resident in its primary missions. SF may conduct CSAR missions unilaterally or as part of a joint force. This type of tasking often originates with the JFC and is routed through the joint search and rescue center (JSRC) to the SOC component commander.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

2-56. SR operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SF, unilaterally or through surrogate or indigenous forces. The objective of SR operations is to confirm, refute, or obtain—by visual observation or other collection methods—information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. SR operations may also occur to satisfy nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance requirements or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an area.

2-57. Like DA, the SF SR mission evolved from the UW mission. SR is an extension of the unilateral or surrogate intelligence activities encompassed by UW. Reconnaissance is an integral component of any SF mission. It exposes SFODs to information of tactical, operational, strategic, and political policy-making significance. SF performing UW normally represents a lower risk and less resource-intensive capability for gathering and reporting required information than may be associated with mounting a separate SR mission. When UW assets cannot feasibly gather and report required information, operational- and strategic-level commanders may task SF to infiltrate an operational area, conduct SR, and exfiltrate upon mission completion.

2-58. SF conducts SR unilaterally, in joint operations or in combined operations with foreign personnel. Technical specialists, such as special operations teams A (SOT-As) or NBC personnel, may be attached to enhance the SFOD's capabilities for a particular mission. SR complements other national and theater collection systems—such as high-altitude imagery or signals intelligence (SIGINT)—that are more vulnerable to weather, terrain masking, and hostile countermeasures.

2-59. SF conducts SR by employing battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance involve the use of standard long-range patrolling tactics and techniques outside the main battle area or areas in nonlinear, noncontiguous operations.

2-60. SF conducts SR to provide commanders and policy makers with near-real-time information of strategic or operational significance from a specified operational area. The presence of SF at the point of collection provides a unique military perspective of the ground situation, with human judgment to

provide context to the information as reported. This support can be particularly important in assessing capabilities and intentions, as well as in countering deception.

2-61. SF normally conducts SR missions beyond the sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems to collect and report information of strategic or operational significance. During the critical transition from peace to war, the NCA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and theater CINCs may have PIR that only SFODAs can satisfy. In a conflict, SFODAs may perform SR missions at the theater strategic or operational level. At the theater strategic level, SFODAs collect and report critical information for the theater CINC and component commanders. SFODAs perform operational-level SR missions in support of insurgencies, COINs, and contingency operations. During war, SFODAs can deploy to named areas of interest (NAIs) to collect and report information in response to specific PIR of the JFC and component commanders at the operational and theater strategic levels. SF SR operations occur at these levels because SF is too small and is in too great a demand to address the tactical needs of tactical combat units. SFODAs are a low-density, high-demand capability that cannot be quickly or easily replaced due to the prolonged selection and training process required to produce SF soldiers. Enough SFODAs simply are not available to act as the eyes and ears of tactical commanders in the main battle area. Therefore, whenever appropriate, long-range reconnaissance units assigned to Army divisions should conduct these missions.

2-62. Reconnaissance missions conducted by SF normally have objectives that are either strategic or operational in nature, although they occur at the tactical level. This fact clarifies the difference between the SF mission of SR and the term *strategic reconnaissance*.

2-63. Other operational activities of SR are target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance. SF can enhance other reconnaissance objectives through remote-sensor emplacement. SF conducts these activities by employing an appropriate mix of the two broad categories of techniques described previously.

TARGET ACQUISITION

2-64. SF conducts target acquisition to identify and locate targets inaccessible to other sensors, to identify the vulnerability of a specific target, or to determine whether conducting a DA operation on the target is feasible. A target acquisition mission may also determine the means or the types of forces necessary to seize materiel, to capture personnel, or to destroy or damage a target. SR may directly support IO by identifying access points for closed information systems or by providing other information critical to developing an IO concept of operations. In support of CP, SF may conduct SR specifically to verify the presence of WMD or to gather information related to WMD.

AREA ASSESSMENT

2-65. SF conducts area assessments to evaluate the overall situation within an operational or target area, including NBC reconnaissance. Such

assessments include information on the capabilities and intentions of military and paramilitary forces, as well as social, cultural, and demographic data. Area assessments are critical to the commander's decision-making process. The assessments also include characteristics and capacity of indigenous infrastructure and support systems and any other information of military value or relevance to regional orientation. Area assessment is an integral part of UW and is conducted during activities incidental to other mission taskings. Evaluating LOCs within the target area are conducted to determine the difficulties that may confront a conventional force during future operations.

POSTSTRIKE RECONNAISSANCE

2-66. SF may conduct poststrike reconnaissance—also known as BDA—to determine the effectiveness of an air strike, IO action, or the effects of some other type of standoff weapon. SF normally conducts these missions in an otherwise denied area not easily accessible to another type of sensor. SF becomes the force of choice when other intelligence assets are unavailable for accurate and timely information or when the actual effect cannot be observed absent a human observer at the point of collection.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

2-67. CBT refers to the offensive and defensive measures taken by civilian and military agencies of a government to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. CT measures are the offensive measures of CBT, whereas antiterrorism (AT) measures are the defensive measures. SF CBT operations encompass both CT and AT.

2-68. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency in CBT overseas or on the high seas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice has the responsibility within the United States. The Department of Transportation combats terrorism related to aircraft flying within the territories of the United States. SF may support the efforts of all these agencies. HN requirements and restrictions also limit SF involvement in CBT.

COUNTERTERRORISM

2-69. The primary mission of SF in CT is to apply specialized capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents abroad. When directed by the NCA or the appropriate theater CINC, designated SFODAs conduct or support CT missions, including hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organizations, and attacks on the terrorist infrastructure.

2-70. Because of the very low profile of most terrorist organizations, identifying targets for CT missions can be extremely difficult. Although a preemptive strike against terrorists is preferable, CT missions must often be conducted after terrorists have initiated a terrorist incident.

2-71. CT is a specialized mission, not a generic mission applicable to all SF units. SF participation in CT is limited to those specially organized, trained, and equipped SFODs designated in theater contingency plans. These designated SFODs respond as directed by the NCA or the theater CINC to

resolve specific situations arising from a terrorist incident. As part of the Counterterrorism Enhancement Program, these designated SFODs may also train selected HN forces to perform CT missions. Further discussion of CT is beyond the scope of this publication.

ANTITERRORISM

2-72. SF, often in conjunction with other government agencies, ensures that the physical security of important people, facilities, and events meets acceptable FP and security standards. These types of operations address the AT side of CBT. Responding to requests from the Services and other government agencies, SF can provide training and advice on how to protect the force by reducing vulnerability to terrorism and other hostile threats. SF uses their extensive expertise to anticipate hostile activity and evaluate the adequacy of existing physical security systems. When directed, SF capabilities can augment existing security for important people and events.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION

2-73. CP is a specialized mission assigned to designated SOF. SF participation in CP is through the conduct of UW, SR, and DA. SFODs designated in national and theater contingency plans to participate in CP may be specially task-organized, trained, and equipped. These designated SFODs respond as directed by the NCA or the geographic CINC to resolve specific situations arising from a proliferation incident. When an SFOD is tasked to perform a CP mission, its role is strategic in nature.

2-74. CP operations can span the entire spectrum of the operational environment—from permissive to hostile. CP operations pertain primarily to the counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD). In terms of arms control, WMD weapons—which may include NBC weapons—are capable of a high order of destruction of personnel and materiel. However, the term WMD excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon when such means is a separate or divisible part of the weapon. CP consists of the following activities:

- Detecting the development of WMD.
- Defending against the development of WMD capabilities.
- Dissuading the acquisition of WMD technical expertise.
- Preventing the development or design of WMD systems.
- Interdicting the acquisition of WMD systems.
- Interdicting WMD delivery and support systems.

2-75. CPWMD missions of SF may include locating, identifying, and safeguarding WMD. Joint theater missile defense (JTMD) is addressed in CP operations. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the performance of CP are outside the continental United States (OCONUS). SF is particularly well-suited to address these requirements because of its cultural orientation and linguistic capabilities. Further discussion of CP is beyond the scope of this publication.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The concept and definition of warfare is going to change more in the next ten years than it has in the last fifty due to the impact of information technology and the compression of time—relative advantage will be realized by achieving and sustaining velocity and agility.

General Peter J. Schoomaker
CINC, USSOCOM (1997-2000)

2-76. IO involves actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy. Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. IO applies across all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information warfare (IW) is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. The ultimate targets of offensive IO are the human decision-making processes. Defensive IO activities are conducted on a continuous basis and are an inherent part of force employment across the range of military operations. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. Offensive and defensive IO should also be integrated with intelligence and other information-related activities, as well as those activities leveraging friendly information systems, including friendly decision-making processes. The IO cell on the JFC's staff is a critical element to ensure ARSOF and joint SOF plans and operations are integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted across the full spectrum of IO.

2-77. IO support the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and the effective employment of IO is essential for meeting the JFC's objectives. As appropriate, IO target or protect information, information-transfer links, information-gathering and information-processing nodes, and the human decision-making process. Offensive and defensive IO are applied to achieve synergy through a combination of elements (Figure 2-1, page 2-20).

2-78. IO-related activities include CMO and public affairs. SO missions that support IO include UW, FID, DA, SR, CA, and PSYOP. SF collateral activities may also support IO strategies and objectives developed in the JFC's TEP, campaign plans, and OPLANs. SF plays a significant role in each of these mission areas and supports IO by providing access within the region and through application of SF regional and cross-cultural communications expertise. For additional information, see JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.

| ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTED CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITIES | INFORMATION OPERATIONS APPLICATION |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Operations Security | Offensive and Defensive |
| Psychological Operations | Offensive |
| Counterpropaganda | Defensive |
| Military Deception | Offensive |
| Counterdeception | Defensive |
| Electronic Warfare | Offensive and Defensive |
| Computer Network Attack | Offensive |
| Physical Attack and Destruction | Offensive |
| Information Assurance | Defensive |
| Physical Security | Defensive |
| Counterintelligence | Defensive |
| Special Information Operations | Offensive and Defensive |

Figure 2-1. Offensive and Defensive Information Operations

2-79. IO and SF operations have mutually supporting characteristics. Examples of DA missions conducted in support of IO include—

- Destroying or disabling critical information infrastructures in denied areas.
- Supporting military deception activities through diversionary attacks conducted by SF personnel or surrogate forces.
- Obtaining critical targeting data on and target designation of critical facilities supporting adversary IO requirements.
- Providing feedback on the effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns.
- Providing intelligence on the effects of offensive IO on adversarial forces and the general populace.

2-80. SF operations can be supported by both offensive and defensive IO activities. Examples of offensive IO activities conducted in support of SF operations include the use of—

- Electronic warfare (EW) to assist in the infiltration or exfiltration of SF.
- PSYOP to gain support within key target audiences for SF UW activities.

2-81. Defensive IO activities supporting SF operations include—

- CI activities designed to counter and penetrate the adversary's intelligence and information systems employed against SF.
- Operations security (OPSEC) programs implemented to deny an adversary critical information on SF operations and activities.
- Information assurance (IA) activities protecting critical information systems required by SF for mission performance.
- EW support measures providing information on locations and capabilities of enemy surveillance and radar systems.

2-82. IO can provide a dividend within the aspects of FP, especially information security and assurance by protecting networks and information. In this FP aspect, IO has overarching implications in the conduct of all SF missions and collateral activities. IO create a synergistic effect that contributes to increased lethality, survivability, and tempo in combat, as well as in MOOTW. IO have the capability to create rapid situational awareness for SF on the ground and for planners and commanders in the rear as situations develop. Additionally, through forward-deployed SF, IO can provide rapid catalysts (both active and passive) to change environments in favor of SF and follow-on forces. SF executing effective IO enhances the effects of the overall plan and operations. Proper employment of IO can have cascading, cumulative, and catastrophic effects on an adversary.

COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

2-83. The Army organizes, trains, and equips to fight and win the nation's wars. The leadership, organization, equipment, discipline, and skill gained in training for war are also useful in MOOTW. SF units conduct or support collateral activities in MOOTW using these inherent capabilities learned in performing their primary missions. When directed to perform a collateral activity, SF commanders may acquire specialized equipment or modify their training programs to prepare for the assigned task. Collateral activities in which SF may participate include coalition support, CSAR, counterdrug (CD) activities, humanitarian demining (HD) activities, foreign HA, SA, and special activities.

COALITION SUPPORT

2-84. Coalition support improves the interaction and interoperability of coalition partners and U.S. military forces. SF personnel are well-suited for carrying out coalition support because of the skills they hone in the conduct of UW operations and because of their regional orientation and cultural awareness. SF has proved invaluable in supporting efforts to form or execute coalition support activities and operations. Examples where SF has organized coalition support teams—now called SFLEs—include Operations DESERT STORM, DESERT SHIELD, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, SUPPORT DEMOCRACY, and JOINT ENDEAVOR. These SFLEs collocated with military forces of coalition partners and provided key U.S. C4I links to the coalition partners. The operations enabled and orchestrated multinational operations by military units not trained in interoperability with U.S. forces. SF's execution of this collateral activity has been critical in successful completion of these and subsequent multinational operations involving U.S. military forces.

2-85. Accompanying SFLEs advise their foreign counterparts on U.S. military intentions and capabilities, provide training, provide global positioning systems downlinks, and secure communications between the supported forces. The SFLEs also confirm the situation on the ground, assist in fire support planning, and enable overall coordination between U.S. forces and their coalition partners. Appendix C explains the importance of establishing rapport in SFLE relationships with a foreign nation.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

2-86. CSAR is a subordinate mission under PR, an umbrella term that encompasses many different missions—such as CSAR, joint CSAR, and UAR. CSAR consists of reporting, locating, identifying, recovering, and repatriating isolated personnel to friendly control. Technically speaking, a single Service or functional combatant component conducts CSAR—for example, SF conducting CSAR to rescue isolated SOF personnel. Joint CSAR involves CSAR by two or more components because the mission requirements exceed the capability of a single component—for example, SOF working with joint force air component (JFAC) combat aircraft in joint CSAR to rescue a downed pilot. The term CSAR often refers to both missions.

2-87. The JFC normally tasks each component to perform CSAR in support of its own operations. As such, the responsibility for the recovery of SOF personnel falls first to the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). Because of this responsibility, CSAR capabilities are often organic in SF missions, sometimes in the form of dedicated CSAR helicopters. CSAR is a collateral activity for SF, which means a capability is available to the JFC, although SF is not specifically manned, trained, or equipped to conduct CSAR. SF has CSAR capability because of its inherent capabilities to conduct its principal missions, such as the UW mission of UAR and the DA mission of recovery operations.

2-88. The JFC normally exercises control of CSAR or joint CSAR operations through the JSRC as a part of his staff or through a designated component commander, often the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Many times, the JSRC is established as part of the JFACC's staff. The JSRC is the primary search and rescue (SAR) facility to plan, coordinate, and execute joint CSAR operations. SF may be tasked to conduct joint CSAR by the JFC by a tasking passed from the JSRC to the JFSOCC. SF conducts joint CSAR operations on a case-by-case basis; however, joint CSAR taskings will be at the expense of core SF mission readiness and capabilities.

COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES

2-89. CD activities are measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Using their skills in cross-cultural communications, SF personnel train HN CD forces on critical skills required to conduct small-unit CD operations. SF CD operations overseas support the geographic CINC's regional CD campaign plan and the Ambassador's country-specific CD plans. Although some CD activities can be classified as FID, most are undertaken as part of legislatively authorized and specifically funded U.S. CD programs, rather than as participation in another government's program to combat this lawlessness. These U.S. CD programs may be multinational or conducted in DS of HN efforts.

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING ACTIVITIES

2-90. SF performs HD activities in support of DOD programs designed to help selected HNs establish their own demining organizations. The goal of humanitarian demining operations (HDO) is to render the HN capable of conducting long-term and self-sustaining operations to reduce or eliminate the suffering and threats to the safety of its civilian populations caused by

land mines and associated battlefield unexploded ordnance. SF teams train the HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy land mines and unexploded ordnance. PSYOP teams assist HN governments develop and implement mine-awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and report locations of land mines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed. CA teams train the HN demining HQ in the management and C2 of its subordinate elements. CA assets also provide liaison with the U.S. Government, the United Nations, and both international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to coordinate support of the HN demining infrastructure.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

2-91. Foreign HA operations use DOD personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote human welfare; to reduce pain, suffering, and hardship; and to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters. In combination with other SOF and conventional forces, SF is uniquely suited to render rapid, effective HA in remote areas, particularly in an uncertain or hostile environment. The same abilities that make SF the force of choice for UW and FID contribute directly to SF's suitability for HA operations.

2-92. Disaster relief operations fall within the overall context of HA. These operations are event-driven. They support the efforts of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within the DOS for foreign disasters and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for disasters within the United States. The ability to deploy on short notice to remote regions, familiarity with multiagency operations, and limited logistics support requirements, all favor SF involvement in disaster relief operations. Examples of SF involvement in HA and disaster relief operations include—

- Providing medical and veterinary assistance in remote regions.
- Establishing communications.
- Performing basic repair of critical facilities.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

2-93. SA activities are programs governed by the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Act, and other related statutes. SA provides defense equipment and training to eligible countries and international organizations to further U.S. national security objectives. These activities are conducted under the supervision and general direction of the DOS through the in-country U.S. Ambassador.

2-94. The primary role of SF in SA activities is to provide mobile training teams (MTTs) and other forms of training assistance tailored to meet the specific requirements of the nation requesting the assistance. The same abilities that make SF the force of choice for UW and FID contribute directly to SF's suitability for SA activities as well. U.S. public law prohibits personnel conducting SA from engaging in combatant activities. For detailed discussions of SA programs, see DOD Manual 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*; AR 12-1, *Security Assistance, International Logistics*,

Training, and Technical Assistance Support Policy and Responsibilities; and AR 12-15, Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT).

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

2-95. Special activities require Presidential approval and congressional oversight. Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, states that no agency except the CIA may conduct any special activity in peacetime unless the President directs otherwise. When directed by the President, the DOD performs special activities during war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a Presidential report under the War Powers Act. Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, SF soldiers may perform any of their principal missions subject to the limitations imposed by the NCA. Such activities are highly compartmented and centrally managed and controlled.

MULTIPLE AND FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS

2-96. Actual operational requirements often cross over doctrinal mission lines. An SFOD can conduct an operation involving multiple missions. Multiple missions are appropriate when operational requirements demand the application of TTP drawn from more than one doctrinal mission. For example, an SFODA can use UW or SR TTP to acquire a target and then use DA TTP to provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions against the acquired target.

2-97. During the mission planning process, SFODs may be assigned a follow-on mission to perform before they infiltrate an AO. For example, an SFOD can conduct a DA mission against a specified target, then link up with a resistance organization or a bypassed or cut-off conventional force to conduct a UW mission. Preplanned multiple missions are appropriate when the risk of exfiltration is greater than the risk of remaining operational in the AO.

2-98. Although strongly discouraged, SFODs may also receive follow-on missions while performing their initial mission. For example, an SFOD conducting another mission may be directed to recover a downed aircrew, other designated personnel, or materiel. Such follow-on missions often place the SFOD at high risk because of the SFOD's limited ability to plan, rehearse, and otherwise prepare for additional operations while deployed. The absence of mission-specific equipment and training related to the follow-on mission may also lessen the probability of mission success. However, SFODs may receive a follow-on mission when the importance of that mission justifies the additional risks. Absent a high-threat infiltration environment, preparing another SFOD for the mission is often preferable to assigning a follow-on mission to a deployed SFOD.

SPECIAL FORCES SUPPORT FOR U.S. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

2-99. If an HN's government or military situation deteriorates to the point that vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, the NCA may commit U.S. forces in a combat role to effect a decisive change in the conflict. Tactical operations by U.S. forces can provide security sufficient for the HN to reestablish its military capabilities and to implement programs or operations necessary to

meet the threat. The objective of these operations is to provide time and space for local forces to regain the initiative and resume the complete responsibility for security operations.

2-100. In this situation, the committed U.S. combat force is likely to find SF already present in-country. The U.S. combat force commander can take advantage of SF's relationship with the HN through SF's formal and informal arrangements with HN organizations. The U.S. conventional force commander should treat this situation like a UW linkup operation. He should fully exploit SF experience and contacts during the critical transition period when his forces are deploying into the country. Commanders should make full use of special operations command and control elements (SOCCEs) when available.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS IN REAR AREAS

2-101. During war, the theater CINC commits his assigned SFODs primarily to theater deep operations in hostile or denied territory. When hostile insurgents, terrorists, or other hostile forces present a significant threat to friendly rear areas, however, the theater CINC may commit SF to theater rear operations.

2-102. Conventional CSS units in the theater rear area establish, or are assigned to, mutually supporting base clusters for local defense. MP units secure the LOC between base clusters, conduct area reconnaissance to detect rear area threats, and fight to defeat threats that exceed base cluster defensive capabilities. When a threat exceeds MP combat capabilities, the MPs delay or disrupt the hostile force until a tactical combat force is committed to defeat it.

2-103. Operational priorities and the density of MP assets in the theater may preclude adequate MP support for all operations simultaneously, especially when the primary threat is an organized, trained, and equipped insurgency. Even when robust HN security forces are available, U.S. advisory and training assistance may be required to counter threats effectively in remote, hostile territory when U.S. LOCs are extended.

2-104. When directed, SF organizes, trains, and directs HN military or paramilitary forces to conduct offensive rear operations against unconventional rear area threats. Under the operational control (OPCON) of the appropriate theater Army (TA) area command or combat unit (normally corps or higher), these forces operate in platoon or company strength in the remote areas of the friendly rear area. They often adopt counterinsurgent organization, tactics, and techniques. Their activities include—

- Patrolling (saturation patrolling) likely and suspected base areas.
- Employing raids and ambushes against a detected base camp or reporting its location so a conventional maneuver unit can attack and destroy it.
- Establishing ambushes along likely hostile infiltration routes to friendly base clusters.
- Reacting to hostile attacks by trailing and hunting down the attackers.

2-105. Depending on the specific situation, the SF-directed HN forces may require additional combat, combat support (CS), and CSS resources. Such support may include artillery or close air support.

FORCE PROTECTION

2-106. FP is an integral part of every SF mission. FP includes all actions taken to protect personnel, equipment, and facilities during the conduct of operations. In addition to common FP measures carried out by all soldiers, SF personnel employ incidental observation. To observe and interpret their environment accurately, SF personnel constantly leverage incidental observation through access and regional orientation provided by their day-to-day activities. Incidental observation enhances SF's overall FP posture. Incidental observation relies on the maturity, judgment, and training background of the SF soldier. Because of their careful selection and training, SF soldiers consciously and subconsciously note information of tactical, operational, strategic, and policy-making significance. Critical information that does not directly impact on the SFOD's immediate FP requirements is recorded as part of postmission debriefings for evaluation and future exploitation.

Chapter 3

Special Forces Organization

Like the commanders of other Army units, SF commanders task-organize their elements into teams and task forces based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) in the battlespace. This chapter describes the formal organization of the SF group and its organic assets. It focuses on current and objective tables of organization and equipment (TOEs), functions of each element at differing levels, and SF staff functions common to all levels. Subsequent chapters explain how and why SF commanders task-organize their units.

SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

3-1. The SFG(A) (Figure 3-1) is a multipurpose and extremely flexible organization. Its mission is to plan, conduct, and support SO activities in any operational environment whether it is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.




Figure 3-1. SFG(A) (TOE 31-800L0)

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

3-2. The group headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) (Figure 3-2, page 3-2) provides C2, staff planning, and staff supervision of group operations and administration.




Figure 3-2. HHC, SFG(A) (TOE 31-802L0)

FUNCTIONS

3-3. The group HQ commands and controls assigned and attached forces. It plans, coordinates, and directs SF operations separately or as a part of a larger force. It also—

- Provides command and staff personnel to establish and operate an SFOB.
- Functions as the HQ for an Army special operations task force (ARSOTF).
- Serves as the nucleus for a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) when augmented by resources from other Services.

- Directs the activities of up to three FOBs.
NOTE: An SFOB normally plans to operate only three FOBs as per TOE; however, if a situation dictates, an SFOB can direct the operations of as many FOBs as are required within the AOR. The additional FOBs are fielded from uncommitted SF groups.
- Provides support for the sustainment of the activities of deployed SFODAs.
- Advises, coordinates, and assists the staff on employing SF elements to a joint theater SOC, JSOTF, SAO, or other major HQ.
- Provides cryptographic material support to the SFG(A) and its subordinate elements.

3-4. The company HQ provides routine administrative and logistics support to the group HQ. It depends on the group support company (GSC) for unit-level maintenance of its organic wheeled vehicles, power-generation equipment, and signal equipment. When the group establishes an SFOB, the HHC commander serves as HQ commandant under the direct supervision of the deputy group commander. As HQ commandant, the HHC commander is responsible for the movement, internal base operations and administration (including space allocation, billeting, and food service), and physical security of the SFOB.

COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-5. Each member of the SFG(A) command and staff elements has specific performance requirements in planning and conducting operations. The following responsibilities are the specific requirements for each SFG(A) staff member.

Group Commander

3-6. The group commander exercises command of the group and its attached elements. When the SFG(A) establishes an SFOB, the group commander serves as the SFOB commander. Additionally, the group commander is delegated SIGINT operational tasking authority by the National Security Agency (NSA) for all organic SIGINT-EW assets.

Deputy Commander

3-7. The deputy commander performs those duties assigned to him by the group commander. He assumes command of the group in the commander's absence. When the group establishes an SFOB, he serves as the SFOB deputy commander and supervises the day-to-day activities of the base.

Executive Officer

3-8. The executive officer performs duties similar to those of a chief of staff. He directs and coordinates the activities of the group staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. When the group establishes an SFOB, the executive officer may serve as director of the group staff or as one of the center directors.

Command Sergeant Major

3-9. The command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) of the group. He is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on enlisted personnel matters. He monitors the implementation of established policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. He provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Personnel Officer

3-10. The personnel officer (S1) is the primary staff officer for all personnel service support (PSS) matters and other administrative matters not assigned to another coordinating staff officer. He may perform special staff officer duties, such as inspector general, provost marshal, public affairs officer, and special services officer. Additional duties include postal operations and the management of stragglers and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). His primary operational concerns are replacement and strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities. He directly supervises the group personnel section and exercises staff supervision over attached PSS units. When the SFOB is established, the S1 is located with and reports to the support center (SPTCEN) director.

Intelligence Officer

3-11. The intelligence officer (S2) is the primary staff officer responsible for all aspects of intelligence, CI, and security support in garrison and while deployed. He plans, coordinates, and directs all group-level intelligence collection, analysis, and production, and approves all products before dissemination. He develops and recommends PIR and IRs for approval by the group commander and maintains the group collection plan with the assistance of the group military intelligence detachment (MID) collection management and dissemination (CM&D) team. The S2 directs all group-level intelligence-collection operations involving organic group assets or attached assets operating out of the SFOB, ARSOTF, or JSOTF.

3-12. The S2 identifies the need for collateral and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) intelligence communications support and intelligence automated data processing (ADP) systems support. He works with the signal officer (S6) in planning and coordinating SCI and ADP systems support. The S2 coordinates geospatial information and services (GI&S) requests and products. He conducts or coordinates for a wide variety of CI activities in support of group OPSEC and FP needs. When an SFOB is established, the S2 serves in the operations center (OPCEN) under the staff supervision of the OPCEN director. He is responsible for the group's information security, information systems security, personnel security, and special security programs. He establishes and makes sure the group maintains an intelligence-training program that not only enhances military intelligence (MI) career management fields (CMFs) but also includes the 18-series CMFs. He coordinates with the group MID commander to establish a tactical sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF). He coordinates tasking and OPCON of group MID assets with the requesting unit and the group MID commander.

Operations and Training Officer

3-13. The operations and training officer (S3) is the primary staff officer for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, and operations of the group. He has overall staff responsibility for PSYOP, OPSEC, EW, PR operations, and deception. He exercises staff supervision over attached aviation and PSYOP units. When an SFOB is established, the S3 serves as the OPCEN director.

Logistics Officer

3-14. The logistics officer (S4) is the primary staff officer for all logistics matters. He is the group's primary logistics planner and coordinator. He exercises staff supervision over the GSC's service detachment and attached logistics units. He coordinates closely with the four support company commanders who are the primary logistics personnel of the group. When an SFOB is established, the S4 is located with and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Civil-Military Operations Officer

3-15. The civil-military operations officer (S5) is the primary staff officer for all CA activities. He plans and coordinates the group's CMO, including coordination for establishing the civil-military operations center (CMOC). He advises the commander on political and military matters and assists him in meeting his legal obligations and moral considerations to the local populace. He exercises staff supervision over attached CA elements. When an SFOB is established, the S5 is located with and reports to the OPCEN director.

Signal Officer

3-16. The S6 is the primary staff officer for all signal operations, automation management, network management, and information security matters. He plans signal operations, prepares the signal annex to operation orders (OPORDs), and recommends employment of SFG(A) communications assets. He is responsible for making sure redundant signal means are available to pass time-sensitive command information from collectors to processors. He assists the S2 and S3 in preparing EW plans and is responsible for electronic protection (EP). He supervises the group's frequency manager, who prepares the group's signal operating instructions (SOI) and assigns frequencies to subordinate units. As the automation manager, the S6 manages the employment automation (hardware and software) supporting the group and the group's tactical local area network. He is also the group communications security (COMSEC) officer and supervises the group COMSEC custodian, who maintains the group COMSEC account. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over training of organic and attached communications personnel. He either exercises staff supervision over the SFOB signal center (SIGCEN) or performs the duties of the SIGCEN director.

Budget Officer

3-17. The budget officer is the primary staff officer for all matters on receiving, handling, safeguarding, and disbursing all program funds. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over all group financial

policies, plans, and services. When an SFOB is established, the budget officer is located with and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Group Engineer

3-18. The group engineer is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on engineer matters. He exercises staff supervision over attached engineer units. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over training of organic and attached engineer personnel. He plans and coordinates the group's real estate and construction needs and real property maintenance activities. He is responsible for target analysis and the construction of rehearsal sites. When an SFOB is established, the group engineer is located with the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Group Surgeon

3-19. The group surgeon is a qualified flight surgeon and is the primary advisor to the commander and staff for all matters affecting the mental and physical health of the group, attached elements, and the group's supported indigenous forces. He is responsible for coordinating for veterinary care at group level when required. He directly supervises the group medical section and exercises staff supervision over attached medical units. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over training of organic and attached medical personnel. When an SFOB is established, the group surgeon is located with and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Chaplain

3-20. The chaplain is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on moral, ethical, and religious issues affecting the unit mission. He plans and coordinates the activities of unit ministry teams (UMTs) to ensure comprehensive religious support of all assigned and attached personnel and their families. He assesses the religious attitudes of indigenous populations to determine the impact of these attitudes on SF operations. When an SFOB is established, the chaplain is located with the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Judge Advocate

3-21. The judge advocate is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on legal matters. He advises on matters involving military law, U.S. domestic law, foreign law, status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), international law, operational law, ROE, and standing rules of engagement (SROE). He reviews all sensitive mission taskings, plans, and orders to make sure they adequately address legal issues. When an SFOB is established, the judge advocate is located with the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Tactical Air Control Party

3-22. The tactical air control party (TACP) consists of the attached United States Air Force (USAF) personnel with the primary responsibility for liaison with USAF aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-winged). The TACP advises the commander on all issues concerning the integration of USAF assets with SF. The TACP instructs SF personnel on the employment of USAF aircraft. When

an SFOB is established, the TACP is located with the OPCEN and reports to the S3.

Staff Weather Officer

3-23. The staff weather officer (SWO) is a USAF meteorologist attached to support the SFG(A). He coordinates all meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support to the SFG(A). The SWO is the primary point of contact (POC) for information on weather, light, tide, and related matters. While under the OPCON of the SFG(A) commander, the SWO exercises command over the group's USAF special operations weather teams (SOWTs). The SWO operates under the staff supervision of the group S2. When an SFOB is established, the SWO is located with the OPCEN and reports to the S2.

Group Operations Warrant Officer

3-24. The group operations warrant officer is the assistant S3 for all operations-related matters at the group. He is the coordinator for the group's short-, mid-, and long-range training plans, as well as current operations. He coordinates war plans and manages joint, combined, JCS, and unilateral exercise training. The operations warrant officer also interfaces regularly with regional CINCs, regional agencies, U.S. Embassies overseas, Department of the Army, and other agencies to conduct, coordinate, and execute training, operational missions, and SA missions. He serves as the senior warrant officer advisor to the group commander on warrant officer assignments, professional development, and accessions.

Group Intelligence Warrant Officer

3-25. The group intelligence warrant officer is the assistant S2 for plans and targeting support at group level. When the SFOB is established, he serves as chief of the S2 plans and targeting support branch, which collocates with the S3 plans branch. He is responsible for all aspects of intelligence support to future plans and targeting, including plans and targeting for activities related to advanced special operations (ASO). He must be fully versed in ASO and familiar with all intelligence functions of the group MID. He works with and assists the group MID commander in developing, focusing, and coordinating intelligence training for personnel who possess MOS 18F or specialty code 180A and ASO training for designated personnel.

Group Assistant Intelligence Officer

3-26. The group assistant S2 is the MI officer who serves as the focal point for collection operations and current intelligence at group level. When the SFOB is established, he serves as chief of the S2 current intelligence branch, which collocates with S3 operations in the OPCEN. His responsibilities include maintenance of the current intelligence estimate; situational awareness of hostile forces of interest to the group commander, OPCEN director, and base commander; and monitoring of the current status of all deployed intelligence-collection assets. He also develops taskings for the SWO and the USAF SOWT. The assistant S2 serves as the acting S2 or senior intelligence officer in the absence of the S2.

Group Chemical Officer

3-27. The group chemical officer is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on all NBC matters. He exercises technical supervision over group NBC activities and staff supervision over the group chemical detachment and attached chemical units. When an SFOB is established, the chemical officer is located in the OPCEN and reports to the S3.

GROUP CHEMICAL DETACHMENT

3-28. The group chemical detachment has a chemical detachment commander, one chemical operations NCO, and three reconnaissance and decontamination teams. The group chemical detachment performs NBC reconnaissance in permissive environments, provides operational decontamination support, and may support the group chemical officer by operating the NBC warning and reporting system.

CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT

3-29. The chemical reconnaissance detachment (CRD) is a USASFC(A) asset attached to an SF group. The CRD may be task-organized within the group to satisfy mission requirements. The CRD conducts chemical reconnaissance and sampling in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments for SOF commanders and geographic combatant CINCs. These special detachments are the only CRDs with this mission in the U.S. Army. USASFC(A) currently has two Active Army CRDs, three United States Army Reserve (USAR) CRDs, and two Army National Guard (ARNG) CRDs.

Organization and Responsibilities

3-30. The CRD (Figure 3-3) is a five-man airborne-qualified unit. Each position within the unit has its own operations and functions.




Figure 3-3. Composition of Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment

3-31. The team NBC officer establishes policies and procedures, supervises and inspects operations, and makes recommendations to the SF group commander and the SFOD commander. The team NBC officer prepares OPORDs and OPLANs for employment of his detachment. His role is

particularly important in the verification or collection of NBC agents and precursors. The commander is responsible for direct supervision of missions intended as field verification or collection operations.

3-32. The operations sergeant has primary responsibility for team and individual training and readiness. He assists in preparing OPORDs and develops and analyzes the intelligence situation and mission profile. He directly supervises team operations during split-team configuration.

3-33. Two chemical operations specialists and an assistant chemical operations specialist execute the missions planned by the commander and the team sergeant. They conduct NBC reconnaissance and sample collection. They operate NBC-detection equipment, communications equipment, and photographic equipment. They also assist in planning operations and in developing and analyzing the enemy situation. The assistant chemical operations specialist is also trained as a combat lifesaver.

Mission

3-34. The mission of the CRD is to conduct NBC reconnaissance in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. It supports the requirements of the geographic combatant CINC, SOF commanders, and SFG(A) commander at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Capabilities

3-35. The CRD is the SFG commander's primary means of conducting special NBC reconnaissance operations. The team has the same geographic orientation as its SFG. The CRD is capable of supporting all NBC aspects of SF missions. The team can augment an SFODA to perform tasks involved in detecting, collecting, packaging, and identifying NBC material. The team can conduct its missions unilaterally in permissive environments and in an uncertain or hostile environment when accompanied by an SFODA. The CRD can identify potential industrial hazards and can confirm or deny the use of WMD to the rear of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or in proximity to the SFOB or FOB. Additionally, the CRD can train SOF and foreign personnel in both individual and collective NBC tasks.

3-36. Typical NBC SR missions include—

- Collecting critical information on the enemy's NBC capabilities, intentions, and disposition.
- Observing areas that are known NBC attacks for civilian and enemy losses and collateral damage (BDA).
- Assessing NBC hazards on damaged enemy WMD facilities, as well as production, stockpile, research, and development centers.
- Analyzing site characteristics to determine if an enemy has WMD capabilities.

3-37. Typical NBC DA missions include—

- Retrieving an NBC sample (water, air, soil, or actual sample of the NBC element) after a SOF element has gained access or provides security.
- Seizing enemy munitions.

GROUP SUPPORT COMPANY

3-38. The GSC (Figure 3-4, page 3-11) provides intelligence, signal, and CSS to the SFOB. It controls consolidated facilities and activities when SFOB and FOBs consolidate support operations. It also augments the resources of the battalion support companies when subordinate battalions establish FOBs. The GSC has a sufficient pool of resources to augment three separate FOBs. With augmentation, an SFOB routinely deploys its three FOBs to locations separate from the SFOB. This arrangement provides operational flexibility to the SFOB commander.

3-39. The GSC commander commands all personnel and elements assigned or attached to the company. His company HQ provides routine administrative and logistics support to the SFOB SPTCENs and SIGCENs. He is the group's primary logistics personnel. When the group establishes an SFOB, he serves as the SPTCEN director. His duties require direct interface with TA logistics support elements. In coordination with the S3 and HQ commandant, the GSC commander prepares the base defense plan and supervises the activities of the base defense operations center (BDOC).

GROUP MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT

3-40. The group MID contains most of the group's single-source and all-source analysis capability. The MID is responsible for collection management; all-source fusion of single-source information; analysis, production, and dissemination of finished intelligence products; and the control and management of the SCI communications team. The MID consists of four subordinate sections or teams with functionally different responsibilities.

All-Source Production Section

3-41. The all-source production section (ASPS) is the hub of the MID. It has broad intelligence support responsibilities and is directed by an all-source intelligence warrant officer (350B).

3-42. The ASPS responds to all-source intelligence support taskings from the group S2. It provides in-depth all-source analysis, production, and collection management support to the group. It provides near-real-time indications and warning overwatch for deployed assets. The all-source analysts within the ASPS are responsible for developing the analysis of the AO or AOR, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), target nomination development, and BDA. They prepare and continually update the current intelligence situation map (SITMAP). They maintain and use the unit intelligence reference files and databases, including the Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES) intelligence ADP system. They assist the CM&D team in developing the collection plan and identifying new requirements to close any intelligence gaps. They prepare intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and responses to requests for intelligence information (RIIs) and requests for information (RFIs) and provide intelligence briefings as required. All the members of the ASPS contribute to the preparation of the intelligence estimate and its corresponding annexes. The ASPS produces and enhances target intelligence packages (TIPs) for subordinate FOBs as required.




Figure 3-4. GSC, SFG(A) (TOE 31-803L0)

3-43. The ASPS has two subordinate elements with specific functions—the CM&D team and the imagery intelligence (IMINT) team. The section may be further subdivided into analysis teams focused on specific AORs in support of the subordinate battalions of the group.

3-44. **CM&D Team.** The CM&D team receives and validates all RIIs and RFIs from subordinate units and assigns them to the appropriate MID section or team IAW the commander's prioritization. The MID section informs the ASPS chief upon PIR satisfaction and recommends new PIR, IRs, and specific information requirements (SIRs) for submission to the S2. It reports intelligence to higher or lateral HQ, based on guidance from the S2, and coordinates dissemination of intelligence to subordinate and attached units. A senior NCO leads the CM&D team. Because of limited personnel, the team may be augmented with other intelligence personnel from within the MID as required. It typically locates within a SCIF. It develops and assists in the implementation of a dynamic collection plan that supports mission analysis and planning, targeting, indications and warning overwatch for deployed SFODs and SOT-As, and communications zone (COMMZ) FP requirements. Personnel from the single-source intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, IMINT, and counterintelligence-human intelligence [CI-HUMINT]) subordinate to the MID assist the CM&D team in these tasks as required. CM&D personnel work with the group S2 to develop the SFG(A)'s peacetime and contingency collection plans. As part of this effort, the team develops information objectives and collection emphasis. It works with the SIGINT and CI-HUMINT sections and the IMINT team to develop SIGINT amplifications, SIGINT end-product reviews, source-directed requirements (SDRs), imagery reconnaissance objective lists (IROLs), and taskers. The CM&D team also works with the S2 to maintain the collateral-recurring document listing (CRDL), sensitive compartmented information-recurring document listing (SCIRDL), and the statement of intelligence interest (SII).

3-45. **IMINT Team.** The 96D IMINT specialists of the IMINT team maintain comprehensive historical and current mission area imagery files in hard copy and in digitized form. Team members use their deployable light tables, Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (SIDS), and imagery products from higher HQ and to provide in-depth imagery analysis and production support to the group. This support includes detailed terrain and facility analysis, annotated prints and target graphics, current SIDS imagery of targets and key terrain, BDA, and highly accurate imagery-based object measurement support.

Signals Intelligence Section

3-46. The SIGINT section conducts single-source collection, collection management, and analysis. Led by a SIGINT warrant officer (352C), the section consists of the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) and six SOT-As.

3-47. The TCAE performs the technical analysis function when operating in garrison and when deployed in the SFOB. The SIGINT analysts (98C) on the team operate the SIGINT-related programs accessed through the SOF intelligence architecture. Access is through communications interoperability with theater intelligence data-handling systems, SOF intelligence systems,

and national assets, such as the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP). The TCAE maintains the SIGINT databases for selected countries in the SFG(A)'s AOR. The TCAE provides critical combat and technical information to the all-source analysts (96Bs) within the ASPS to support situation development, INTSUMs, and intelligence briefings to the commander and staff.

3-48. The TCAE determines specific SIGINT collection taskings from stated intelligence requirements received by the CM&D team. The TCAE also monitors the effectiveness of collection efforts, redirecting coverage and providing technical feedback and support to the SOT-As and SIGINT personnel attached to SF battalion FOBs. They establish, update, and maintain the SFG(A)'s intercept tasking database. They ensure adherence to all legal aspects of SIGINT operations. Finally, they issue all appropriate SIGINT operational tasking authority reports.

3-49. **IMINT Analyst.** Under the TOE, the battalion analysis and control team (ACT) has only one 96D (IMINT analyst) assigned to it. Additional IMINT analysts from the group MID or one or more all-source analysts may, however, augment the battalion IMINT analyst. The IMINT analyst maintains comprehensive historical and current mission area imagery files in hard copy and in digitized form. He uses the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Enhanced Imagery Workstation to provide imagery analysis support and production support to the FOB. This support includes detailed terrain and facility analysis, annotated prints and target graphics, current imagery of targets and key terrain, BDA, and highly accurate imagery-based object-measurement support. He also develops reconnaissance requests for submission to higher HQ.

3-50. **SIGINT Traffic Analysis Team.** The deployable TCAE team is an organic element of the SF group MID. The traffic analysis team is not an organic element of the SF battalion S2 section. The team is attached to the battalion from the group MID when directed by the group commander for signals intercept to support the operational concept. The group MID task-organizes the traffic analysis team from personnel and equipment organic to the group TCAE. Up to six SOT-As accompany the traffic analysis team.

3-51. The SIGINT analysts of the traffic analysis team are responsible for FOB-level technical control of attached SOT-As, SIGINT analysis, and operational and technical reporting. They use and maintain threat electronic order-of-battle and technical-support databases developed by the TCAE or by other national- or theater-level SIGINT organizations. The traffic analysis team maintains the battalion SIGINT collection plan in coordination with the ACT. They translate general collection requirements assigned by the battalion ACT into specific SIGINT collection taskings for the SOT-As. Operational reporting consists of combat information purged of technical data and reported directly to the supported commander. Technical reporting is conducted through the TCAE communications architecture only.

3-52. SOT-As are low-level SIGINT collection teams that intercept and report operational and technical information derived from tactical threat communications through prescribed communications paths. The mission of a SOT-A is to conduct SIGINT and EW in support of IO, unilaterally or in

conjunction with other SOF elements to support existing and emerging SOF missions worldwide.

3-53. SOT-As perform a number of different missions and collateral activities in support of larger SO. The primary roles of SOT-As include—

- Electronic reconnaissance (ER).
- FP.
- EW MTT.

3-54. Collateral activities include—

- Signals research and target development (SRTD).
- Support to PR.

3-55. The role assigned to a SOT-A is dependent upon a thorough, overall mission analysis and the commander's approval. The group commander may direct the attachment of up to six SOT-As to a subordinate battalion. The group MID task-organizes the SOT-As according to mission requirements and predeployment analysis of the signals environment.

3-56. When conducting ER, the SOT-A can provide overall situational development information and locate and identify specific intelligence indicators to satisfy IRs—for example, target development, confirmation or denial of IPB information, and BDA. In this role, the SOT-A receives technical tasking from the traffic analysis team and reports technical data through the same element.

3-57. While engaged in an FP role, a SOT-A employs in DS or general support (GS) to a SOF commander. It receives technical tasking from the accompanying traffic analysis team, provides combat information (immediate threat, threat location, threat intent, threat capabilities, and threat limitations) to the operational commander, and provides technical data to the traffic analysis team.

3-58. If a SOT-A is to serve as an MTT as part of a FID mission conducted by an SF battalion or group, the NSA must approve the tasking. The focus of any SIGINT training provided to HN SIGINT elements must be on low-level tactical SIGINT collection, radio direction-finding, basic SIGINT analysis, and combat information recognition and reporting. Sharing advanced analytic functions and processes with third-party elements is not authorized.

3-59. SRTD is the description of a mission in which a SOT-A deploys to a target area where the SIGINT database is nonexistent, outdated, or continually evolving. The SOT-A collects technical data from signals of interest and forwards the data to the TCAE or a supporting traffic analysis team for analysis and database development.

3-60. During PR or other recovery missions, a SOT-A can use organic handheld equipment to intercept and locate distress frequencies. However, use of the combat survivor evader locator (CSEL) distress radio reduces this capability. Any support to PR must be assigned with specific reporting instructions and should be assigned only after a thorough mission analysis.

3-61. SOT-As and traffic analysis teams can support all levels and types of SF operations. Depending on the mission and the situation, SOT-As may deploy independently into uncertain or denied areas, operate with other SOT-As, or be attached to deploying SFODAs or SFODBs.

Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence Section

3-62. The CI-HUMINT section is responsible for a large number of tactical CI-HUMINT collection, analysis, production, and operational support activities. A counterintelligence warrant officer (351B) leads the CI-HUMINT section. The section consists of CI agents or analysts (97B), trained in multidisciplined counterintelligence (MDCI) functions, and interrogators (97E), who operate in two-man teams. The CI agents and interrogator teams may be attached to support the group's subordinate battalions. They are normally task-organized by language capability for this mission.

3-63. The section produces Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) and other formatted reports to disseminate the results of CI-HUMINT collection and liaison activities. They use locally collected intelligence and theater CI products to assess a wide variety of threats within the SFOB's COMMZ or HN rear area. These threats include, but are not limited to, foreign intelligence services (FIS); insurgents, terrorists, and criminals; dissident political factions; and anti-U.S. elements of the civilian populace. The CI-HUMINT section also prepares and maintains the SFOB MDCI estimate, as well as comprehensive base defense, COMMZ, and HN rear area IPB products. These products permit the timely provision of indications and warning information and predictive intelligence on significant OPSEC and FP threats. CI-HUMINT analysts develop profiles of friendly forces and identify their vulnerabilities.

3-64. In response to the situation and collection taskings from the CM&D team and the MID commander, the CI-HUMINT section plans, coordinates, and conducts CI liaison, EPW interrogation, document exploitation, overt collection, and refugee and evacuee debriefings. They also serve as the OPCEN staff focal point for FP operations. They process plans, coordinate financial and administration support, and ensure regulatory intelligence oversight compliance. The team recommends essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and threat countermeasures and continually assesses the effectiveness of the base OPSEC countermeasures and base security plans. The CI-HUMINT section supports the OPSEC plan by providing Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA) briefings and limited investigations. It also provides CI and security site surveys in support of SFOB relocation within the country and theater as required.

Military Intelligence Detachment Commander

3-65. The MID commander works directly with the S2, assisting him in developing the group's concept for intelligence operations. He is responsible for implementing the MID task organization, deploying collection assets and analytic augmentation to subordinate units as directed by the group commander. The MID commander has broad responsibilities—directing the efforts of the analytic elements of the MID and the mission support for the intelligence-collection activities of the SOT-As and CI-HUMINT teams

deployed forward. He is responsible for the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and limited administrative actions, individual and collective training for MI specialties, and property accountability for equipment unique to the MID. The MID does not, however, have the organic maintenance, supply, or administrative personnel to operate independently. The MID must rely on and coordinate closely with the GSC for administrative and logistics support.

3-66. Connectivity to theater and national intelligence databases and supporting assets is an absolute necessity to ensure successful MID operations and, more important, to provide sufficient intelligence for group-level planning and execution. The S2, MID, and S6 staff sections must work closely together to make sure SCI and collateral intelligence systems are properly linked into the overall informational architecture.

SERVICE DETACHMENT

3-67. The service detachment performs unit-level supply, services, and maintenance functions for the group HHC and support company and their attached elements. When the group establishes an SFOB, the service detachment commander coordinates and supervises SPTCEN logistics activities. He works for the support company commander under the staff supervision of the S4.

MEDICAL SECTION

3-68. The medical section provides combat health support (CHS) to the SFOB. This support includes unit-level medical support and health services, logistics emergency medical and resuscitative treatment for all classes of patients, emergency dental treatment, preventive medicine support, and veterinary support.

SIGNAL DETACHMENT

3-69. The signal detachment has two primary functions. It installs, operates, and maintains secure SFOB radio communications with the FOBs and the deployed SFODAs and SOCCEs under the group's direct C2. It also installs, operates, and maintains continuous internal SFOB communications. This base communications support includes message center services, internal telephone communications, electronic maintenance, and photographic support. When the group establishes an SFOB, the signal detachment commander serves as the systems control (SYSCON) officer and assists the SIGCEN director. When the detachment is formally detached from the support company, the detachment commander exercises normal company-level command; however, the detachment depends on the support company for administrative and logistics support.

PERSONNEL SECTION

3-70. The personnel section collocates with the supporting military personnel office (MILPO). The section augments MILPO capabilities to perform personnel management functions for the entire SFG(A). When elements of the group are supported by more than one MILPO, members of the personnel section may be attached to each supporting MILPO.

SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION

3-71. The SF battalion of the SFG(A) (Figure 3-5) plans, conducts, and supports SO activities in any operational environment—permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The battalion is directly responsible for isolating, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and reconstituting SFOBs and SFODAs.




Figure 3-5. SF Battalion SFG(A) (TOE 31-805LO)

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT (SFODC)

3-72. The battalion HQ and HQ detachment (Figure 3-6, page 3-18) (also known as the SFODC) commands and controls the battalion and attachments. When augmented, it can function as the HQ for an ARSOTF. The battalion HQ and HQ detachment (SFODC) performs no operational mission separate from its battalion.

FUNCTIONS

3-73. The battalion HQ and HQ detachment (SFODC) commands and controls the activities of the SF battalion. When deployed, it commands and controls the activities of an FOB. It also—

- Trains and prepares SFOBs and SFODAs for deployment.
- Directs, supports, and sustains the activities of deployed SFOBs and SFODAs.

COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-74. Each member of the SF battalion staff has specific performance requirements in planning and conducting operations. The responsibilities that follow are the specific requirements for each SF battalion staff member.




Figure 3-6. Battalion HQ and HQ Detachment (SFODC), SF Battalion (TOE 31-806L0)

Battalion Commander

3-75. The battalion commander exercises command of the battalion and attached elements. When the battalion commander establishes an FOB, he serves as the FOB commander.

Executive Officer

3-76. The executive officer performs duties similar to those of a deputy commander and the chief of staff. He directs the battalion staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. When the battalion commander establishes an FOB, the executive officer serves as FOB deputy commander and supervises the day-to-day activities of the base.

Command Sergeant Major

3-77. The command sergeant major is the senior NCO of the battalion. He is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He monitors the implementation of established policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. He provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Personnel Officer

3-78. The S1 is the primary staff officer for all PSS matters and other administrative matters not assigned to another coordinating staff officer. He can perform additional special staff officer duties, such as inspector general, provost marshal, public affairs officer, and special services officer. Additional duties include postal operations and the management of stragglers and EPWs. His primary operational concerns are replacement operations, strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities. Under his direct supervision, the battalion personnel and administration center provides consolidated unit-level personnel administrative support to the SF battalion. When an FOB is established, the S1 is located in the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Intelligence Officer

3-79. The S2 is the primary staff officer responsible for all aspects of intelligence, CI, and security support in garrison and while deployed. He plans, coordinates, and directs all battalion-level intelligence collection, analysis, and production, and approves all products before dissemination. He develops and recommends PIR and IRs for approval by the battalion commander and maintains the battalion collection plan with the assistance of the S2 ACT. The S2 directs all intelligence-collection operations involving battalion assets or attached assets from the group MID.

3-80. The S2 identifies the need for collateral and SCI intelligence communications support and intelligence ADP systems support. He works with the S6 in planning and coordinating SCI and ADP systems support. He coordinates GI&S requests and products. He conducts or coordinates for a wide variety of CI activities in support of battalion OPSEC and FP needs. When an FOB is established, the S2 serves in the OPCEN under the staff supervision of the OPCEN director. He is responsible for the battalion's information security, information systems security, personnel security, and special security programs. He exercises technical supervision over the battalion's intelligence training program to make sure it not only enhances MI CMFs but also includes the 18-series CMFs. When required, the S2 establishes a tactical SCIF within the OPCEN.

Operations and Training Officer

3-81. The S3 is the primary staff officer for all matters pertaining to the operations, training, preparation, deployment, employment, and readiness of the battalion and its subordinate elements. He also has overall staff responsibility for the employment of CA and PSYOP (S5), OPSEC, EW, PR, and deception operations within the battalion. The S3 is responsible for managing ammunition, the training budget, personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), air support requirements, training resources, and taskings. When the battalion commander establishes an FOB, the S3 serves as the OPCEN director.

Operations Sergeant Major

3-82. The operations sergeant major works directly for the S3 and is the primary staff NCO for daily operations in all matters pertaining to the

operations, training, preparation, deployment, employment, and readiness of the battalion and its subordinate elements. He has additional responsibilities for the employment of CA and PSYOP (S5), OPSEC, EW, PR, and deception operations within the battalion. The operations sergeant major also manages ammunition, the training budget, PERSTEMPO, air support requirements, training resources, and taskings.

Logistics Officer

3-83. The S4 is the primary staff officer for all logistics matters. He is the battalion's primary logistics planner and coordinator. He exercises staff supervision over the battalion support company's (BSC's) service detachment and attached logistics units. He coordinates closely with the BSC commander, who is the primary logistics officer of the battalion. The S4 is responsible for ordering all National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) standard products (hard copy and soft copy maps and digital data) using standard Army logistics procedures. When an FOB is established, the S4 falls under the supervision of the SPTCEN director. The S4 in an FOB assumes the role of logistics operations and plans officer.

Civil-Military Operations Officer

3-84. The S5 is the primary staff officer for all CMO, including foreign nation support (FNS). He advises the commander on political and military matters and assists him in meeting his legal obligations and moral considerations to the local populace. He exercises staff supervision over attached CA elements. When the FOB is established, the S5 is located with the OPCEN and reports to the OPCEN director.

Signal Officer

3-85. The S6 is the primary staff officer for all signal matters. He plans signal operations, prepares the signal annex to OPORDs, and recommends employment of SF battalion signal assets. He is also the tactical command information systems management officer with staff responsibility for automation. He is also the battalion COMSEC officer and supervises the battalion COMSEC custodian. He assists the S2 and S3 in preparing EW plans and is responsible for EP. He supervises the battalion's frequency manager, who prepares the battalion's SOI and assigns frequencies to subordinate units. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training of organic and attached communications personnel. When the FOB is established, he performs the duties of the SIGCEN director and reports to the FOB deputy commander.

Battalion Flight Surgeon

3-86. The battalion flight surgeon is the primary advisor to the commander and staff for all matters affecting the mental and physical health of the battalion, its attached elements, and its supported indigenous force. He coordinates veterinary care at battalion level when required. He directly supervises the battalion medical section and exercises staff supervision over attached medical units. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training of organic and attached medical personnel. When an FOB is

established, the flight surgeon is collocated with the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Battalion Chemical Officer

3-87. The battalion chemical officer advises the battalion commander and staff on all matters pertaining to NBC defense and the concept for chemical unit support of battalion operations. He is responsible for the collection, collation, evaluation, and distribution of NBC data. The battalion chemical officer recommends NBC defensive posture and operations. He supervises and monitors NBC training throughout the command and provides technical supervision of all NBC activities. When the FOB is established, the chemical officer is located with the OPCEN and reports to the S3.

Battalion Chaplain

3-88. The battalion chaplain, when attached, is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on moral, ethical, and religious issues affecting the unit's mission. He plans and coordinates the activities of the UMT to make sure all assigned and attached personnel and their families have comprehensive religious support. He assesses the religious attitudes of indigenous populations to determine the impact of those attitudes on SF operations. When an FOB is established, the chaplain is located with the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Battalion Judge Advocate

3-89. The battalion judge advocate, when attached, is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on legal matters. He advises on matters involving military law, U.S. domestic law, foreign law, SOFAs, international law, operational law, and ROE. He reviews all sensitive mission taskings, plans, and orders to make sure they adequately address legal issues. When an FOB is established, the judge advocate is located in the SPTCEN and reports to the SPTCEN director.

Staff Weather Officer

3-90. The SWO is a group asset that when attached is the USAF meteorologist tasked to support the SF battalion. The SWO coordinates all METOC support to the battalion. This special staff officer is the primary POC for information referring to weather, light, tide, and related matters. The SWO also commands the attached USAF SOWT while under the staff supervision of the S2. When the FOB is established, the SWO is located in the OPCEN and reports to the S2.

Battalion Operations Warrant Officer

3-91. The battalion operations warrant officer is an assistant S3 who focuses primarily on operations and training. He is the coordinator for the battalion's short-, mid-, and long-range training plans and for maintaining and coordinating current operations. He manages joint, combined, JCS, and unilateral exercise training. He also interfaces regularly with the theater SOC, U.S. Embassies overseas, and other government agencies to plan and coordinate training and operational missions. He is also responsible for the

management of ASO and UAR. He serves as the senior warrant officer advisor to the battalion commander on warrant officer assignments, professional development, and accessions.

Assistant Battalion Intelligence Officer

3-92. The assistant battalion S2 is a senior warrant officer. He serves primarily as officer in charge (OIC) of the ACT.

Analysis and Control Team

3-93. The ACT consists of a senior intelligence NCO and one or more all-source analysts. IMINT, SIGINT, CI, and human intelligence (HUMINT) specialists assist the ACT as required. The section typically operates within a SCIF. The ACT receives all RFIs and RIIs from subordinate detachments or teams and determines how to satisfy the requirements in a timely manner. The ACT develops and implements an intelligence-collection plan that supports mission analysis and planning, current operations, and FP.

3-94. The ACT is the hub of the S2 section, and it has broad intelligence support responsibilities. It consists of all-source intelligence analysts (96B) and IMINT analysts (96D). The ACT responds to all-source intelligence support taskings from the battalion S2. The 96B all-source intelligence analysts within the ACT monitor the unit collection plan and identify new requirements to close intelligence gaps. The ACT receives and validates all RIIs and RFIs from subordinate units and assigns them with the commander's prioritization to the appropriate team of the S2 section. The ACT informs the S2 of PIR satisfaction and recommends new PIR, IRs, and SIRs. It reports intelligence to higher or lateral HQ, based on guidance from the S2, and coordinates dissemination of intelligence to subordinate and attached units. They are responsible for IPB, situation and target development, and BDA. All members of the ACT contribute to the preparation of the S2's intelligence estimate.

3-95. The ACT produces and updates TIPs for the SFODAs, SFODBs, and SOT-As. They maintain and use the unit intelligence reference files and databases, including the SOCRATES intelligence ADP system. The ACT personnel translate all PIR from the group or the JFSOCC into SIRs for tasking to SFODAs, SFODBs, and SOT-As. The ACT personnel prepare INTSUMs, IIRs, and responses to RIIs and present intelligence briefings as required. The ACT provides all-source analysis and intelligence production support to the SF battalion. The 96B all-source analysts within the ACT focus and refine the efforts of three single-source suborganizations—the IMINT analyst, the SIGINT traffic analysis team, and the CI-HUMINT team.

3-96. **CI-HUMINT Team.** The CI-HUMINT team consists of two CI agents (97B), augmented by two interrogators (97E) from the group MID. The interrogators are attached according to the target language of the battalion's current mission. The CI-HUMINT soldiers on this team are responsible for a large number of tactical CI-HUMINT analysis, production, collection, and operational support activities. The team produces IIRs and other formatted reports to disseminate the results of CI-HUMINT collection and liaison activities. The team uses locally collected intelligence and theater

CI-HUMINT products to assess a wide variety of threats within the battalion AOR. These threats include, but are not limited to, FIS; insurgents, terrorists, and criminals; dissident political factions; and anti-U.S. elements of the civilian populace.

3-97. The CI-HUMINT team prepares and maintains the battalion MDCI estimate, as well as comprehensive base defense, COMMZ, and HN rear area IPB products. These products permit the timely reporting of indications and warning (I&W) information and predictive analysis on significant OPSEC and FP threats. The CI-HUMINT specialists develop the profiles of the friendly force and identify friendly vulnerabilities.

3-98. In response to the situation and collection taskings from the S2, the CI-HUMINT team plans, coordinates, and conducts CI liaison, EPW interrogation, document exploitation, overt collection, and displaced civilian debriefings. The team also serves as the OPCEN focal point for FP activities. It recommends EEFI and threat countermeasures, ensures compliance with intelligence oversight regulations, and continually assesses the effectiveness of the base OPSEC countermeasures and base security plans. The CI team supports the OPSEC plan by providing SAEDA briefings and limited investigations. It also provides CI and security site surveys in support of FOB relocation within the country or theater, as required.

Medical Section

3-99. The battalion medical section provides CHS to the battalion and its attached elements. This support includes unit-level medical support and health services logistics (including maintenance of the Class VIII basic load), emergency medical and resuscitative treatment for all classes of patients, emergency dental treatment, and preventive medicine support. Veterinary support is coordinated through the group medical section.

BATTALION SUPPORT COMPANY

3-100. The BSC (Figure 3-7, page 3-24) provides routine administrative and logistics support to the battalion HQ detachment, the company's organic elements, and the FOB SPTCENs and SIGCENs. The support company commander commands all personnel and elements assigned or attached to the company. He is the battalion's primary logistics officer. When the battalion establishes an FOB, he may serve as the SPTCEN director. His duties require direct interface with the GSC or battalion and TA logistics support elements. In coordination with the S3 and HQ commandant, the support company commander prepares the base defense plan and supervises the activities of the BDOC. When all SFODBs are committed to other missions, the SPTCEN commander commands all the uncommitted SFODAs and attached SOT-As at the FOB and supervises their premission training activities in coordination with the OPCEN.

SERVICE DETACHMENT

3-101. The service detachment performs unit-level supply, service, and maintenance functions for the entire SF battalion and its attached elements. When the battalion establishes an FOB, the service detachment commander

coordinates and supervises SPTCEN logistics activities. He works for the BSC commander under the staff supervision of the S4. The battalion service detachment does not have organic truck drivers in its supply and transportation section.




Figure 3-7. BSC, SF Battalion (TOE 31-808LO)

SIGNAL DETACHMENT

3-102. The battalion signal detachment has two primary functions. It installs, operates, and maintains secure FOB radio communications with the SFOB (or other higher HQ) and deployed SFODAs and SOCCEs under the FOB's direct control. It also installs, operates, and maintains continuous internal FOB communications. This base communications support includes message center services, internal telephone communications, and electronic maintenance. The detachment has no organic multimedia or COMSEC section; however, the signal detachment normally maintains its own COMSEC subaccount.

3-103. When the battalion establishes an FOB, the signal detachment commander serves as the SIGCEN SYSCON officer and assistant SIGCEN

director. When the detachment is formally detached from the support company, the detachment commander exercises normal company-level command. The detachment, however, depends on the support company for administrative and logistics support.

SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY

3-104. The SF company (Figure 3-8) plans and conducts SO activities in any operational environment—permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The company HQ is the SFODB, a 10-man team (Figure 3-9, page 3-26). In garrison, the SFODB commands and controls its own organic SFODAs. The SF company commander, an experienced SF major, normally has more authority and greater freedom of action than do conventional Army company commanders. When deployed, the SFODB functions as a separate operational detachment with its own assigned mission. The mission may require the SFODB to operate separately or to exercise OPCON of a mix of organic and attached SFODAs. A significant difference exists between conventional Army companies and SFODBs. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti (1994–95) illustrates this difference. During the operation, SFODBs acted as area commands providing C2 to the SFODAs, which in turn performed peacekeeping missions throughout the country. Early in the operation, 5 SFODBs commanded 30 SFODAs, which made up the entire U.S. presence outside Port-au-Prince, the capital city, and the city of Cap Haitien. This presence encompassed 90 percent of Haiti’s land area and was the peacekeeping effort for approximately 5 million Haitians. Later in the operation, two additional SFODBs arrived with more SFODAs, bringing the total number of deployed teams to 44 with the same requirements as the original force.




Figure 3-8. SF Company (SFOB)



Figure 3-9. Composition of an SFODB

3-105. The SFODB is a multipurpose C2 element with many employment options. It can exercise C2 over one to six SFODAs. The SFODB's primary missions are to act as an advanced operational base (AOB), a SOCCE, or an isolation facility (ISOFAC). All three of these missions may require augmentation with USAF special weather observers or other personnel as required. The SFODB can also deploy to conduct SF operations in a specified AO or JSOA.

FUNCTIONS

3-106. The SFODB plans and conducts SF operations separately or as part of a larger force. It also—

- Trains and prepares SFODAs for deployment.

- Establishes and operates, when augmented, an AOB to expand the C2 capabilities of an SFOB or an FOB.
- Infiltrates and exfiltrates specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.
- Conducts operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods with minimal external direction and support.
- Develops, organizes, equips, trains, and advises or directs indigenous forces up to regiment size in SO activities.
- Trains, advises, and assists other U.S. and multinational forces and agencies.
- Serves as a SOCCE at a corps-level or higher conventional HQ. Recent operations have placed SOCCEs at tactical HQ, but such task organizations are inadvisable as they strain SF organizational and personnel resources.
- Organizes, advises, and assists a UW area command in a specified JSOA.
- Serves as a pilot team to assess the resistance potential in a specified JSOA.
- Establishes and operates an ISOFAC for an SFOB or an FOB.
- Augments the C2 capabilities of an SFOB or an FOB.
- Performs other SO activities as directed by higher authority.

COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-107. Each member of an SFODB has specific performance requirements in planning and conducting operations. All detachment members are capable of advising, assisting, or directing foreign counterparts in their functional areas up through regiment level. The responsibilities that follow are the specific requirements for each SFODB member.

Company Commander

3-108. The company commander exercises command of the personnel and elements assigned or attached to the company. When the SF company is employed as an AOB, an ISOFAC, or a SOCCE, the SF company commander commands those elements.

Executive Officer

3-109. The company executive officer directs the company staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. In coordination with the company sergeant major, he directs and supervises company administrative and logistics activities.

Operations Warrant Officer

3-110. The company operations warrant officer is responsible for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, intelligence and CI activities, and future operations of the company and its SFODAs. He is the coordinator for the company's short-, mid-, and long-range training. He is also responsible for ASO management and is the focal point officer for MOSs 18F and 180A

intelligence training. He serves as the senior warrant officer advisor to the company commander on warrant officer assignments, professional development, and accessions.

Sergeant Major

3-111. The company sergeant major is the senior NCO of the company. He is the commander's primary advisor on matters pertaining to the health and welfare of enlisted personnel. He supervises the daily training, operations, and administration of the company.

Operations Sergeant and Assistant Operations Sergeant

3-112. The operations sergeant and the assistant operations sergeant work with the executive officer and company operations warrant officer in accomplishing their duties. When the SF company and its SFODAs are uncommitted, they manage the company's training program for the company commander. They manage the day-to-day activities of the company, both in garrison and on deployments.

Supply Sergeant

3-113. The supply sergeant is the company's primary logistics planner and coordinator. He coordinates closely with the battalion S4, service detachment commander, and SFODA S4 planners to meet the logistics requirements of the company and its SFODAs.

Medical Sergeant

3-114. The medical sergeant provides routine, preventive, and emergency medical care. He establishes field medical facilities to support operations. He trains allied and indigenous personnel in basic emergency and preventive medical care. He also gathers medical information and provides limited mission-related veterinary care. In garrison, he maintains the company's medical readiness data. He advises the commander on all medical-related issues.

Communications Sergeant

3-115. The two communications sergeants advise the commander on communications matters. They install, operate, and maintain communications equipment IAW METT-TC. They train detachment members and indigenous forces in signal equipment and procedures. They also advise the commander on all communications-related issues.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT A

3-116. The basic building block of SF operations is the 12-man SFODA (Figure 3-10, page 3-29), also known as an *A detachment* or *A team*. All other SF organizations are designed to command, control, and support the SFODA.




Figure 3-10. Composition of an SFODA

FUNCTIONS

3-117. The SFODA is designed to organize, equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces engaged in UW or FID activities. Using its inherent capabilities, the SFODA also performs the other SF missions and collateral activities discussed in Chapter 2. The time-tested composition of the SFODA remains as viable and relevant today as it has been throughout SF's history. The commander of an SFODA is a captain. His two primary assistants are an assistant detachment commander (an SF warrant officer) and an operations sergeant (a master sergeant). The SFODA has one assistant operations and intelligence sergeant and two specialists in

each of the four primary SF functional areas (weapons, engineer, medical, and communications). By having two of each of the specialties, the SFODA can conduct split-team operations when the situation does not warrant the employment of the full team or when the commander believes it is prudent to do so. During split-team operations, the detachment commander and the assistant detachment commander each commands one of the split teams. The operations sergeant and the second-ranking NCO on the detachment each serves as the senior NCOs on one of the split teams. The SFODA can serve as a manpower pool from which higher SF commanders can organize a tailored composite team to perform a specific mission.

3-118. By TOE, each SF battalion has one SFODA trained in underwater operations (UWO) and one SFODA trained in military free-fall parachuting (MFFP). The remaining SFODAs may be trained in SFAUC, ASO, military mountaineering, surface maritime operations (water infiltration and scout swimmer), or long-range vehicle operations based on the SFODA's METL.

3-119. The SFODA can—

- Plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger force.
- Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, and sea.
- Conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with a minimum of external direction and support.
- Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces up to battalion size.
- Train, advise, and assist other U.S. and multinational forces and agencies.
- Plan and conduct unilateral SF operations.
- Perform other SO activities as directed by higher authority.

COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

3-120. All detachment members are capable of training, advising, assisting, or directing foreign counterparts in their functional areas up through battalion level. To ensure functional coverage of all premission activities, the SFODA commander organizes a detachment staff using METT-TC. Detachment staff members perform their functional duties as described in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.

3-121. SF soldiers often hold more than one of the CMF 18 series MOSs. Further cross-training is fundamental to SF training. All team members can send a burst message, construct a demolition charge, and start an intravenous infusion. These additional skills are important in maintaining split-team operations and a mission-capable status in the event of a casualty.

3-122. Each member of an SFODA has specific performance requirements in planning and conducting operations. The responsibilities that follow are the specific requirements for each SFODA member.

Detachment Commander

3-123. The detachment commander exercises command of his detachment. He can command, organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead an indigenous combat force up to battalion size.

Assistant Detachment Commander

3-124. The assistant detachment commander is an SF warrant officer. He serves as second in command and ensures implementation of the detachment commander's decisions and concepts. He provides technical and tactical advice and assistance to the detachment commander on all matters pertaining to SO. His primary responsibilities within the detachment pertain to intelligence and operations for day-to-day activities, area studies, briefbacks, and OPORDs. He writes the mid- to long-range training calendars. He provides technical and tactical experience and guidance to detachment members. He can command, organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.

Operations Sergeant

3-125. The operations sergeant is the senior enlisted member of the detachment. He is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the detachment. With guidance from the commander, he assigns specific tasks, supervises the performance of detachment tasks, and prepares plans, orders, and reports. The operations sergeant oversees individual and collective training and the preparation of briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. He writes daily training schedules and maintains the responsibility for short-term training. He can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.

Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant

3-126. The assistant operations and intelligence sergeant is the detachment member responsible for all aspects of intelligence, CI, and FP for the SFODA and its indigenous forces. In garrison, he plans, coordinates, and conducts continuous collection planning and intelligence analysis in support of the detachment's area study and intelligence reference files effort. During mission planning, he analyzes the detachment mission and evaluates the unit intelligence database and TIPS. The intent of this analysis and evaluation is to identify intelligence gaps and to conduct a detailed IPB in support of the development of the plan of execution (POE). The assistant operations and intelligence sergeant also requests imagery, maps, weather information, topographic terrain analysis products, and intelligence updates from the battalion S2. In addition, he disseminates the mission classification guidance and assists the commander in implementing OPSEC and information security procedures. While deployed, he continually updates the mission intelligence estimate and advises the SFODA commander on significant changes in the threat and the HN military and civilian populace. He also interrogates and processes EPWs and civilian detainees, debriefs friendly patrols, conducts informal intelligence liaison with local HN military and police forces, and questions the local populace to acquire combat and FP information. He also provides intelligence reports and summaries to higher HQ. Finally, he assists

the detachment operations sergeant in preparing area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. He can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Weapons Sergeants

3-127. The two weapons sergeants employ conventional and UW tactics and techniques as tactical mission leaders. They train detachment members and indigenous forces in the use of individual small arms, light crew-served weapons, and antiaircraft and antiarmor weapons. They plan and implement the tactical security of the team. They assist the operations sergeant in the preparation of the operations and training portions of area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. They can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Engineer Sergeants

3-128. The two engineer sergeants plan, supervise, lead, perform, and instruct all aspects of combat engineering and light construction engineering. They construct and employ improvised munitions. They plan and perform sabotage operations. They prepare the engineer and targeting analysis portions of area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. They can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Medical Sergeants

3-129. The two medical sergeants provide emergency, routine, and limited definitive care for detachment members and associated indigenous personnel. They train, advise, and direct detachment routine, emergency, and preventive medical care. They establish field medical facilities to support detachment operations. SF medical sergeants are highly trained as practitioners in emergency care, primary care medicine, parasitology, dentistry, and advanced life-support techniques. Their primary limitations are that they cannot open the thoracic, abdominal, or cranial cavities without consulting with a physician, unless death appears unavoidable without immediate medical intervention. SF medical sergeants also provide limited veterinary care. SF medical sergeants serve as the medical officer for an indigenous force up to the battalion level. Their duties within a JSOA can include, but are not limited to, overseeing preinduction screening, combat lifesaver and other medical training, soldier and family member healthcare, CHS, and field preventive medicine. Indigenous medical personnel in the JSOA can augment the SF medical sergeants' efforts. The medical sergeants prepare the medical portion of area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. They can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Communications Sergeants

3-130. The two communications sergeants install, operate, and maintain communications equipment. They advise the detachment commander on communications matters. They train detachment members and indigenous forces in communications. They prepare the communications portion of area studies, briefbacks, OPLANs, and OPORDs. They can organize, train, assist, advise, direct, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Chapter 4

Command and Control of Special Forces Operations

SF operates under many varied C2 relationships. The requirements at each echelon of command determine the exact C2 structure. SF operations are inherently joint and frequently controlled by higher echelons, often with minimal involvement of intermediate HQ. Certain functions or activities may require oversight at the national level. This chapter discusses C2 of SF operations from the theater level down. It provides a number of generic command relationships that may be tailored to meet the needs of the situation.

COMMAND ENVIRONMENT

4-1. SF operations require a responsive, unified C2 structure. Unnecessary layering of HQ in the SF chain of command decreases responsiveness and threatens OPSEC. All SF commanders must understand the nature of joint, combined, and interagency operations because their abbreviated chains of command often require frequent contact with joint and combined HQ, as well as interagency departments. Every operational HQ above the SF group level is joint. For detailed discussions of joint operations as they apply to SF Operations, see JPs 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*; 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; and 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

4-2. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is the Army Service Component of the USSOCOM. It provides trained and ready SF, Ranger, Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA), PSYOP, and CA personnel to Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), geographic CINCs and U.S. Ambassadors. USASOC is responsible for the development of unique ARSOF doctrine, TTP, and materiel. The USASOC commander exercises command of Active Army and USAR SOF based in CONUS. He also oversees and evaluates ARNG SF in CONUS.

4-3. The major subordinate units of USASOC are the USASFC(A), the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC[A]), the special operations support command (airborne) (SOSCOM)(A), the 75th Ranger Regiment, the ARSOA Regiment, and the USAJFKSWCS.

4-4. The process of mission tasking for ARSOF elements begins when the geographic CINC forwards his requirements through the JCS to USSOCOM. The joint staff validates the mission requirement and forwards the request through USSOCOM to USASOC. In the case of JCS exercises, no deployment order is required and hence not routed through the JCS. USASOC tasks its

major subordinate units to fill the requirement for the validated mission. Commanders may use Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) assets to satisfy a mission requirement. Both may deploy as units or as individuals. The RC structure is dependent upon the type of RC call-up authority granted for the operation.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

4-5. USASFC(A) HQ is a table of distribution and allowances (TDA), nondeploying major subordinate command (MSC) of USASOC. Its mission is to organize, train, equip, validate, and prepare forces for deployment to conduct worldwide SO—across the range of military operations—in support of USCINCSOC, geographic CINCs, U.S. Ambassadors, and other agencies as directed by USASOC.

4-6. When tasked by USASOC to fill personnel requirements for validated missions in current and projected war plans, USASFC(A) may recommend Active Army and RC major subordinate units (MSUs) and direct training priorities to meet requirements for assigned missions.

4-7. USASFC(A) also recommends to USASOC the employment of MSUs and their level of participation in CJCS exercises, joint combined exchange training (JCET) exercises, MTTs, deployments for training (DFTs), and deployments in support of other regional engagement operations as directed by the geographic CINCs.

4-8. USASFC(A) exercises command authority consistent with assignment of OPCON over all CONUS-based Active Army USAR and federalized ARNG SF elements, to include CRDs. Upon deployment of the designated units from CONUS, OPCON is relinquished by USASFC(A) and gained by the geographic CINC or other appropriate authority.

THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

4-9. The NCA has established five geographic unified commands, each with broad strategic responsibility for U.S. military operations in an AOR. Each geographic combatant CINC has established a theater SOC as a subordinate unified command to function as the joint force special operations component (JFSOC) of his command. Other joint force commanders with broad continuing missions and area responsibilities may also establish theater SOCs as functional component commands to perform the same JFSOC functions in their theaters. During active military operations, the theater SOC may transition into a multinational organization under the control of a multinational CINC. This publication simplifies its discussion by referring to the *theater CINC* and the *theater SOC* to encompass all these command relationships.

4-10. As the JFSOCC, the theater Commander, Special Operations Command (COMSOC) exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached theater SOF. He begins the SOF mission-planning process by developing the theater CINC's broad guidance into a blend of SO activities that support the theater campaign or engagement plans. Keeping a theater-wide perspective, he must understand the CINC's vision and strategic concept and the way the other

theater component commanders intend to support the theater plan. The COMSOC must identify and anticipate theater operational and intelligence requirements appropriate for SOF and then develop and recommend SO activities that satisfy those requirements. The COMSOC may be dual-hatted as the theater CINC's SO staff officer or executive agent.

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

4-11. A JSOTF is established to plan, conduct, and support joint SO in a specific theater of operations or to accomplish a specific joint SO mission. Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriate when SOF C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater SOC staff. A JSOTF staff is normally established around elements from the theater SOC staff or the staff of an SF group or similar Service SOF unit with augmentation from other Service SOF. The theater COMSOC may exercise OPCON of a subordinate JSOTF or transfer OPCON or TACON of a JSOTF to another supported Service, joint or multinational force commander for a specific contingency operation. When the JSOTF transitions into a multinational organization, it becomes a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). JP 3-05.5, *Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures*, details the organization and operations of a JSOTF.

4-12. The JFSOCC may establish an ARSOTF to function as the operational ARSOF component HQ of the theater SOC or JSOTF. An ARSOTF usually is organized around the nucleus of an SF group or battalion. It may include a mix of SF, Ranger, ARSOA, PSYOP, CA, signal assets, and other CS and CSS assets, as required. The ARSOTF is similar to a conventional combined arms task force but specifically supports an SO mission. The composition and command relationships of the ARSOTF depend on its specific circumstances. Its normal augmentation can include—

- A CA detachment.
- A PSYOP detachment.
- A medical detachment.
- An engineer detachment.
- An MP detachment.
- An MI detachment.
- A signal detachment.
- Other combat, CS, and CSS detachments, as required.

4-13. The ARSOTF commander responds to two channels of authority. The ARSOTF is normally under the OPCON of the JFSOCC for all operational matters and is under the administrative control (ADCON) of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for matters not assigned to the JFC. The ARSOTF commander and staff coordinate directly with the JFSOCC staff and the other Service SOF components on operational matters. They coordinate with the ASCC staff through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the attached special operations theater support element (SOTSE) to obtain required Army CS and CSS.

OPERATIONAL BASES

4-14. SF commanders employ the standard Army staff organization and military decision-making process described in FM 101-5. Their C2 facilities, however, differ significantly from those in conventional combat arms maneuver units. The SF group commander exercises C2 through a network of operational bases. These bases combine the functions of a command post, unit trains, and a staging area into a single entity. Their locations are normally at secure, logistically supportable sites. Bases may also be afloat or at home station or elsewhere in the CONUS. The SF group design permits SF commanders to task-organize the bases according to mission requirements and the operational environment. SF groups, battalions, and companies can establish and operate operational bases at each level of command. All SF bases are tactically organized in three functional centers—OPCEN, SIGCEN, and SPTCEN.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE

4-15. The SFOB is a command, control, and support base established and operated by an SF group using organic and attached resources. Each SF group is capable of establishing an SFOB. An SFOB may serve as the ARSOTF HQ or, when suitably augmented, as the nucleus of a JSOTF.

4-16. The SFOB develops the JFSOCC's operational guidance into tactical missions for the SF battalions—and other ARSOF battalions—to plan and execute. The SF group commander assigns specific missions and operational areas to the battalions, allocates SFODAs and other resources among them, and orchestrates their activities. As the ARSOF commander, the SF group commander also makes sure the battalions and their deployed detachments receive adequate administrative and logistics support from the ASCC. The SFOB coordinates group activities with higher, adjacent, and supported HQ. In unusual circumstances, the SFOB may also isolate, deploy, recover, and sustain SFODAs executing special missions under the direct OPCON of the group commander.

FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASE

4-17. The FOB is a command, control, and support base established and operated by an SF battalion, using organic and attached resources. Each SF battalion is capable of establishing an FOB. The FOB's task organization and functions vary with the factors of METT-TC. The FOB may collocate with the SFOB or be thousands of miles away from it. The FOB may be subordinate to or independent of the SFOB. An independent FOB reports directly to the JFSOCC—or another major HQ—and must task-organize to perform the broad planning and coordinating responsibilities normally performed by the SFOB. With augmentation, an SF group can establish four separate bases—an SFOB and three FOBs.

4-18. The FOB is responsible for isolating, preparing, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and reconstituting the SFODAs, SFODBs, and attached SOT-As deployed into specified AOs or JSOAs to execute assigned missions directed by higher HQ. An FOB's organization may be on an area or a functional basis. If the FOB's organization is on an area basis, it plans, conducts, and supports all SF operations in a specified AO or in support of a

specified conventional force. If the FOB's organization is on a functional basis, it plans, conducts, and supports a specific type of SF operation throughout the joint operations area or theater AOR. The SF group commander may, for example, direct an FOB to plan and conduct all sensitive SO in-theater, and two other FOBs elsewhere in-theater to perform area missions in DS of other component commanders.

ADVANCED OPERATIONAL BASE

4-19. The AOB is a C2 support base established and operated by an SF company using organic and attached resources. Each company can, when augmented, establish an AOB to support a specific mission or operation independently or to expand the C2 capabilities of the group or battalion. The AOB, with augmentation, is capable of continuous operations. Specifically, the AOB maintains 24-hour communication nets. AOB operations include—but are not limited to—establishing a deployment and recovery site, a radio relay site, and a mission support base.

BATTLE STAFF

4-20. To command effectively, the SF group commander must free himself from detailed mission planning and the daily activities of the SFOB. He must instead focus on broader issues, such as current and future operational requirements of the JFC, JFSOCC, and supported conventional commanders. He designs, executes, and sustains sequential and cumulative SF operations to support the theater campaign plan and the major OPLANs of the theater component commanders. The group commander also synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions, including supervising the battalions' decentralized execution of his operational and sustainment concepts.

4-21. To assist in these functions, the group commander may establish a battle staff. The battle staff operates out of the SFOB OPCEN but physically locates with the group commander. The battle staff is similar in function to a conventional commander's tactical command post. Anywhere the group commander travels, the battle staff can prepare an estimate or a fragmentary order. It keeps the SFOB OPCEN informed of new developments. It may direct the OPCEN to begin planning for a new mission, to reallocate available resources, or to request additional assets.

4-22. The battle staff reflects the group commander's personal leadership style, but it must remain small, mobile, and responsive to his needs. The group executive officer, assisted by the group command sergeant major, normally directs the battle staff. Depending on the situation, the battle staff may include the primary staff officers from the S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and S6 or their deputies. The S6 provides a secure tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications package linking the battle staff to the JFSOCC, ASCC, SFOB, and FOBs.

LIAISON AND COORDINATION OPERATIONS

4-23. In addition to their seven primary missions, SF units may be tasked to conduct liaison and coordination activities or related operations in support of the geographic combatant commands or JTF operations. ARSOF execute

liaison and coordination activities in several capacities. Whether individually or in teams, or organic members of assigned staffs, liaison and coordination representatives perform several critical functions that are consistent across the full spectrum of operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION ELEMENT

4-24. The special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) is the ARSOF element within the Army corps or Marine expeditionary force (MEF) G3 responsible for coordinating SO requirements. As an integral part of the corps or MEF staff, the SOCOORD provides a focal point for SOF C4I structure to synchronize SO activities in support of corps missions. The SOCOORD supports corps or MEF operations in the capacity of SO subject matter experts (SMEs), not as a C2 element for SOF deploying in support of the corps or the MEF. For more information on the SOCOORD, see Appendix A of this manual.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT

4-25. The SOCCE is a C2 element based on an SFODB augmented with a communications package, equipment, and selected personnel as required by METT-TC. It may also have liaison elements from other Army or joint SOF units. The SOCCE is normally OPCON or TACON to the conventional forces at corps level. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. The mission of the SOCCE is to synchronize operations between SF and conventional forces. For this synchronization to occur, communications must be established and maintained between the supported unit and the SOCCE and between the SOCOORD and the SOCCE. For more information on the SOCCE, see Appendix B of this manual.

SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON ELEMENT

4-26. For coordination below corps or MEF level, an SFLE, normally built around an SFODA, deploys to the HQ where direct liaison is required. Refer to Appendix C of this manual for a detailed description of SFLE operations.

LIAISON OFFICERS

4-27. Liaison officers (LNOs) are representatives (one to two) who serve in designated organizations. They serve primarily among JTF components to represent their commands and to coordinate operations, staff actions, and any other requirements. Normally, an LNO cell is a temporary requirement, established in support of any requirement.

SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS

4-28. During stability operations, SF's most common missions are UW, FID, or a collateral activity. Currently, public law prohibits SF or other U.S. military forces from taking an active combat role in FID. Instead, SFODAs train HN military and paramilitary forces to defend their own nation against a myriad of internal, external, and transnational threats. An understanding

of the Country Team and the SAO is essential to understanding interagency SF C2 arrangements in this operational environment.

COUNTRY TEAM

4-29. A Country Team is the executive committee of an embassy. It consists of senior members of U.S. Government agencies assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission overseas. By public law, the Ambassador is the Chief of Mission, and he directs the activities of the Country Team. Members of the Country Team meet regularly to coordinate U.S. Government political, economic, and military activities in the HN.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION

4-30. The SAO, within the Country Team, provides U.S. military advisory assistance to the HN. Certain countries do not have U.S. Embassies; therefore, the organizations within neighboring countries service them. An SAO is not present in all embassies. DOD tailors each SAO to the needs of the HN. For this reason, no typical or standard SAO organization exists. The SAO in country may have various names, depending on the number of personnel assigned, the functions it performs, or the desires of the HN. Typical SAO designations include Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Joint U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission, or Office of Defense Cooperation. The SAO is a joint organization. The SAO chief responds to three authorities: the country Ambassador, the CINC of the unified command, and the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Ambassador has OPCON of all matters affecting his diplomatic mission, including SA programs.

4-31. SF can provide detachment-level or individual advisory assistance to an HN military or paramilitary organization. In a permissive environment, this assistance is provided under the direction of the SAO chief. The U.S. advisor often works with civilians from other U.S. Country Team agencies. The advisor must have a full understanding of his status in the HN. A SOFA between the United States and the HN normally establishes the U.S. advisor's status. The agreement may provide for full or limited diplomatic immunity. In the absence of an agreement, the advisor is subject to local laws, customs, and local courts. Regardless of the diplomatic immunity afforded him, the advisor is expected to observe local laws, as well as the applicable laws of war and all U.S. Army regulations and directives.

4-32. When forming its policy for the employment of advisors, the DOD must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the United States and the HN. The introduction of military advisors requires thorough preparation of the HN populace with whom the advisors will come in contact. Before an advisor enters a country, the benefits of his presence are clearly emphasized to HN citizens. Credibility must be established well in advance to minimize propaganda benefits that may accrue to dissenting elements within the HN.

4-33. Before deploying overseas, SF units must know the scope of SAO activities being conducted in the HN. They must have an understanding of the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of the other U.S. agencies. This knowledge is important because SF often interacts with other U.S.

agencies. SF advisors and trainers must coordinate their actions with the Country Team during all phases of their deployment to avoid conflicts and duplication of effort.

INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

4-34. SFODAs often operate in interagency environments. An example is an SFODA conducting training in a province where the United States Agency for International Development is helping the local government build a school, or the United States Department of Agriculture is developing local farming methods. The SFODA may be the only contact these agencies have with another U.S. organization in the region. Prior coordination should be made through the Country Team with the appropriate organizations in the area. The organizations could be of valuable assistance to the SFODA. Without prior coordination, the SFODA and local organizations may find themselves working against each other.

4-35. SFODAs support interagency engagement activities through operational FID and HA missions, through SA missions, and through the ancillary benefits that may accrue to HN forces during a JCET. SFODAs conduct operational FID and HA missions under the OPCON of the theater SOC or another U.S. military commander, but their activities must be closely coordinated with other elements of the Country Team. USSOCOM and the Services fund operational deployments with their operations and maintenance (O&M) funds.

4-36. SFODAs task-organize as MTTs to conduct SA missions under the supervision of the in-country U.S. mission to meet the specific needs of the HN. The in-country SAO normally exercises OPCON and ADCON of the MTTs during mission execution. DOS SA programs fund SA missions.

4-37. By law (Title 10, United States Code [USC] 2011), SFODAs must conduct JCETs primarily for their own training benefit, but an ancillary benefit may be realized by improved interoperability and relations with the participating HN forces. The unit's O&M funds finance the JCETs. The SOF exclusion authorizes use of these funds to pay the incremental HN costs associated with the JCET. The in-country SAO or theater SOC normally exercises OPCON of the SFODAs during mission execution. The parent SF unit normally retains ADCON. The USSOCOM JCET program funds JCET activities.

SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

4-38. Because of the far-reaching nature of contingency operations, C2 relationships for deploying SF units can become confusing and convoluted. To relieve this confusion, SF commanders at all levels should consider several factors, including transfer of forces, options for establishing SF AOs, linkup operations with conventional forces, and SF C2 at the conventional force HQ.

TRANSFER OF FORCES

4-39. The overseas deployment of a CONUS-based SF unit involves the change of operational control (CHOP) from USSOCOM to the gaining

regional unified CINC. This CHOP may be a temporary attachment or a permanent reassignment. Transfers of forces between unified commands occur only by the authority of the NCA, using the processes prescribed by the NCA. The CHOP of forces for an operational deployment requires a deployment order approved by the NCA.

4-40. In a long-term war or conflict situation, the SF unit moves from home station to a port of embarkation. From there, it moves by air or sea into the gaining CINC's AOR. At a predetermined point (for example, upon crossing a specified latitude or longitude), OPCON formally transfers to the gaining CINC. The gaining CINC's ASCC is responsible for receiving the SF unit at the port of debarkation and moving it to its base location. The theater SOC receives OPCON of the SF unit from the ASCC when it arrives at its base location and becomes operational.

4-41. In a short-term contingency situation, the SF unit may establish its operational base at home station, elsewhere in CONUS, or outside the active AO but within the gaining CINC's AOR. SFODAs may be deployed from a battalion FOB, through a company AOB, or directly from CONUS into the AO. Deployment orders specify C2 and support relationships.

OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING SF AREAS OF OPERATIONS

4-42. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned to a JFSOCC to conduct SO activities. The JFC establishes a JSOA only when the JFSOCC's control of the airspace above his forces is critical. Otherwise, the JFC assigns the JFSOCC a surface AO and allows the theater airspace control authority to control the airspace above the AO. The JFSOCC assigns specific JSOAs to an SF commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of SF operations, the size and composition of indigenous forces, the hostile situation, and the political situation influence the number and composition of SFODAs deployed into a JSOA. Additional SFODAs may deploy later because of increased tempo in operations, expansion of existing resistance forces, or a change in the political situation.

4-43. During UW, a task-organized SFOD may infiltrate a JSOA when the situation is not well known, when the indigenous force is small, or when the indigenous force is so well developed that only minimum coordination is needed. It normally coordinates directly with the FOB staff on all operational, administrative, and logistics support matters.

4-44. Two or more SFODs may infiltrate a JSOA concurrently, each establishing separate area commands for larger areas or more complex situations. Lateral communication between detachments operating in adjacent areas is limited to need-to-know operational requirements or emergency situations.

4-45. As activities in the JSOA expand, a tailored SFOD may deploy to establish and advise an area command. The area command directs the activities of the SFODAs in subordinate JSOAs. In this situation, subordinate SFODAs coordinate all operational matters with the commanding SFOD, which in turn coordinates directly with the FOB staff. Each subordinate SFODA continues to coordinate routine administrative and logistics support directly with the FOB. In addition to SF, other U.S. or coalition military

organizations or agencies may have elements operating in the JSOA. The SOC commander must make every effort to identify these other elements. He coordinates to establish command and support relationships and the proper degree of liaison, coordination, and cooperation among elements. Coordination of all external agencies with the SOC or JSOTF is critical before the agencies conduct any activities that may affect operations within the JSOA.

4-46. In an era of increased mobility and a seamless battlespace, SF JSOAs may border or encompass part of another theater component's AO. This condition could allow conventional forces to bypass or overrun the SF units suddenly, or to place the SF units in a friendly rear area. In these cases, deconfliction by the theater SOC and close coordination with the bordering or approaching forces are critical to maintaining unity of effort and preventing fratricide.

LINKUP OPERATIONS WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES

4-47. Termination of all SF missions is preplanned whenever possible. Preplanning is exceptionally critical during the conduct of linkup operations. Once the intent to link up is determined, an SFLE deploys to the supported conventional force HQ. The SFLE coordinates the SFODA's linkup plan with that of the conventional force to ensure efficiency and to prevent fratricide. Elaborate plans for linkup must be avoided. Simple plans for linkup or passage of friendly lines, both taught in most leadership schools, produce the best results. During mission planning, planners must also address postmission employment for SF units conducting linkup with conventional forces. They must answer, as early as possible, such questions as, *Will the SFODA be attached to the conventional force, exfiltrated, or issued new instructions after linkup?*

SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND AND CONTROL AT CONVENTIONAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS

4-48. To ensure success, SF operations require synchronization with other ongoing or planned conventional force operations. This function is a fundamental command responsibility, enabled through coordination through a SOCOORD, SOCCE, or SFLE.

4-49. Information flow through and the placement of the SOCOORD, SOCCE, or SFLE are dependent upon the situation and the level of coordination required. At the corps or MEF level, the SOCOORD is the SO staff coordinating future SF operations into the overall plan. When SF conducts missions that support the conventional forces or operates within a conventional force's AOR, the SOC or JSOTF commander directs a SOCCE to collocate with the conventional forces. The SOCCE performs a vital function during the conduct of an SF mission that supports or potentially operates in the path of a tactical unit. SOF commanders at every level must analyze conventional force dispositions and missions to ensure that the proper SF liaison presence is established when required.

SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

4-50. In some situations, SF may receive OPCON or attachment of conventional forces. This situation is most likely to occur in MOOTW when an SF-supported indigenous combat force requires additional combat power for a specific combined arms operation. SF control of conventional forces may also take place in linkup or postlinkup combat operations during the combat employment phase of an insurgency or when the ARSOTF HQ is the senior Army HQ in the AO.

Chapter 5

Special Forces Operational Bases

SF operations are planned, directed, deployed, supported, and recovered through a system of operational bases—the SFOB, the FOB, and the AOB. Each level of SF command task-organizes to establish bases with specific functions. This chapter describes how SF commanders task-organize to establish, operate, sustain, and protect their bases.

BASE LOCATION CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. The group commander recommends SF base locations to the JFSOCC for approval. The primary determinant of the number and types of bases is the mission. Considering the duration and scope of operations, the group commander determines the base or combination of bases that will satisfy mission requirements. The group commander must make sure the base locations give him responsive C2, sufficient OPSEC, and adequate CSS.

5-2. The group commander should locate the SFOB and FOBs at secure and logistically sustainable locations outside the combat zone. The bases do not necessarily need to be in the AOR they support. They may remain in CONUS, locate in a friendly nation outside the supported CINC's AOR, or be established at sea. Regardless of the base location, the SF unit must consider the following:

- Security requirements.
- Distance from deployment sites for infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration.
- Access to main supply routes.
- OPSEC (visual and electronic signatures).

NOTE: Locating bases on existing military installations with defended perimeters enhances OPSEC. It reduces SF signatures, as well as SF exterior guard requirements. Collocating with an airfield, a port facility, or a major conventional HQ, however, may increase the likelihood of collateral damage to the SF base if the other facility is targeted.

- Communication ranges to deployed SFODAs and connectivity with higher, adjacent, and supported HQ.
- Access to training facilities.

NOTE: The training of uncommitted SFODAs continues after actual SF operations begin. Uncommitted SFODAs train in basic and advanced SF skills between operational missions; therefore, SF base locations must have access to suitable training facilities.

5-3. Base activities may be consolidated at one site or dispersed at several smaller sites. Dispersal may improve OPSEC by reducing the signature of the base, but dispersal also complicates base functions. The SFG(A) and battalion have limited TOE capability to support dispersed base facilities.

BASE ORGANIZATION

5-4. Each SF commander normally organizes his base into an OPCEN, a SPTCEN, and a SIGCEN. The OPCEN is primarily concerned with operational matters, such as mission planning and execution. The SPTCEN handles all CSS and CHS requirements. The SIGCEN installs, operates, and maintains the base's internal and external command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems. All three centers have their own organization and functions, but their activities are interdependent.

ALTERNATE BASES

5-5. The group commander must designate a subordinate FOB as the alternate SFOB, to assume the SFOB's functions, if the primary SFOB is destroyed or compromised. He also designates an alternate base for each deployed FOB and AOB. The group commander ensures that each alternate base is prepared to assume the primary base's mission. He pays particular attention to emergency communications procedures, established intelligence links, and the provision of mission operations cell (MOC) packages to the alternate ISOFAC.

BASE DISPLACEMENT

5-6. SFOBs and FOBs are normally fixed, but they may be required to move because of hostile activity or natural disaster. The group and battalion commanders and their staffs must prepare contingency displacement plans to ensure continuity of operations. Before relocating the primary base, they must shift minimum operational and emergency communications to their alternate base. Base displacement plans must include—

- Criteria for movement.
- C2 of ongoing operations.
- Alternate base locations.
- Means of movement.
- Sequences and phases of movement.

OPERATIONS CENTER

5-7. The OPCEN is the functional activity that plans, coordinates, directs, and controls SF operations in a designated AO. It performs the functions of the conventional combat arms unit's tactical operations center (TOC).

OPCEN DIRECTOR

5-8. Based on approved plans and guidance from the commander, the OPCEN director supervises all operational aspects of mission planning and

execution. The OPCEN director ensures the total orchestration of S2, S3, and S5 activities within the OPCEN.

LIAISON SECTION

5-9. The liaison section is under the direct supervision of the OPCEN director. The SFOB commander provides LNOs to the JFSOCC for work in the JFSOCC OPCEN and the JFACC special operations liaison element (SOLE). He also exchanges LNOs with the joint special operations air component (JSOAC) and naval special warfare task group (NSWTG). He may also exchange LNOs with U.S. nonmilitary agencies, allied military organizations, and other organizations as deemed necessary. FOB commanders provide LNOs to the SFOB or to the JFSOCC if operating independently. The center directors coordinate closely with the appropriate LNOs to ensure proper mutual support and to synchronize joint SO activities. The TOE does not authorize LNOs to the SFG(A). The SFOB commander must use personnel from uncommitted SFODAs if he cannot obtain external augmentation.

S2 SECTION

5-10. The base S2 section, under the direction of the unit S2, is the focal point for all intelligence, CI, and security support for the base and its assigned and attached units. The base S2 section consists of personnel from the S2 staff and the MID. The S2 task-organizes the S2 section based on METT-TC and the approved concept for intelligence operations. The organization of the base S2 section is different at each echelon. At the SFOB level, the organization of the S2 section includes current intelligence, plans and targeting support, and security branches, all supported by the MID. At the FOB level, the S2 section performs the current intelligence function, as well as plans and targeting support functions. At the AOB level, the company operations warrant officer and the 18F focus on intelligence matters. They may be augmented by intelligence analysts from their battalion S2 section or a traffic analysis team from the group level.

S2 Current Intelligence Branch

5-11. This branch collocates with S3 operations in the OPCEN, outside the SCIF. The primary responsibility of the branch is to maintain the current intelligence estimate and situational awareness of hostile forces of interest to the OPCEN director and base commander. This branch also supervises the activities of the attached SOWT.

S2 Plans and Targeting Support Branch

5-12. At the SFOB level, this branch collocates with the S3 plans branch and provides targeting and other intelligence support to that branch. Using the MID intelligence databases, it performs intelligence analysis in support of feasibility assessments, COA development, and targeting. It prepares the intelligence annex for OPLANs. It also coordinates GI&S support for the base. It therefore serves as the interface between operational planners and targeting personnel and the MID.

S3 SECTION

5-13. The base S3 section, under the direction of the unit S3, is responsible for the unit's organization, training, and operations. At the SFOB and FOB levels, the section normally has three branches: operations, plans, and training. At the AOB level, a small, tailored S3 section focuses almost exclusively on the current operations for which the base was established.

S3 Operations Branch

5-14. The S3 operations branch monitors, directs, and coordinates current SF operations of subordinate units. It maintains the current operations estimate for the OPCEN director. It also exercises staff supervision of the ISOFAC and the preparation of isolated SFODAs for deployment. (See the ISOFAC portion of this chapter.) Other specific functions include—

- Preparing OPORDs and mission briefs for isolated SFODAs.
- Receiving, processing, and forwarding or approving air and other mission-support requests.
- Coordinating infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and recovery operations.
- Monitoring training of uncommitted SFODAs.
- Planning and coordinating offensive EW and IO.
- Integrating PSYOP and CA into current operations.
- Managing the Class V unit basic load (UBL).
- Preparing the unit readiness report.
- Preparing other reports to the JFSOCC and other higher HQ.

5-15. Under the direction of the S3 operations, the S3 air officer or NCO is the coordinator for all the airlift assets required by the base and the SFODAs. Planning for the type of aircraft, parking requirements around the base, and time scheduling is the job of this section. The S3 air officer is also a valuable source of reference information for capabilities, limitations, and regulations pertaining to airframes and air operations.

5-16. Under the direction of the S3 operations, the PSYOP officer advises the commander and his staff on the psychological implications of specific SF operations. He recommends how to integrate PSYOP into SF operations. He coordinates external PSYOP support as well. The PSYOP officer exercises staff supervision over the attached PSYOP support cell. The JFSOCC normally attaches a tailored PSYOP support cell to the group to provide direct PSYOP support from the SFOB. The group commander further attaches PSYOP teams to subordinate SF commanders, as required. At the FOB and AOB levels, the attached PSYOP team leader also serves as PSYOP staff officer to the supported SF commander.

5-17. Under the direction of the S3 operations, the chemical officer establishes and operates the NBC element in the OPCEN. The NBC element receives and processes NBC reports from higher HQ and deployed SFODAs. It maintains the current NBC status of the unit. It briefs and assists committed SFODAs during mission preparation. It also monitors unit NBC training.

S3 Plans Branch

5-18. This staff branch coordinates and prepares the unit's targeting effort and contingency plans. It coordinates and prepares feasibility assessments and mission OPLANs in support of the targeting and mission planning process. It reviews plans of subordinate elements and coordinates plans with the other centers of the base. It anticipates future SF operations as far in advance as possible. The OPCEN director normally transfers staff responsibility for an SF operation from S3 plans to S3 operations when the decision is made to isolate the SFODAs. This branch also maintains, coordinates, and revises the unit's MTOE and augmentation TDA.

5-19. As an alternative arrangement, SFOB and FOB commanders may task-organize a consolidated S5 plans section to facilitate the planning process by providing a counterpart to the Plans Directorate of a joint staff (J5) of the JFC and JFSOCC. The consolidated plans section operates under the direct supervision of the OPCEN director.

S3 Training Branch

5-20. This branch plans, programs, coordinates, and manages the base training program. When the SFOB or FOB is committed to actual operations, the S3 training branch plans, programs, coordinates, and supervises training of SFODAs, SOT-As, and individual replacements for the SFOB or FOB. The ISOFAC is directly responsible for addressing the training requirements of all committed SFODAs and SOT-As through the S3 training branch.

S5 SECTION

5-21. The S5 section, under the direction of the unit S5, plans and coordinates the CMO of the base and its assigned and attached units. The S5 coordinates closely with the S3 to integrate CA and CMO considerations into all base activities. If a DS CA element is attached to the base, that element advises the commander on—

- Expected impacts of SF operations on the local populace.
- Political, economic, and cultural considerations for the AO.
- Capabilities of theater CA assets in GS.
- Deployment considerations for CA teams operating with SFODAs in the field.
- Measures designed to gain support of the populace.

5-22. If the situation does not warrant a full-time S5 section for CMO, the S5 section may provide the nucleus of a consolidated plans section as described above.

ISOLATION FACILITY

5-23. The ISOFAC is a secure facility established to isolate the committed SFODAs and SOT-As physically when they perform their mission planning and preparation. OPSEC is paramount throughout this time. SFODAs committed to separate missions and separate AOs are isolated physically to preclude mission compromise. The base commander must balance the competing demands of synchronization and security by determining the

degree of physical isolation and mission compartmentation required for each mission.

5-24. For planning purposes, an ISOFAC can isolate up to six SFODAs or SOT-As simultaneously. The limiting factor is the inability of the base staff to plan and prepare more than six missions at the same time. The ISOFAC should include separate briefing, planning, billeting, and storage areas for each operational element in isolation. Its layout should incorporate a dining area, latrine and shower facilities, a dispensary service, a recreation and exercise area, and administrative support sections and areas.

5-25. The FOB (or SFOB) commander tasks an SF company HQ (SFODB) to establish and operate the ISOFAC under the staff supervision of the OPCEN director but reporting directly to the base commander. The SFODB commander thus has the same command relationships in the base as he does as a company commander in garrison. The SFODB commander task-organizes into three cells to conduct continuous operations with two overlapping shifts.

5-26. An AOB does not have sufficient resources to isolate and deploy SFODAs independently. It may, however, task-organize as an ISOFAC to isolate SFODAs at a location distant from its higher SFOB or FOB while taking advantage of FOB OPCEN targeting and mission planning products. The AOB may then reorganize to deploy and control the SFODAs during mission execution.

Command Cell

5-27. The SFODB commander and sergeant major constitute the command cell. The ISOFAC commander is directly responsible to the base commander for the mission preparation of committed SFODAs, from the moment of their tasking and physical isolation until their deployment from the base. He treats the committed SFODAs as he would his organic SFODAs in garrison. He makes sure the SFODAs receive proper support from the base centers. He ensures the proper degree of OPSEC and compartmentation within the ISOFAC as well. This use of an SFODB enables the OPCEN director to plan and coordinate future operations and to direct and control current operations without becoming embroiled in the minute details of SFODA mission preparation.

Support Cell

5-28. The SFODB executive officer, supply sergeant, medical sergeant, and two communications sergeants normally constitute the support cell. They provide the interface between the ISOFAC and the SPTCEN and SIGCEN. They make sure SFODA equipment is mission capable. They receive, consolidate, and track support requests to make sure the SFODAs receive the mission support they require. The cell secures and maintains nondeploying equipment for the deployed SFODAs. The cell also helps SFODAs prepare automatic and emergency resupply bundles.

Operations Cell

5-29. The SFODB operations warrant officer, two operations sergeants, and the augmenting MOC constitute the operations cell. The MOC consists of a MOC director and two liaison NCOs (LNOs) for each isolated SFODA. (NOTE: When referring to the MOC, the term "liaison officer [LNO]" replaces the old terms "area specialty team" and "area specialty officer.") The operations cell provides the interface between the ISOFAC and the OPCEN. It also establishes and operates the ISOFAC distribution center, which processes all correspondence (including SFODA mission support requests) between the isolated SFODAs and the three base centers. Cell personnel make sure the isolated SFODAs receive sufficient operational guidance and intelligence support. The cell provides current updates on the SFODAs' status and situation to the OPCEN director. It assists the SFODAs and base S3 operations in preparing mission support plans.

5-30. The operations cell coordinates all training requirements for all isolated SFODAs and SOT-As. During sustained combat operations, uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As are not the responsibility of the ISOFAC. Instead, they are the responsibility of the SPTCEN, under the direction of the FOB's or SFOB's OPCEN, as the ISOFAC must focus on preparing isolated SFODAs and SOT-As to execute their missions. Directing attention elsewhere can lead to mission failure and lost SF lives. The operations cell reviews the SFODAs' concepts and plans before they go to the OPCEN director.

5-31. The operations cell coordinates operational activities that involve more than one isolated SFODA. It ensures proper OPSEC and compartmentation throughout the process. During isolation, the cell obtains training and rehearsal sites. At least one member of the cell is present during all SFODA training and rehearsals to make sure all training requirements are met in preparing the committed SFODAs to perform their assigned tasks. The cell prepares and coordinates the isolation schedule and coordinates the briefback schedule with the base command group.

5-32. For planning purposes, an SFODB can isolate up to six SFODAs or SOT-As simultaneously, with augmentation. The base commander can greatly improve the capacity and efficiency of the ISOFAC operations cell by augmenting it with an SFODA tasked to serve within the MOC as the MOC director and as the LNOs for the isolated SFODAs.

5-33. The MOC LNOs provide 24-hour interface between the isolated SFODA and the ISOFAC cells. They actively participate in all aspects of mission planning and deployment preparation. The MOC LNOs process and track mission support requests. They act as escorts to move the SFODAs in and out of the ISOFAC as required. After their supported SFODAs deploy, the LNOs move to the S3 operations to monitor and track the missions until mission completion. They process SFODA message traffic, compile and maintain a written record of the missions, track and provide intelligence updates for the deployed SFODAs, and otherwise assist the deployed SFODAs in accomplishing their assigned missions. MOC LNOs must remain committed to the SF unit they support until mission completion.

5-34. To preserve OPSEC, the LNOs normally do not deploy on another mission until the mission they are supporting is complete. Once committed, due to OPSEC considerations, the MOC LNOs do not deploy beyond friendly

lines until the mission they are supporting is complete. The SFOB or FOB commander, however, has some discretion to permit an LNO to participate in operations supporting the deployed detachment, such as in resupply operations. In addition, during linkup operations, the LNOs may deploy forward to accompany the conventional unit linking up with the SFODA. Upon recovery of the SFODA, the MOC LNOs assist the SFODA in debriefing and preparing after-action reports (AARs). In supporting SFODAs, the MOC LNOs become intimately familiar with the SFODAs' POEs and the personalities of the SFODA members.

5-35. Each two-man MOC LNO team can normally support one SFODA during isolation, depending upon the duration and complexity of the mission. An ISOFAC, therefore, needs an augmentation package of 18 two-man MOC LNO teams to deploy 18 SFODAs in 3 isolation cycles. The number of personnel needed to fill MOC LNO requirements may shift as missions are completed, SFODAs return to base, and MOC LNOs become available for redirection to new SFODAs entering isolation.

5-36. The MOC is an unresourced requirement in the company staff. Although the requirement exists, no one is assigned to the MOC on a permanent basis. Instead, the MOC is established as the need arises. It consists of SF officers and NCOs from one or two SFODAs. MOC members may also come from nonorganic SF assets. They may come from another SF group, battalion, or company. If external augmentation from an uncommitted SF battalion is unavailable, the commander normally attaches limited duty SF personnel or an uncommitted SFODA to the ISOFAC to perform the MOC functions. The mission of the MOC is to act as a facilitator for the deploying companies or for the deployed SFODs. During isolation, the MOC is the liaison between the detachment and the different staff sections of the ISOFAC and other agencies and units having impact on the deployed SFOD's mission or the operational area. The MOC's mission derives from two basic tenets—compartmentalization and deconfliction.

5-37. **Compartmentalization.** One of the basic tenets of SF operations in hostile or denied areas is compartmentalization. A deploying SFOD usually does not need to know the mission of other SFODs outside its AO. If an SFOD member with knowledge of more than one mission is captured, the other missions may be compromised. In some situations, the exchange of information before infiltration to obtain current intelligence is imperative, barring OPSEC concerns and any operational compartmentalization requirements. Command guidance must address this exchange of information for SFODs and nonorganic units deploying into the same or adjacent AOs. If compartmentalization is necessary, each of the deploying SFODs must have a MOC assigned to it. Access to operational information must be limited to that which affects the mission of the assigned SFOD.

5-38. **Deconfliction.** After the SFOD has deployed, the MOC member monitoring the deployed SFOD deconflicts events impacting on the team's assigned AO by—

- Reviewing SITMAPs.
- Attending operational briefings for units entering the team's area.

- Reviewing intelligence reports to extract pertinent data on the enemy, the weather, and other relevant information.

5-39. The MOC's mission begins when the MOC is assigned to the team preparing for deployment, normally while the detachment is in the ISOFAAC. The mission ends after the exfiltrated team has been debriefed.

5-40. While assigned to the team, the MOC member must be knowledgeable of the following:

- The supported SFOD's mission execution plans and OPORDs.
- Primary and alternate infiltration and exfiltration plans.
- E&R plans.
- Resupply plans and schedules.
- Key equipment lists.
- Radio frequencies, call signs, and contact times.
- Code names.
- Linkup plans.
- Training plans.

5-41. The above partial mission-planning list demonstrates the amount of information the MOC member must learn. For optimum results, commanders must remember the one-mission rule and the two tenets of compartmentalization and deconfliction.

SUPPORT CENTER

5-42. Under the direction of the support company commander, the SPTCEN is normally the functional activity that provides CSS to the base and its subordinate elements. It performs the functions of a conventional unit's trains. An SF SPTCEN normally consists of the unit S1, S4, and medical sections; the UMT; the organic support company; and appropriate DS-level CSS and CHS attachments from the 528th Support Battalion, ASCC, or another Service.

5-43. At the SFOB SPTCEN, the S1, S4, and surgeon plan and coordinate CSS and CHS for the group and subordinate bases. Whenever possible, they coordinate throughput distribution to the FOB or even the AOB level. When two bases collocate, the group commander may decide to collocate or consolidate the SPTCENs for mutual support. At the FOB SPTCEN, the S1, S4, and surgeon plan and coordinate CSS and CHS for the battalion FOB, its subordinate AOBs, and its deployed SFODs and SOT-As. At the AOB SPTCEN, CSS is normally limited to unit-level logistics functions that support current operations. The SPTCEN plans and controls the administrative activities of the base, including the coordination of facilities engineering and other base operations support. The SPTCEN maintains the UBL and supplies. The SPTCEN also manages assigned stocks, coordinates movements, provides or arranges for maintenance, requisitions and coordinates CSS requirements, controls personnel management, and supports the training and preparation of uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As.

SPTCEN DIRECTOR

5-44. The SPTCEN director is normally the support company commander. He is responsible to the base commander for the execution of all base CSS and CHS operations, the base support plan, and base security. The group SPTCEN director has no responsibility for the CSS and CHS operations of subordinate FOBs and AOBs.

HQ COMMANDANT

5-45. The HHC commander or the GSC commander can be the HQ commandant at the SFOB level. The support company commander or his executive officer assumes the duties of the HQ commandant at the FOB level. The HQ commandant is responsible for SPTCEN housekeeping details, including billeting, food service, space allocation, and internal guard duties. He is also responsible for base defense operations and base emergency evacuation planning. The HQ commandant, along with the base chemical officer, establishes mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) for base NBC defense.

SECURITY PLATOON

5-46. Whenever possible, an MP or infantry security platoon element is requested and attached to an SFOB or FOB for personnel and physical security. It controls the entrance to the base, the OPCEN, and the SCIF; monitors perimeter security; and provides escort security for personnel and convoys. Security support requires coordination because of the lack of formal security augmentation agreements between the SFG(A)s and the ASCCs.

S1 SECTION

5-47. Under the direction of the unit S1, the base S1 is responsible for the administration and management of personnel assigned or attached to the base. He assists SFODAs during their mission preparation. Once SFODAs deploy, the S1 monitors and responds to their support requests through the MOCs in the OPCEN. The primary concerns of the S1 include personnel accountability and strength management. The S1 is further responsible for—

- Casualty reporting.
- Personnel replacement operations.
- Personnel actions for deployed personnel and other personnel services, including any administrative support of indigenous forces.
- Postal operations.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation activities for base personnel during protracted deployments.
- Base administrative services, including operation of the base distribution center.

NOTE: The center processes all base correspondence except operational message traffic (SIGCEN responsibility) and mission planning traffic to and from the ISOFAC (ISOFAC responsibility).

MEDICAL SECTION

5-48. Under the direction of the base flight surgeon, the base medical section establishes and operates a medical treatment facility capable of supporting base operations and the deployed SFODAs. It also manages base preventive medicine programs, maintains the Class VIII basic load, and provides medical intelligence and other aspects of medical planning to the SFODAs.

UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

5-49. The UMT consists of a chaplain and one assistant. The role of the UMT is to implement the commander's program of religious support during all phases of training, service, support, combat operations, and sustainment. The UMT is the focal point for religious background information and required support for deploying SFODAs. It frequently manages the base morale, welfare, and recreation programs during protracted deployments.

LEGAL SECTION

5-50. The legal section reviews all OPLANS to make sure they comply with the ROE, international laws, and Army regulations. The legal section also provides background information about the laws and customs of the AO.

S3 TRAINING SECTION

5-51. The S3 training section in the FOB SPTCEN supports training requirements by scheduling training for uncommitted SFODAs and replacement personnel. It coordinates and resources training for newly identified skills needed on a specific mission. This section also coordinates with the ISOFAC director for mission training and rehearsals for isolated SFODAs.

SERVICE DETACHMENT

5-52. The service detachment performs unit-level supply, services, and maintenance functions for the base and its attached elements. It also coordinates base transportation support.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION SECTION

5-53. This section performs consolidated unit-level supply functions for the base and its deployed SFODAs. At the SFOB level, it maintains the property book and basic loads (less Classes I, VIII, and IX) for the group HHC and support company. At the FOB level, it performs these functions for the entire battalion. The section also procures nonstandard and SF-peculiar supplies and equipment. The section's organic vehicles provide local transportation support to the base, but the section depends on nondedicated drivers to perform this function.

FOOD SERVICE SECTION

5-54. This section provides consolidated food service to the base. The section establishes and operates a dining facility in the SPTCEN. In addition to its 24-hour (four-meal) feeding operation to support two-shift activities, the

section conducts remote feeding operations as required. The section also maintains the unit's Class I basic load.

MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE SECTION

5-55. This section performs consolidated unit-level maintenance support for the base's organic wheeled vehicles and power-generation equipment. It also coordinates for DS maintenance support, evacuates damaged items to the supporting DS maintenance company, and maintains the unit's Class IX prescribed load list.

RIGGER-AIR DELIVERY SECTION

5-56. This section provides personnel and cargo parachute-packing, unit-level maintenance of air delivery items, rigger support, and air delivery support to the base. It also coordinates external rigger and air delivery support when requirements exceed organic capabilities.

UNCOMMITTED SFODA AND SOT-A

5-57. Uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As fall into two categories—those tasked to augment elements (such as the SOCCE, the ISOFAC, and the BDOC) and those scheduled to conduct a future tactical mission. All SFODAs and SOT-As slated for tactical missions do not deploy simultaneously. Uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As under the supervision of the SPTCEN prepare for contingency missions and rapid deployment in the event of a time-sensitive requirement. Uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As must not be tasked to perform housekeeping duties or support functions at the expense of their combat readiness. The BDOC, however, may integrate uncommitted SFODAs and SOT-As into the base defense plan.

SIGNAL CENTER

5-58. Under the direction of the unit S6, the SIGCEN installs, operates, and maintains secure, reliable, long-range communications between the base and its higher, adjacent, subordinate, supporting and supported HQ, and deployed SFODAs. (See Figure 5-1, page 5-13.) The SIGCEN also installs, operates, and maintains continuous internal base communications. The SIGCEN normally consists of the unit S6 section, organic signal detachment, and attached or supporting signal elements. At the SFOB level, the SIGCEN director normally task-organizes these assets into a signal support coordination element (SSCE), SYSCON section, communications center (COMCEN), multimedia section, and message center. At the FOB level, no multimedia section exists and the SYSCON may also perform SSCE functions. The SYSCON has the additional responsibility for the technical control of deployed SFODBs.

SIGNAL SUPPORT COORDINATION ELEMENT

5-59. SSCE plans and coordinates all base signal support. It exercises technical control over the special security officer (SSO) communications section, subordinate bases and units, and deployed SFODs. The SSCE prepares current and future communications plans in support of SF

operations. It provides frequency management, COMSEC management and distribution, and automation support.




Figure 5-1. FOB Communications Connectivity

SYSTEMS CONTROL SECTION

5-60. The SYSCON section exercises technical control of the signal operation. It determines the priority of the signal work effort, message-handling priorities, and signal systems troubleshooting and maintenance. The section provides electronic maintenance at the unit level and DS. It performs limited GS maintenance on SF-peculiar signal items. The section is a combination of the unit signal operations section and the C2 section of the supporting signal detachment. As such, it also provides operational planning and coordination support for current and future operations, including frequency spectrum management and analysis. The SYSCON section also provides storage, control, issue, and disposition of COMSEC equipment and material. It also integrates any external support.

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

5-61. The COMCEN is the hub for all communications requirements within the unit signal detachment. It provides the various communications nodes as required by the unit commander. At times, the COMCEN may be augmented because of operational requirements.

Base Communications Support Section

5-62. The base communications support section of the unit signal detachment, with augmentation as required, provides communications support to the base. The section provides redundant multichannel, superhigh frequency (SHF) satellite and high-frequency (HF) communications support to SF operations. The battalion also provides limited repair and maintenance support for SF communications systems.

Switchboard Section

5-63. The switchboard section provides an internal switchboard that may be integrated into the theater's tactical automated switching system. Currently, SFG(A)s use analog switching equipment. An automatic switchboard is used to establish internal telephonic support and to exploit and extend available Defense Switched Network (DSN) and HN telephone systems, which are normally analog systems.

Telecommunications Section

5-64. The COMCEN terminates most telecommunications traffic transmitted over DSN, the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), or dedicated Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program or mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) systems, using various terminals. Hard copy messages are sent to the servicing message center, or data are transferred over the lightweight deployable communications (LDC) system. This section also maintains a secure terminal, such as the LDC, connected to the message center when configured with an internal data network.

Base Station Section

5-65. The base station section provides HF, ultrahigh frequency (UHF), TACSAT, and tactical local area network communications between the base and its deployed SFODAs. The section can use these same means to provide backup communications among the FOB and the AOBs. The section uses a variety of systems to accomplish this mission, including the special operations communications assemblage (SOCA). In the future, the new SF base station and advanced data controller systems will replace these systems.

MULTIMEDIA SECTION

5-66. At the group level, the multimedia section provides limited ground and aerial still-photography support to the SFOB and its subordinate bases and units. When requirements exceed organic capabilities, the group S6 coordinates through the JFSOCC Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (J6) to obtain external support.

MESSAGE CENTER

5-67. The location of the message center is normally as close as possible to the OPCEN. S1 personnel, signal personnel, and personnel from other sections man the message center under the supervision of the OPCEN sergeant major. The center receives, processes, logs, and distributes all incoming and outgoing message traffic. The message center is linked by secure means to the COMCEN. Secure links are through organic systems. In some cases, messages are hand carried.

5-68. The message center may maintain the AUTODIN link if established, although the COMCEN may have the terminal instead. The message center may also process nonsecure and secure facsimile traffic.

5-69. The message center maintains accountability of all messages and information entering and leaving the operating base. It uses existing manual or automated message-handling forms to maintain accountability. The message center reports message-handling status and time to the SYSCON.

BASE DEFENSE

5-70. The BDOC chief, under the direction of the HQ commandant, makes sure specific responses and procedures are established, reviewed, and practiced for base defense. All available personnel perform base security duties.

SECURITY FORCES

5-71. SF bases may experience the full range of hostile air and surface threats. Because of the austere nature of SF organizations, SF bases may require dedicated security forces to protect them from hostile actions. If the location of the base must be in a high-threat area because of operational needs or logistics requirements, base security forces may be available from three sources—U.S. unilateral forces, combined U.S. and HN forces, or HN unilateral forces.

5-72. The preferred base defense option is for U.S. elements to secure the group's bases and activities. The bases may be located within the perimeters of larger U.S. installations. The JFC or ASCC commander may direct the attachment of MP or infantry security elements to the SFG(A) to perform the base security mission. U.S. installations and security assets may, however, be unavailable, and the HN may not authorize U.S. unilateral security operations beyond the base perimeter.

5-73. In a combined U.S. and HN option, U.S. MP or infantry elements may provide physical security within the base perimeter. An HN or a combined U.S. and HN military or paramilitary force may provide security beyond the perimeter, perhaps within the perimeter of a larger HN installation. If the supporting U.S. MP element cannot fully perform the base defense mission, the SF base commander may have to divert operational and support personnel to augment MP capabilities. This option should serve as a last resort and be relied upon only when absolutely necessary.

5-74. In the third option, the supported HN force may provide physical security to the base. The SF commander may also contract with the HN or

another source, such as a third country or a commercial contractor, for a dedicated security force.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-75. The HQ commandant appoints a BDOC chief to plan, coordinate, and control all base defense operations. The BDOC chief may be anyone with the requisite tactical knowledge and experience. If no qualified personnel are available, the HQ commandant himself performs the duties of the BDOC chief.

5-76. The BDOC chief—in coordination with the HQ commandant, center directors, and supporting security force commander—prepares the base defense plan. This plan provides options for the coordinated defense of the base against surface or air attack, including acts of sabotage and terrorism. The plan employs active and passive security measures by partitioning the base into security areas, assigning responsibility for the areas, and establishing a BDOC to coordinate and control base defense operations.

5-77. The BDOC chief makes sure the unit guards are integrated into the base security plan. The BDOC maintains continuous communications with attached and supporting security forces, including any HN forces. It exercises OPCON of the designated base response force. In a combined U.S. and HN effort, the BDOC chief and his HN counterpart must consider language capabilities. They must agree on the chain of command, ROE, AORs, the quick-reaction force, and employment tactics and techniques. The BDOC staff also exchanges liaison personnel and standardized communications.

NBC DEFENSE

5-78. SF bases employ standard NBC defense measures to protect themselves in an NBC environment. Base commanders must harden critical base facilities against chemical attack. They must also develop contingency plans for decontaminating the base or displacing it if contaminated with persistent chemical agents.

Chapter 6

Special Forces Targeting and Mission Planning

Detailed targeting and mission planning is vital to successful SF mission execution and SFOD survival. SF targeting and mission planning is distinctive in its degree of joint integration at the tactical level of execution, its dependence on detailed operational intelligence, and the degree of personnel participation. This chapter describes the joint special operations targeting and mission planning process (JSOTMPP) and the way SF commanders integrate the JSOTMPP with the Army's military decision-making process to plan missions and to prepare SFODs for employment.

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING PROCESS

6-1. The JSOTMPP is the process by which joint SOF conduct execution planning. The JSOTMPP is different in each theater. Differences occur because of variations in the strategic environment, command arrangements, presence of multinational military forces, participation in the process by other government agencies, NGOs, and other factors. Procedures may vary for peacetime, deliberate planning, and crisis action. The time required for SF targeting and mission planning varies depending upon the factors of METT-TC—the complexity of the mission, the nature of the operational environment, and the proficiency of the committed forces.

6-2. The first portion of this chapter addresses a generic doctrinal template for planning wartime missions requiring air infiltration of hostile airspace in a joint theater of operations using the crisis-action procedures of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. It assumes that the JFSOCC has designated an SF group as the ARSOF component and an Air Force SO wing or group as the JSOAC.

PHASE I - SITUATION DEVELOPMENT AND PHASE II - CRISIS ASSESSMENT

6-3. When an event occurs in the strategic or operational environment that causes the JFC to assess the situation and direct a change in the theater campaign plan, the JFC directs the JFC J5 to initiate COA development. The JFC may issue a formal JFC warning order (WARNORD) to his subordinate forces. Typically, this action occurs at least 8 to 10 days before the JFC anticipates having to execute the change. If the JFC has less time, the process described below will have to be compressed to meet the actual circumstances that prevail in the theater.

PHASE III - JFC COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

6-4. The JFC J5 convenes the Future Plans Working Group (FPWG) to prepare a theater staff estimate and to develop COAs. Members of the JFC SO staff element (or the JFSOCC liaison or staff element at the JFC HQ) are members of this FPWG. They prepare the theater SO staff estimate and integrate joint SOF options as appropriate into each COA. They keep the JFSOCC informed of the FPWG's progress and the JFC's decision. The JFSOCC provides input and begins concurrent planning. As a minimum, the JFC SO staff element and or JFSOCC staff planners should coordinate with JFC Operations Directorate (J3) and J5 planners and the planners of the other component commands to identify SOF target sets and target priorities for each COA. During this phase, SOF planners should focus on the discrepancies between conventional JFC capabilities and operational requirements.

6-5. The COA development process requires a theater perspective not only in the geographic sense but also in regard to the interests, functions, and responsibilities of the other components. The intent of SOF is not to compete with other theater assets but through collaborative planning to complement them by filling gaps in their capabilities. Given the conditions of time, location, and situation, SOF planners look for opportunities to apply SOF capabilities where they are the most appropriate or are the only asset able to take effective action. They must develop SOF options that enhance the capabilities or compensate for the limitations of the other JFC components. Only then can SOF facilitate the attainment of JFC objectives.

6-6. The JFC measures SOF utility by economy and responsiveness. The relatively small signature of SOF and the extent to which SOF activities can be synchronized with the operations of the other components to reduce their distraction or obstruction define the economy of SOF. Responsiveness is not necessarily quick reaction to a mission in real time. It refers primarily to precision tactical solutions accomplished in a relatively quick manner. This type of responsiveness is frequently a limitation of SF, especially when compared to the responsiveness of tactical airpower.

6-7. Quick reaction is the ability to apply adequate combat power and to take appropriate action across the battlespace in time for the effects to enable a favorable outcome at the decisive time and place. The JFSOCC may achieve this kind of responsiveness by tasking his component commanders to plan and prepare their operational elements to execute multiple options, then canceling specific missions as the actual situation develops and certain options become infeasible. For example, the JFSOCC may task the SFOB to prepare two SFODAs to support JFC COA 1 and four SFODAs to support JFC COA 2. The SFOB then tasks a subordinate FOB to isolate and prepare all six SFODAs, knowing in advance that one of the COAs will never be executed, but not knowing which of the two COAs will be approved.

PHASE IV - JFC COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

6-8. This phase corresponds to Phase I (Objectives and Guidance) of the joint targeting cycle outlined in JP 3-05.5. When the JFC selects COAs for execution planning, the JFC J3 issues a JFC planning directive or WARNORD by means of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The WARNORD directs the initiation of execution planning at least 7 to 10

days before execution. When the JFC decides to implement a particular COA, the JFC J3 issues a JFC implementation directive. The key to timely SO execution is foreknowledge of the guidance in the planning and implementation directives.

PHASE V - EXECUTION PLANNING

6-9. Upon receipt of the JFC WARNORD, if not sooner during Phase III, the JFSOCC begins execution planning by means of the JSOTMPP. The execution-planning phase of the JSOTMPP is a seven-step process (Figure 6-1, page 6-4).

Step 1 - Develop JFSOCC Course of Action

6-10. This step corresponds to Phase II (Target Development [Validation, Nomination, Prioritization]) of the joint targeting cycle. It begins as soon as the SOF options are developed in Phase III of the JSOTMPP. The JFC or the other components rarely nominate specific SOF targets. Normally, the best SOF planners can hope for is a clear statement of the desired effects or outcomes the JFC and his component commanders want SOF to achieve. SOF must then translate the targeting guidance into a list of SOF target nominations. The JFSOCC SO J3 plans officer performs a mission analysis of the SOF options in the WARNORD and directs all JFSOCC staff elements to prepare their staff estimates and submit the proposed commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). As part of the staff estimate process, the SO J3 reviews the theater target database and determines the targets that will achieve the desired effects or outcomes specified or implied in the planning directive. He coordinates with the SOF LNOs at the JFC's Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) to obtain JTCB targeting objectives and priorities based on the JFC's targeting guidance in the WARNORD. He also coordinates with the SO LNOs at the other JFC components and supported operational HQ to determine the SO targets that will support their future plans.

Step 2 - Issue the WARNORD

6-11. During this step, the JFSOCC SO J3 issues a JFSOCC WARNORD through the GCCS to subordinate commanders and SOF LNOs. The J3 normally issues the WARNORD not later than (NLT) 168 hours before the earliest anticipated launch time (EALT). The WARNORD requests estimates (formerly called preliminary and initial assessments) from the commanders and LNOs by a certain date-time group (DTG) so the JFSOCC staff can integrate their input into the joint targeting cycle. Concurrently, the SO Intelligence Directorate (J2) provides the approved IRs to the SO J2 collection manager for refinement into RFI and collection tasks. The SO J2 collection manager submits RFIs over the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) through the JFC collection manager to the theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The RFIs are for preliminary target intelligence data on the proposed targets to support the components' estimate process. The theater JIC transmits this data directly to the JFSOCC, its SOF, and components through JWICS, normally within 8 hours of receipt of the RFI. This phase allows the JFSOCC components 24 hours to prepare their estimates, the last 16 of them with the preliminary target intelligence data in their possession.




Figure 6-1. Special Operations Execution Planning Phase

Step 3 - Conduct SOF Component Estimates (Assessments)

6-12. This step corresponds to Phase III (Capabilities Analysis) of the joint targeting cycle. Upon receipt of the JFSOCC WARNORD, the ARSOTF commander directs his OPCEN director to begin the military decision-making process (see FM 101-5). The ARSOTF plans officer performs a mission analysis of the SOF options, and the center directors prepare their staff estimates. Before ARSOTF plans and targeting personnel conduct capability analysis to determine the feasibility of the proposed targets, the target panel assesses the targets to confirm whether they satisfy the following four operational SOF mission criteria:

- Is this target an appropriate SOF mission?
- Does the mission support the JFC's campaign plan?
- Are required resources available to execute the mission?
- Does the expected outcome justify the risk?

6-13. Upon completion of the ARSOTF staff estimates, the OPCEN director recommends a COA, a target nomination list, and a list of CCIR to the ARSOTF commander for approval and submission as input to the JFSOCC commander's estimate. Based on these staff estimates and the OPCEN director's recommendations, the ARSOTF commander provides his commander's estimate (preliminary assessment) to the JFSOCC, normally NLT 144 hours before the EALT. The ARSOTF OPCEN director issues an ARSOTF WARNORD to subordinate FOBs, submits RFIs through JWICS to the JFSOCC SO J2 collection manager, and identifies other initial requirements to the JFSOCC staff, the SOTSE, and the supporting elements of the ASCC. Concurrently, the SOF LNOs at the JTCB orchestrate and deconflict the proposed joint SOF targets and missions with those of the other JFC components.

6-14. Based on the ARSOTF WARNORD, the FOB commander may issue FOB WARNORDs to uncommitted SFODs to prepare for isolation. Upon selection to perform a mission, the SFOD is isolated. All SFODs are unique. Each has a different level of proficiency based on the strengths of its individual members, personnel turnover, and recent training opportunities. Each requires a different amount of time to prepare for a specific mission and a different level of supervision during isolation and mission preparation. The FOB commander must consider these variables when selecting an uncommitted SFOD to perform a mission.

Step 4 - Select JFSOCC Course of Action

6-15. Upon completion of the JFSOCC staff estimates and receipt of the SOF component commanders' estimates, the SO J3 prepares a decision brief for the JFSOCC (or his authorized deputy). The SO J3 recommends a COA, a refined target nomination list and the appropriate forces to execute the targets, and a list of CCIR.

6-16. The JFSOCC makes a decision or forwards a recommendation to the JFC (or his authorized deputy) for a decision, depending upon the JFSOCC's approval authority. When the JFSOCC (or JFC) selects a COA for execution

planning, the JFSOCC J3 issues a JFSOCC TASKORD normally NLT 120 hours before EALT.

Step 5 - Apply JFSOCC Force

6-17. This step corresponds to Phase IV (Force Application) of the joint targeting cycle. The JFSOCC TASKORD designates a mission planning agent (MPA) (supported commander) and mission-supporting agents (supporting commanders) for each approved target. The TASKORD also directs the MPAs and mission-supporting agents to begin mission planning. Concurrently, the SO J2 collection manager submits a request through JWICS through the JFC collection manager to the theater JIC, requesting a complete TIP on each approved target. The theater JIC transmits these TIPs through JWICS directly to the JFSOCC, MPAs, and mission-supporting agents, normally within 24 hours of receipt of the request but NLT 96 hours before EALT. The FOB S2 section supporting the ISOFAC must have the equipment to produce hard copy TIPs for SFOD use from the electronic products delivered through JWICS. The S2 must make sure the MID maintains connectivity to the joint intelligence community as contingency databases in order to supplement gaps in information.

Step 6 - Conduct Component Mission Planning

6-18. This step corresponds to Phase V (Mission Planning and Force Execution) of the joint targeting cycle. As the MPA, the ARSOTF commander has coordinating authority over designated mission-supporting agents for mission planning. Upon receipt of the JFSOCC TASKORD, the ARSOTF and FOB commanders begin the orders production step of the military decision-making process. The FOB is the focal point of this step.

6-19. The FOB OPCEN director produces an FOB TASKORD and a special operations mission planning folder (SOMPF) for each committed SFOD. He may submit additional RFIs through JWICS to the JFSOCC J2 collection manager and initial mission support requests through the GCCS to the JSOAC, SOTSE, and other mission-supporting agents. The FOB commander isolates the SFOD and issues the TASKORD so the SFOD can begin planning and preparing for its mission.

6-20. The hallmark of the JSOTMPP is the decentralization of mission planning from the MPA staff down to the actual operational elements that will execute the mission. Upon receipt of the FOB TASKORD, the SFOD prepares its own initial estimate. About 1 to 2 hours after the SFOD receives its TASKORD, the FOB commander and staff provide the SFOD a staff mission brief and answer the SFOD's initial questions. The staff mission brief amplifies and clarifies information in the FOB TASKORD. The staff mission brief includes the detailed mission planning without revealing information that could compromise the higher commander's operation if revealed to the enemy. For example, an SFOD conducting a mission in a denied area in support of an imminent airborne or amphibious assault should not know D-day or H-hour until that information is absolutely necessary to mission execution. Similarly, an SFOD conducting a deception operation should not know the purpose of the deception and may not even be told that the mission is part of a deception operation.

6-21. At the end of the mission briefing, the ISOFAC commander and MOC give the SFOD a proposed isolation schedule and a list of requirements already requested and provided for the SFOD. These requirements may include—

- Ranges and other training facilities.
- Rehearsal sites.
- Updated intelligence products and current RFIs.
- Air items, evasion aids, and other mission-peculiar equipment.
- Accompanying supplies.
- Items for emergency resupply.
- Expendable supply items available to supplement the SFOD isolation kit.

6-22. The time and level of supervision an SFOD receives to prepare for a mission depend on the time available, mission complexity, and the degree of SFOD competence. As a doctrinal template, a committed SFOD needs at least 96 hours to accomplish the following tasks in isolation:

- Continue area study and perform IPB of the assigned AO.
- Receive and internalize operational intelligence briefings.
- Receive FOB staff visits, pilot's briefing, and other mission-specific briefings.
- Develop and rehearse the mission.
- Conduct any specialized mission-peculiar training.
- Request and receive specialized mission-peculiar materiel.
- Resolve legal or policy issues concerning the mission.
- Prepare a written OPORD and a briefback. (See Appendix D for SF mission briefback format.)
- Prepare individual and SFOD equipment for infiltration.
- Get adequate rest and physical training before infiltration.

6-23. The FOB commander (or his authorized deputy) receives the SFOD mission analysis brief 2 to 4 hours after the mission brief and the SFOD concept of operations (CONOPS) brief 12 to 16 hours later. Based on these briefs and more coordination with the mission-supporting agents, the FOB commander may approve or modify the recommended SFOD COA. When the FOB commander selects a COA (not necessarily the SFOD's recommended COA), the FOB OPCEN director submits an FOB commander's CONOPS. The director submits the CONOPS in OPORD format through the GCCS to the ARSOTF OPCEN and the SO J3 for approval, normally NLT 72 hours before EALT. Concurrently, the FOB commander may submit refined mission support requests through the GCCS to the JSOAC and other mission-supporting agents. The JSOAC responds by transmitting mission support confirmations through the GCCS to the SO J3, the SOLE at the JFACC staff, and the ARSOTF and the FOB in time for the SOLE at the JFACC staff to integrate the missions into the JFACC planning cycle.

Step 7 - Obtain Mission Approval

6-24. When the SO J3 receives the FOB commander's concept and the joint special operations air component commander's (JSOACC's) mission support confirmations, he prepares a decision brief for the JFSOCC, his authorized deputy, or the JFC to approve or modify the concept.

6-25. When the JFSOCC (or JFC) selects a commander's concept (not necessarily the recommended commander's concept) for implementation, the SO J3 issues a JFSOCC CONOPS approval. The S3 issues the CONOPS approval through the GCCS to the MPA, mission-supporting agents, and SOLEs, normally NLT 48 hours before the EALT to allow adequate time for theater-level coordination and deconfliction. The SOLE at the JFACC staff uses the information in the CONOPS approval and the JSOAC support confirmation message to integrate the mission into the JFACC air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order (ACO). The SO LNOs at the JFC and the other components and supported operational HQ use the CONOPS approval to continue the synchronization and deconfliction process at their levels. The ARSOTF and FOB commanders continue mission planning in close coordination with the JSOAC and other mission-supporting agents.

6-26. The FOB commander or his deputy approves the SFOD dress rehearsal, briefback, and written OPOD, normally 18 to 24 hours before the EALT to allow for rest and final preparation. The SFOD should brief a comprehensive plan with primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) options that facilitate flexible execution as actual circumstances change in the AO. SF commanders must not tie themselves to a rigid plan that depends on split-second timing. They must anticipate the unexpected and remain agile enough to modify their plans as required to achieve higher commanders' intent.

PHASE VI - EXECUTION

6-27. The JFC execute order (EXORD), ATO, and ACO are published. When the SO J3 confirms that all theater-level coordination and deconfliction of the mission is complete, he obtains the JFSOCC's approval to issue a JFSOCC EXORD, normally (but not necessarily) 24 to 30 hours before the EALT. Upon receipt of the JFSOCC EXORD, the JSOACC and the ARSOTF commander direct mission execution. The FOB commander deploys the SFOD, directs and supports its activities in the AO, recovers it upon mission completion, and reconstitutes it for future missions. The SFOD deploys into its AO and executes its mission.

PHASE VII - OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

6-28. This phase corresponds to Phase VI (Combat Assessment) of the joint targeting cycle or an operation summary (OPSUM). The JFSOCC, ARSOTF, and FOB commanders conduct their assessments of the executed mission to determine if the outcome meets the criteria established during the capabilities analysis phase. If the criteria were not met, the SO J3 coordinates with the SOLEs at the JFC and JTCCB staffs to determine a new COA.

DELIBERATE TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING

6-29. Deliberate SF targeting and mission planning may require weeks or months to complete an adequate IPB and to prepare for commitment of an SFOD. SFOD members must study their AO to understand the political, military, economic, and cultural situation. They must know the ethnic groups, customs, taboos, religions, and other essential data that could affect mission execution. The SFOD can best achieve this level of area orientation through intensive area study before commitment.

GROUP TARGET PANEL AND PROCEDURE

6-30. When the group functions as the ARSOF HQ, the group target panel becomes the consolidated ARSOF target panel. As such, it serves the function of both ARSOF and group targeting. Although not addressed in detail in this publication, the group target panel deals with both lethal and nonlethal fires for targeting, as well as targeting support to UARMs and PR.

6-31. At the SF group level, specific requirements exist for both organization and procedure. This portion of the chapter addresses the organization, role, functions, and responsibilities of the group target panel.

Organization

6-32. The group target panel may consist of the—

- Group deputy commanding officer (DCO).
- Group S3 and PSYOP officer.
- Group S2 targeting officer.
- Group engineer.
- Group assistant communications-electronics (C-E) officer.
- Group S5.
- Group assistant S4.
- Group staff judge advocate.
- Battalion LNOs (if SFOB and FOBs are not collocated).
- Special operations aviation regiment (SOAR) LNO.
- Ranger LNO.
- Group chemical officer.
- SOWT representative.
- SF, CA, and PSYOP LNOs, as well as the air liaison officer (ALO).
- Battalion S2s (if SFOB and FOBs are collocated).

Role

6-33. The target panel is the focal point for nominating targets from each component of the ARSOF, reviewing target assessments, reviewing and approving target validations, and developing the initial planning considerations for executing nominated targets. The target panel reviews the standing joint target list (JTL) on a daily basis to cross-reference available forces against designated targets assigned or apportioned to the group or

ARSOF forces. It reviews the status of previously tasked targets for significant changes that would affect timing, forces, or success of the operation. It collects, assesses, and validates new targets nominated by the components for forwarding to higher HQ to be serviced by other Service assets and deconflicted with other targets. Finally, it identifies—based on guidance from the group, ARSOF, SOC, CINC—future targets that support organic and CINC operations.

Functions and Responsibilities

6-34. Some functions and responsibilities of the target panel members resemble the detailed planning portion of target operations rather than nominations. This overlap coverage condenses the planning information that occurs in the target panel to the planning cell. Many players in the target panel are also the players for future operations. The following are the most common roles, functions, and responsibilities of members of the target panel. They are not all-inclusive, and they vary due to the situation, battle rhythm of the controlling HQ, targeting guidance, OPORD directives, and emerging targets.

6-35. **Group DCO.** The group DCO serves as the group or ARSOF senior targeting authority when the group or ARSOF commander is absent. He is responsible for assembling, managing, deconflicting, adjudicating, and guiding the target panel in target nomination, validation, assessment, and approval at group or ARSOF level. The group DCO makes sure each component receives equal consideration for target nominations. As targets are nominated, he deconflicts repetitive targets and decides the tasking of the target. He also validates targets to make sure they support the intent and operations of the CINC; COMSOC; commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF); and ARSOF.

6-36. **Group S3 and PSYOP Officer.** The group S3 serves as the focal point in consolidating target nominations, validations, and assessments. He is responsible for posting, maintaining, justifying, and preparing targeting overlay for map and message text format (MTF) messages to address target issues to higher HQ. The group S3 remains familiar with all ongoing and planned operations during the 5-day window for target validation and assessment and future plans for targeting guidance. He is responsible for presenting any operational targeting guidance to the target panel during meetings. He maintains information on infiltration platforms, equipment, and on-hand capabilities to support nominated targets. The PSYOP officer advises on nonlethal fires, target audiences, and approved PSYOP themes in determining targets.

6-37. **Group S2 Targeting Officer.** The group S2 targeting officer serves as the focal point for nominated target intelligence and intelligence guidance for nominations. He works in close coordination with SOC J2 or JSOTF J2 for proposed targeting and associated intelligence. He is responsible for briefing enemy situation updates for proposed ongoing targets and expected enemy actions for nominated targets. He is also responsible for making sure supporting agencies are aware of upcoming target nominations for rapid preparation of TIPS. He coordinates assignment of the numbers to nominated targets. He maintains the standing JTL through secure computer link with

higher HQ. He focuses on enemy reaction forces, air defense artillery (ADA), and surveillance capabilities around nominated targets.

6-38. **Group Engineer.** The group engineer serves as an assistant to the DCO in the execution of his duties on the group target panel. He verifies criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability (CARVER) requirements for validated targets, assessments, and analysis. He identifies target nominations that require refinement before going forward to higher HQ. The group engineer serves as the continuity element to the group battle staff to relay guidance and information on targeting during battle staff planning sessions. He serves as the recorder for target panel meetings, decisions, directives, and issues. He briefs required information at staff update briefings.

6-39. **Group Assistant C-E Officer.** The group assistant C-E officer serves as an SME on communications required and on hand to service nominated targets. He relays communications requirements to the C-E planning cell for OPORD development. (See Appendixes E and F for sample OPORDs.) Within capabilities, the group assistant C-E provides technical data on targets as required. He assists the group S3 with message preparation as directed.

6-40. **Group S5.** The group S5 serves as CA and CMO advisor to the target panel for target validation and nominations. He conducts staff coordination with the appropriate CMO, NGO, and HN agencies. He coordinates as appropriate within classification, ROE, and other friendly elements at risk if the target is executed to—

- Prevent unnecessary casualties.
- Preserve protected facilities.
- Determine the effect on the various audiences that may react to proposed missions.

6-41. **Group Assistant S4.** The group assistant S4 serves as a supply and support SME on supportability of elements attacking a nominated target. He makes sure logistics information associated with nominated and ongoing targets is forecasted to ensure availability at the required time. Within capabilities, he advises on supply and transportation aspects of nominated and ongoing targets.

6-42. **Battalion LNO and S2.** The battalion LNO and S2 serve as battalion representatives for target nominations, target validations, and assessments. They communicate to the group target panel the battalion commander's intent and purpose or his justification for nominated targets.

6-43. **Ranger LNO.** Like the battalion LNO, the Ranger LNO serves as Ranger representative for target nominations, target validations, and assessments. He communicates to the group target panel the Ranger commander's intent and purpose or his justification for nominated targets.

6-44. **SOAR LNO.** The SOAR LNO primarily serves a twofold purpose on the target panel. He represents SOAR commanders for target nominations, such as the battalion LNO or battalion S2s and the SME on the availability, capability, and vulnerability of ARSOF rotary-wing assets. The SOAR LNO represents the commander for SOAR-nominated targets in support of

operations. He addresses ADA and enemy activity concerns for infiltration, resupply, recovery, and exfiltration of operational elements.

6-45. **Group Chemical Officer.** The group chemical officer serves as the NBC SME to advise the DCO on targeting information, enemy NBC capabilities, and all aspects of operations in the NBC environment. He works with the group assistant S4 and S3 in providing NBC equipment information and guidance.

6-46. **SOWT Representative.** The SOWT representative provides the DCO and target panel with forecasted weather at nominated target locations to help determine feasibility and suggested optimum attack time.

6-47. **Other LNOs.** Target panel members may serve as LNOs from other SF groups, PSYOP elements, or CA elements. They may also serve as ALOs and as theater airlift LNOs to advise on the capabilities of assets and the target nominations and validations to the ARSOF staff as required. In some cases, a selected LNO may co-chair the group or ARSOF target panel because of the nature and location of the target.

6-48. **Staff Judge Advocate.** The staff judge advocate serves as the legal counsel on land warfare laws and ROE, as well as other operational law issues.

SCHEDULED MEETINGS

6-49. The target panel must meet as frequently as is required by operating tempo (OPTEMPO). The focus of the meetings should be on changes in orders, TASKORDs, SOMPFs, identification of emerging targets, and future planning of the campaign. Many of these activities are according to the published *battle rhythm* (also called the plan, decide, execute [PDE]) cycle set by higher HQ. In the continuous combat operations that would characterize a major theater war (MTW), the panel meets at least daily to process new orders IAW the JSOTMPP. In a small-scale contingency operation with an irregular OPTEMPO, the panel may meet only when a new TASKORD is received. In a short-duration contingency operation, the panel may meet only once or twice at the start of the planning process.

6-50. The target panel has the responsibility to update the group or ARSOF commander. The DCO decides if the target panel has reason to address target nominations, assessments, or validations for the group or ARSOF. Based on the DCO's assessment of the situation, a target panel meeting takes place accordingly. When the target panel does meet, it uses the OPCEN briefing room for security purposes. Target panel members who cannot attend targeting meetings must have permission for the absence from the DCO or group engineer.

REQUIRED TOOLS FOR THE TARGET PANEL

6-51. Essentially, the target panel requires the following five basic tools:

- *Current approved theater JTL.* The JTL is a list of all ongoing targets for all theater forces. It may or may not be prioritized and resourced. The JTCB updates this list daily for the next ATO cycle. By the time the list is compiled and approved, the group target panel has already

done its job and nominated targets. The purpose of the target panel is to nominate targets for inclusion on the JTL. Having past JTLs may eliminate potential targets already being attacked. Theater target databases that list all potential targets with assigned basic encyclopedia (BE) numbers is of great use to the target panel. The theater BDA database also provides the J2 or JFACC assessment of damage already inflicted on targets with BE numbers. The target panel uses the theater restricted target list and prohibited target list. The restricted target list places restrictions on otherwise legitimate targets, such as C4 sites being exploited by the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) community and runways and bridges the Logistics Directorate (J4) wants to capture intact. The prohibited target list prohibits the attack of other targets entirely, such as churches, hospitals, and cultural properties. The target panel uses the SOF extract, provided by the group S2 targeting officer, to review current targets (projected for the next 5 days).

- *SOC, ARSOF, and group commander's targeting and planning guidance.* This tool is the directive from higher HQ to lower HQ, based on target nominations from the CINC and other Service components to SOF elements in support of their operations or directed targets.
- *OPORD and TASKORD.* These are planned, directed targets for SOF elements. They are the specified tasks in mission analysis. In other words, these are the priority targets for SOF elements.
- *ARSOF component worksheets.* The SOC Target Panel Handbook contains ARSOF component worksheets. The worksheets are the target nominations of the subordinate unit based on the unit's analysis of the operation. They may be supporting targets to a directed target or emerging targets that arise from tactical operations. POEs are critical to the validation and approval process to forward nominated targets. The POE supports the CARVER analysis.
- *ATO and ACO.* These documents are important in providing planning constraints for targeting. The ATO lists all aircraft flights and supporting flights, including their locations. By cross-referencing the ATO, the target panel looks for conflicts on an existing target before new nominations begin. The ACO lists constraints, such as restricted or no-fire areas, that may impact on target nominations. The ACO is normally issued only once in the theater of operation. Then, it is updated as required.

TARGET NOMINATION PROCESS

6-52. The target nomination process occurs under two conditions—deliberate planning (up to 5 to 6 days before the desired execution) and time-sensitive or crisis planning (96 hours before the desired execution). The targeting process varies slightly for each type.

Deliberate Planning

6-53. The target panel's main role is deliberate planning—that is, planning for targets that take place 5 to 6 days or longer before the intended execution. This type of planning gives the target panel the best opportunity to anticipate

targeting requirements and to direct the development of standing target packages for anticipated execution. The following mission criteria serve as a useful start point:

- Does this target support the CINC's and COMSOC's campaign plan?
- Is this target operationally feasible?
- Is this target an appropriate target for ARSOF?
- Are the resources required likely to be reasonably available?
- Does the expected end state justify the anticipated risk to the resources required?

6-54. Target nomination takes place with OPORD development as a part of campaign planning. During campaign planning, targeting is detailed and laborious. During wartime, it occurs routinely and continuously throughout combat operations. The JSOTMPP, with associated TIPs, is developed and maintained as an ongoing activity. Even after deployment, when planning for future targets, the deliberate planning process remains valid. Typically, the target nomination process occurs in the following manner:

- Targeting is primarily an SFOB-ARSOTF function. The FOBs are only responsible for tactical execution. FOBs do not have the robust planning and targeting support staffs required to participate in the target nomination process. The SFOB plans officer and the S2 targeting support personnel who support him should generate the vast majority of SF target nominations. The target nominations are based on published guidance from the higher HQ and the mission analysis of plans and orders. They are normally geared to the capabilities of the unit. Otherwise, they identify additional resources needed to attack the target (beyond organic assets capability). A targeting cell at each component HQ develops supporting targets that will affect the component's stated mission, as well as the primary mission target.
- Target nominations are submitted by MTF message, secure local area network, burst device, or hard copy and disk, using the following format:
 - BE number, if available.
 - Target name or identification, including alternate names and identifications.
 - Radius of coverage for imagery point targets.
 - Geographic coordinates (accurate to the nearest minute or degree) and the source of the coordinates (for example, the Joint Operations Graphic Air Sheet number and edition date).
 - Universal transverse mercator (UTM) coordinates (accurate to at least eight digits), the source of the coordinates, and the map datum (taken from the map legend).
 - Target description, including unique situational information bearing on the status and importance of the target.
 - Justification for attack or surveillance.
 - Proposed time of execution.

- POE, as detailed as possible, based on available information. The POE may be only a concept. The SFOB most likely will not have sufficient time or intelligence to provide a credible POE on a target not already approved. The FOBs and the theater JIC will have higher priority tasks, such as mission preparation for approved and tasked targets.

6-55. The time for submitting these target nominations to the target panel is theater-specific, depending on the PDE cycle of the JFC and JFSOCC. Understanding that the targeting process relates to the ATO process is an important factor. The daily ATO meetings address the activities of the day and the operations for the immediate future. The time frame addressed by the ATO meetings is also theater-specific. Because most targets in the CINC's theater are air targets, this method shows how the ATO goes hand-in-hand with the JTL. SR sites, for example, may be listed as *no-fly* areas for a 1-nautical-mile-diameter circle around the SR site location (or multiple locations) on the ATO or ACO for its entire duration. The SR target is listed on the JTL.

6-56. The target panel reviews each nomination, including targets received from higher HQ for SOF units to execute and SOF-generated targets for SOF and other Services to engage in support of SOF operations. This action is directly related to Step 3 of the targeting process where SOF component estimates are made. The designated MPA or group S3 or S2 staff in the OPCEN forwards target nominations from higher HQ for feasibility assessment. Target nominations from group and ARSOF components are analyzed using the following:

- COMSOC guidance, OPORDs, or directives.
- Theater planning guidance for targeting.
- Current JTL-approved targets.
- Appropriateness of the mission, as evaluated under the CARVER criteria:
 - **Criticality** (target value versus risk). Is the target critical? Does it support the operation, including SR and PSYOP?
 - **Accessibility** (essentially the initial assessment). Is it accessible, given the available resources? Can the target be reached for infiltration and exfiltration? Can the available weapons system be used against the target?
 - **Recuperability**. How quickly is the enemy likely to recuperate from the effects of the mission? Is the target worthwhile—can it be rendered inoperable for the required time with SOF assets? What and how long is the effect on the target audience?
 - **Vulnerability**. Is the target vulnerable to the resources available? Are expertise or equipment available to conduct the mission and to get the desired results?
 - **Effect**. What are the likely effects of the mission on the enemy and civilian population, on coalition and allied civilian populations, and on the domestic and international stage? Will this target hamper

future SOF operations by isolating the local populace or by destroying hard-to-replace equipment?

- **Recognizability.** Can the soldier or the target acquisition system recognize the target? Will conditions exist that prevent identifying the target or even finding it? Can the target be serviced with allocated sorties in support of another operation? If not, is it justifiable to forward to higher HQ as a stand-alone target?

6-57. Based on these considerations, the target panel determines the validity of the nominated target and recommends forwarding it after the commander's approval. Once the target panel and the commander approve the group- and ARSOF-nominated target list, the S2 and the S3 forward target nominations to the higher HQ. These nominations, validated by the chain of command, are forwarded to the compiling HQ. The JFSOCC is always the HQ to which an SFOB or ARSOTF forwards its target nominations and its estimates (formerly called feasibility assessments). Target nominations are submitted through operations and intelligence channels at the same time. This action allows the responsible agencies to note the nominations; to compare them to existing nominations, streamlining the workload and eliminating duplicate targeting; and to begin building a target information database.

6-58. The ending period is designated as such because it is the time the higher level JTCB and JFACC begin implementing nominated targets in the theater.

Time-Sensitive or Crisis Planning

6-59. Time-sensitive target nomination takes place based on the emerging situation and anticipated enemy reactions to ongoing operations as a part of the campaign. During this period, speed and directive authority characterize targeting. Some members of the target panel may be unavailable. As a minimum, the panel will consist of the DCO, the S2, and S3 representatives. Complete SOMPFs, with their associated TIPs, are not expected in this type of planning. Normally, the MPA receives only the mission-tasking letter. Because of their urgency, time-sensitive target nominations are processed through operations channels. Typically, the target nomination process occurs in the following manner:

- The individual ARSOF components (SF, SOAR, Ranger, PSYOP, CA, other) identify emerging targets during their planning or operations process. These target nominations are based on the anticipated or known effect on current or near-future operations. The operations section at each component HQ rapidly develops supporting targets that affect their stated mission, as well as the primary mission target.
- These nominations are rapidly forwarded to the compiling HQ, ARSOF and then to the SOC. Target nominations are submitted through operations channels to evaluate for the possibility of fratricide or duplication and to check the database for existing target information. Target nominations are submitted by the fastest possible means. The format is as follows:
 - BE number, if available.

- Target name or identification, including alternate names or identifications.
 - Geographic coordinates (accurate to the nearest minute or degree) and the source of coordinates (for example, the Joint Operations Graphic Air Sheet number and edition date).
 - UTM coordinates (accurate to at least eight digits) and the source of the coordinates.
 - Target description, including unique situational information bearing on the status and importance of the target.
 - Justification for attack or surveillance.
 - Proposed time of execution.
 - Concept for the POE.
- These target nominations are submitted immediately to the target panel for rapid attention. The target panel may not convene to consider the target nomination, depending on the urgency of the operation.
 - If the minimum number of target panel members is present, they review each target nomination. Otherwise, the operations duty officer validates, approves, and forwards the target nomination as quickly as possible. Nominations may include targets received from higher HQ for SOF units to execute, as well as SOF-nominated targets for other Services to engage in support of SOF operations. The designated MPA or group S3 or S2 staff in the OPCEN forwards target nominations from higher HQ for initial assessment and POE. Target nominations from group or ARSOF components will be analyzed using the following:
 - COMSOC guidance, OPORDs, or directives.
 - Theater planning guidance for targeting.
 - Current JTL-approved targets.
 - Appropriateness of the mission, as evaluated under the CARVER criteria.

6-60. Based on these considerations, the target panel or the operations duty officer determines the validity of the nominated target and recommends forwarding it after the commander's approval. Additional recommendations include diverting available assets or sorties (from the review of the ATO) or requesting additional sorties from loitering orbits (aircraft). Once the DCO or commander approves the nominated target, it is immediately forwarded to the SOC J3 for validation and execution.

END PRODUCTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TARGET PANEL

6-61. The following end products are associated with the efforts of the group target panel:

- *Group and ARSOF standing target list.* This list of nominated targets is a reference for intelligence assets to develop or maintain a database on the target. The database can provide information on similar targets for future or time-sensitive planning events.

- *Group and ARSOF input to the ATO cycle.* Because almost every target has aircraft flights associated with it, target nominations serve as a warning for air asset planners for mission development and ATO inputs.
- *Future missions for operational units.* All target nominations go into a target database for future missions. If a target is important enough for SOF units to identify, it probably will be an actual target at some point in the campaign. Keeping the target nominations supports the idea of maintaining a database of targeting information.

INTEGRATION OF NOMINATED TARGETS WITH TARGET PANELS OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

6-62. Targets nominated by the group or ARSOF elements are forwarded to the SOC target panel to be validated by the panel and integrated into the SOC target nominations. The SOC target panel performs the same tasks on nominated targets as did the group or ARSOF target panel. The SOC target panel validates ARSOF or group target nominations and deconflicts, prioritizes, and approves nominations to go forward to the theater or CINC's target panel (the JTCB) and the joint targeting board. POEs provide input for ARSOF and Air Force special operations component (AFSOC) air assets to the ATO.

Chapter 7

Special Forces Support and Sustainment

The SF group depends on both the special operations support battalion (SOSB) and the TA CSS infrastructure to sustain its operations. An SF group or battalion, in some theaters, may also depend on the CSS system of another Service. This chapter describes how the internal SF CSS system interacts with the ARSOF and the TA CSS infrastructure to meet SF requirements. When sustained by another Service, the SF commander and his logisticians must modify Army doctrine, policy, and procedures to conform to the CSS procedures in the theater.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

7-1. By law (Title 10, USC 165), the ASCC supports assigned U.S. Army forces and, if directed, other U.S. Services and allies in a theater. In a hostile environment (during war), a theater has a combat zone and a COMMZ. The combat zone begins at the rear boundary of the senior combat echelon in the theater (normally a corps or field army) and extends to the forward limit of the theater commander's AO. The COMMZ extends rearward from the rear boundary of the combat zone and includes the area necessary to support forces in the combat zone.

7-2. The TA has two types of support organizations in the COMMZ—the theater support command (TSC) and the area support group (ASG). TSCs provide CSS and designated CS on an area basis to forces passing through or located in the COMMZ. TSCs have area responsibility for rear operations in the COMMZ. The ASG's functional commands provide specialized support (such as personnel, engineer, transportation, and medical) to forces throughout the ASCC AOR. For a detailed description of ASCC organization and support operations, see FM 100-1, *The Army*.

7-3. Two TA agencies are vital to the C2 of these organizations—the Theater Army Material Management Command (TAMMC) and the Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA). The TAMMC provides centralized management of most supply and maintenance operations. It is the primary TA link with the CONUS-sustaining base. The TAMCA provides theaterwide movement management and control of transportation assets.

7-4. During MOOTW, the ASCC's responsibilities differ from the command's normal responsibilities. Each operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and interagency activities add complexity to the sustainment system. Because of the geographic location, ARSOF may conduct operations outside a theater support system. Preparing and submitting a statement of requirements (SOR) during these types of exercises can enhance the unit's

ability to determine requirements and can add a final coordination check to the theater OPLAN.

7-5. Deliberate planning and crisis-action planning are two methodologies of planning. In deliberate planning and preparation, ARSOF and the ASCC fully identify support requirements in OPLANs and CONPLANs from a bare-base SOR down to the user level, based on an established set of planning assumptions. The ASCC coordinates the procedures for fulfilling requirements from the support structure in the theater Army. In crisis-action planning and preparation, the requirements anticipated at the CINC's level dictate the amount of responsiveness and improvisation required to provide reactive, no-notice support and sustainment. Actual circumstances may dictate the modification of preplanned requirements or generate new requirements unanticipated during the deliberate planning process.

7-6. During deliberate planning for a mission, the theater SOC may use ARSOF (either in theater or requested from USSOCOM) to assist the planning process by conducting assessments or site surveys. These missions can also serve ASCC preparations. When feasible, planners integrate these assessments into the theater campaign plan to provide intelligence, operational, and logistics information for logistics preparation of the theater.

7-7. The use of assessment teams may not be practical during crisis-action planning. When crisis-action planning occurs, the theater SOC staff, with the ASCC, must anticipate the unified command's ARSOF support requirements. USASOC can deploy advance party personnel to assist the ASCC in receiving ARSOF and to establish access to the theater support structure.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ASSETS

7-8. Since SF units routinely deploy into undeveloped theaters where little or no support structure exists, SF units often depend on ARSOF CSS assets. These assets include the SOSCOM and its subordinate units—the SOTSE, the SOSB, and the Special Operations Signal Battalion (A).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

7-9. SOSCOM(A) (Figure 7-1, page 7-3) is a major subordinate unit of the USASOC. As such, the SOSCOM(A) commander is responsible for the administration, training, maintenance, support, and readiness of assigned forces, including the Special Operations Signal Battalion(A), the Special Operations Support Battalion(A), and the Materiel Management Center (MMC).

7-10. The mission of SOSCOM(A) is to plan, coordinate, and provide CSS and CHS to ARSOF in the full spectrum of conflict, from MOOTW to war, in two theaters simultaneously. SOSCOM(A) also plans, coordinates, and provides operational and tactical communications for JSOTF commanders in support of up to two geographic CINCs simultaneously.

7-11. SOSCOM(A) deploys elements of the Special Operations Signal Battalion(A) and the Special Operations Support Battalion(A) in DS of deployed ARSOF. Elements of the SOSCOM HQ also deploy to conduct

logistics preparation of the battlespace. Actions include interfacing with the theater support structure, establishing Standard Army Multi-command Management Information System (STAMMIS) connectivity for ARSOF, establishing support accounts, coordinating HN and contracting support, establishing base camp support, and moving personnel and equipment in theater.




Figure 7-1. Special Operations Support Command (Airborne)

7-12. The MMC provides ARSOF with centralized and integrated materiel management of property, equipment, maintenance, logistics automation, repair parts, and supplies (less Classes V and VIII).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT

7-13. The SOTSE is assigned to the SOSCOM(A) but is attached to a specific TA to coordinate ARSOF support for that theater. Its mission is to plan and coordinate with TA, SOSCOM(A), and apportioned ARSOF to assure CSS, CHS, and signal support for ARSOF (supporting the warfighting CINCs) during deliberate and crisis actions. The SOTSEs participate in SOC logistics planning processes and serve as the conduit of logistics information between the TA, SOC, ARSOF, and SOSCOM(A). The group S4 identifies CSS requirements to the SOTSE, which in turn coordinates with TA for support. When requirements can be satisfied through the TA, the SOTSE develops a support plan specifying support for ARSOF. If requirements cannot be fulfilled from within the theater, the SOTSE assists the SOC in preparing a request for support from the SOSCOM. The geographic CINC validates the SOC request. The requirement is then sent to the JCS for action. The JCS

staff tasks USSOCOM, which in turn tasks USASOC to provide support from SOSCOM. While the official request for support is being sent through official channels, the SOTSE notifies the SOSCOM of the upcoming support requirements.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT BATTALION (AIRBORNE)

7-14. The mission of the Special Operations Support Battalion(A) (Figure 7-2) is to provide rapid, deployable CSS and health service support (HSS) to ARSOF in war and in stability operations and support operations. Consisting of a headquarters and main support company (HMSC) and two forward support companies (FSCs), the Special Operations Support Battalion(A) can task-organize along multifunctional lines and tailor deployable companies to meet mission requirements.




Figure 7-2. Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne)

7-15. The Special Operations Support Battalion(A) HQ provides C2, staff support, contracting services, and LNOs for all operations ongoing within the unit. The HMSC provides support in organizational maintenance, food service, and limited airdrop capabilities. They provide medical logistics, medical treatment, and medical holding capabilities. The HMSC also provides Classes II and IV support, Class VII supply support activities, and Class IX technical supply support.

7-16. The FSCs are multifunctional companies. They provide support for water production requirements, fuel, ammunition, food service, engineer service, transportation, movement control, organizational maintenance, and limited DS maintenance. They provide medical logistics, medical treatment, medical holding, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities. The FSC also provides support in supply Classes I, II, IV, and IX.

7-17. The Special Operations Support Battalion(A) also maintains a 30-personnel immediate deployment package (IDP), which can deploy within 18 hours to support ARSOF missions. The IDP provides initial support on the ground, helps determine additional support requirements, and prepares for reception and integration of additional ARSOF units. The package, which normally follows the IDP for sustained operations, is determined based on mission analysis and can deploy within 72 hours.

7-18. Once deployed in theater, the Special Operations Support Battalion(A) may require augmentation in the following areas:

- Laundry and bath.
- Mortuary affairs.
- STAMMIS integration.
- Base security.
- Transportation.
- NBC decontamination.
- SOF-peculiar maintenance.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SIGNAL BATTALION (AIRBORNE)

7-19. The mission of the Special Operations Signal Battalion(A) (Figure 7-3) is to provide operational and tactical communications for JSOTF commanders in support of deliberate plans and crisis-action operations of geographic CINCs in up to two theaters simultaneously. The battalion also provides signal packages in support of ARSOF as directed or as available. The battalion consists of an HHC and two signal companies. The battalion can task-organize communications packages to provide command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) connectivity to JSOTF and ARSOTF commanders. These packages can range from a three- to four-soldier SOCA team to a full 100-soldier company.




Figure 7-3. Special Operations Signal Battalion (Airborne)

7-20. The Special Operations Signal Battalion(A) provides UHF satellite communications and a secure combat net radio. It also provides ground mobile forces (GMF) TACSAT multichannel systems, telephone switching, a communications center, commercial news services, net radio interface, long-range connectivity, and defense communications service entry. The Special

Operations Signal Battalion(A) is also capable of providing limited organizational and DS-level maintenance.

SPECIAL FORCES LOGISTICS

7-21. The SFOB and FOB SPTCENs provide—or coordinate through the ARSOTF for—CSS on a unit-support basis for all elements assigned or attached to their respective bases. SF CSS planners and personnel apply their knowledge of conventional CSS operations to meet the specific CSS requirements generated by SF units. CSS fundamentals apply to most SF operations. (FM 100-10, *Combat Service Support*, is the Army's capstone manual for CSS operations.)

7-22. CSS normally includes—

- Requisition, receipt, storage, and distribution of all classes of supplies.
- Procurement of nonstandard supplies and items of materiel.
- Bath facilities, laundry, and clothing exchange.
- Mortuary affairs.
- Production and distribution of potable water.
- Unit and DS maintenance for all wheeled vehicles, power-generation equipment, signal equipment, diving and marine equipment, and small arms.
- Limited GS maintenance for SF-peculiar materiel.
- Airdrop equipment rigging, supply, and repair.
- Transportation service.
- CHS.
- PSS.

7-23. The SF group and battalion support companies may need MTOE or TDA augmentation to provide CSS during sustained operations. This augmentation is necessary when—

- The SFOB and FOBs are set up in undeveloped theaters in support of contingency operations.
- The SFOB and FOBs are not set up at fixed facilities.
- A high percentage of SFODs are committed simultaneously.

OPERATIONAL PROJECTS

7-24. To support contingency operations and war plans, SF uses operational projects to obtain required supplies and equipment above its normal allowances. The allowances are typically established by an MTOE, a supplemental TDA, special letters of authorization, or AR 710-2, *Inventory Management Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level*. The stocks include supplies and equipment for operations in extreme environments and for the sustainment of indigenous forces. They may also include supplies and equipment that SF clandestinely caches in potential operational areas to support stay-behind operations.

7-25. The theater CINC may set up and maintain operational projects to support joint SO activities. Operational projects are restricted to the minimum essential types and quantities of supplies and equipment required to execute the total plan or a prescribed portion of the plan successfully. Stocks normally include only standard items listed under the war reserve stock. The SF group commander must justify the inclusion of nonstandard items in project stocks. (AR 710-1, *Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System*, delineates the procedures for requesting and establishing operational projects.)

WAR RESERVE MATERIEL

7-26. The USASOC commander, in coordination with the ASCC and Department of the Army, obtains adequate pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS) in the theater and fills shortages in existing war reserve materiel stocks (WRMS). Alternatives include—

- PWRMS afloat, adjacent to the theater of operations.
- PWRMS in a third country support base.
- WRMS in tailored packages for deployment with the SF group.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

7-27. Host nation support (HNS) is an additional means of meeting unresourced CSS requirements during SF operations. It should not, however, be the preferred means. HNS refers to support provided by a friendly country for U.S. military operations conducted within its borders based on mutually concluded agreements. It includes planning, negotiating for, and acquiring such support. HNS can include almost every aspect of CSS. HN personnel and organizations can perform many CSS functions as well as or better than their U.S. counterparts. The SF group commander, with the ASCC, must determine the functional types and levels of HNS he can accept without unduly jeopardizing OPSEC and mission accomplishment. The SOTSE furnishes the SF group S5 with POCs of specific HN agencies or organizations that provide support in the theater. A similar source of CSS is FNS. FNS includes the identification, coordination, and acquisition of foreign nation resources, such as supplies, materiel, and labor to support U.S. forces and operations. The difference between HNS and FNS is that FNS CSS is from a third country, not from the United States or the country in which the U.S. operations are taking place. All aspects for acquiring foreign nation CSS are the same as those provided for HNS.

DEVELOPED THEATER LOGISTICS

7-28. In a developed theater, a sustainment base sets up within the theater. PWRMS and operational project stocks are in place. FNS agreements exist. The following information explains how a SPTCEN in a developed theater performs its four logistics functions—supply, field services, maintenance, and transportation.

SUPPLY

7-29. The service detachment's supply and transportation section requisitions, receives, and stores standard Classes I, II, III, IV, VI, and VII supplies from the supporting DS supply and service company in the TSC, ASG, or SOSB. All these classes of supplies (except bulk Class III) are demand items. The using unit submits a request through the service detachment to the direct support unit (DSU). The DSU either fills the request from its existing stocks or forwards the request to its supporting GS unit. The DSU uses a combination of supply point, unit, and throughput distribution. When fixed or mobile post exchanges are unavailable, the supply and transportation section requisitions and receives Class VI packages the same way they requisition Class I supplies.

7-30. Bulk Class III is a scheduled item. The SF group S4 forecasts unit requirements through logistics channels to the TSC or ASG based on input from the battalions. The TSC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and TAMMC develop a distribution plan to allocate fuel to subordinate units based on fuel availability (IAW theater OPLANs) and unit priorities.

7-31. The supply and transportation section requisitions and receives nonstandard SF-peculiar items through the SOSB. The SOSB fills the request from the theater or (in the case of certain non-DOD items) obtains the items through the SOC J4.

7-32. The supply and transportation section requests, draws, and stores conventional Class V supplies from the supporting ammunition supply point (ASP). A conventional ordnance ammunition company of the TSC ammunition group operates the ASP and uses supply point distribution. Class V supply is scheduled, not demanded. Based on input from the battalions, the SF group S3 must determine the group's operational requirements, primarily the UBL and required supply rate. The S3 then submits the requirements through operational channels for approval and allocation by the TSC DCSOPS. The TSC DCSLOG and TAMMC allocate scarce Class V items by computing a controlled supply rate based on guidance from the ASCC DCSOPS. Once the SF group commander receives his Class V allocation, he suballocates it among his subordinate elements. Considering these suballocations, the SF group and battalion S3s approve unit Class V requests before the S4s can fill them.

7-33. The group or battalion medical section requisitions and receives its normal Class VIII supplies from the supporting DS medical treatment facility of the TSC medical command (MEDCOM). The medical facility uses a combination of unit and supply point distribution. Class VIII resupply is on demand. The using unit submits its request to the medical supply sergeant, who forwards the request through medical channels to the medical facility. The facility either fills the request from its existing stocks or forwards the request to its supporting medical logistics (MEDLOG) unit. For bulk issue of Class VIII supplies to fill SF operational requirements, the MEDCOM normally authorizes direct requisitioning from the MEDLOG unit. The service detachment's mechanical maintenance section requisitions, receives, and stores Class IX supplies from the supporting DS maintenance company in the ASG. The DSU uses supply point distribution. Class IX resupply is on

demand. The using unit submits its request to the mechanical maintenance section. It forwards the request to the DSU. The DSU fills the request from its existing stocks or forwards the request to the TAMMC.

7-34. The supply and transportation section receives and stores Class X supplies from the supporting TSC. The TSC uses a combination of unit, supply point, and throughput distribution. The using unit submits its request through the base S5. He forwards the request through logistics channels.

7-35. The supply and transportation section obtains potable and nonpotable water from local sources using organic equipment. When water requirements exceed the local supply, the section requisitions and draws water from a water supply point set up by the supporting DS supply and service company. The DSU uses supply point distribution.

7-36. The supply and transportation section requisitions and receives unclassified maps from the supporting DS supply and service company. The DSU obtains its unclassified maps from the appropriate TA map depot. Using units submit their requests to the S2, who then consolidates them and forwards the requests through supply channels. The S2 requisitions and receives classified maps and other classified intelligence products through intelligence channels.

7-37. To meet their operational requirements during the transition to active operations and during unanticipated breaks in normal resupply operations, SF units maintain UBLs of Classes I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, and IX supply items. Commanders should review these UBLs at least annually to make sure they adequately address current operational requirements. Commanders should also inspect their UBLs periodically for proper maintenance, rotation, and security and for the requisition of necessary supplies.

FIELD SERVICES

7-38. Field services include mortuary affairs, airdrop, clothing exchange and bath, laundry, bread baking, textile and clothing renovation, and salvage. Mortuary affairs and airdrop are primary field services because they are essential to the sustainment of combat operations. All others are secondary field services.

7-39. Whenever possible, SF teams that sustain fatal casualties identify the human remains and place them in human-remains pouches. They then evacuate the remains to the service detachment for further evacuation to the supporting mortuary affairs collection point. If the remains are contaminated, they and the pouches should be so marked. When an SFODA cannot evacuate its dead, it conducts an emergency burial and reports the burial to the group or battalion. The group or battalion S4 submits a record of interment through mortuary affairs channels. Whenever possible, a unit chaplain or the SFODA commander conducts an appropriate service to honor the dead.

7-40. The group and battalion rigger air delivery sections do not have the capability to conduct sustained airdrop support for SF operations. The TSC airdrop supply company and SOSB's airdrop section can augment the group's organic capabilities by providing the group and battalion service detachments with dedicated support teams or by providing GS on a mission basis.

7-41. The SFOB and FOBs may not have fixed facilities or civilian contractors to provide secondary field services. In this situation, the supporting DS supply and service company provides these services when the situation permits.

MAINTENANCE

7-42. The service detachment's mechanical maintenance section performs limited consolidated unit-level maintenance of wheeled vehicles and power-generation equipment. It also performs vehicle recovery. The signal detachment's electronic maintenance section performs consolidated unit- and DS-level maintenance of signal equipment. It also performs limited GS maintenance on SF-peculiar signal equipment. Unit armorers perform decentralized or consolidated unit-level maintenance of small arms. The SOSB may also provide limited DS maintenance.

7-43. Required maintenance on an item of equipment may exceed unit capabilities. In this case, the mechanical maintenance section or electronics maintenance section evacuates the equipment to the supporting DS maintenance company or requests on-site repair by a mobile maintenance support team from that company. The DS maintenance company performs DS maintenance to return unserviceable equipment to the user. It evacuates to intermediate GS maintenance units those items that it cannot repair. It also provides direct exchange service and maintains a limited operational readiness float.

7-44. There are exceptions to these procedures. The rigger air delivery section evacuates unserviceable airdrop equipment to the TSC airdrop equipment repair and supply company. The medical section evacuates unserviceable medical equipment to the supporting DS medical treatment facility or MEDLOG unit.

7-45. For those items of SF-peculiar equipment the Army maintenance system cannot repair, the SF group must rely on the SOSB or civilian specialists and technicians (U.S., HN, or third country) and on SF personnel who have attended civilian maintenance training. Such equipment may require evacuation to CONUS for repair at the manufacturer or other selected facility.

TRANSPORTATION

7-46. The primary concern of the service detachment commander is transportation mode operations (air, motor, rail, and water transport). The supply and transportation section provides the trucks to support supply point distribution and other normal CSS activities. It does not, however, have dedicated drivers for these trucks. The base commander may organize a provisional transportation section by assigning dedicated drivers to these trucks. The TSC transportation may attach appropriate motor and water transportation assets to the support company for abnormal CSS operations. Otherwise, transportation units support abnormal transportation requirements on a mission basis with its GS assets. The unit S4 coordinates for transportation support through the regional transportation movement office (TMO) of the TAMCA. When the same TMO services the SFOB and

FOB, the TMO may require the group S4 to consolidate support requests. The SOSB also may resolve transportation requirements.

DEVELOPED THEATER PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT

7-47. PSS consists of five related areas—personnel management, public affairs, legal services, finance services, and religious support. SF units plan and conduct most PSS activities using standard Army systems and procedures. SF group and battalion S1s deal directly with their supporting personnel service company (PSC). When the same PSC services the SFOB and FOB, the PSC may require the group S1 to consolidate reports.

CRITICAL PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

7-48. Three critical military personnel activities directly support SF operations. They are strength management, casualty reporting, and replacement operations.

7-49. Strength management determines personnel replacement requirements and influences personnel cross-leveling and replacement-distribution decisions. The group and battalion S1s use the deliberate Army personnel accounting and strength reporting system to maintain the unit's personnel database. They forward their daily personnel summaries and personnel requirement reports to the supporting PSC. The battalion S1s provide copies of their reports to the group S1 so he can prepare a consolidated report for the SF group commander and forward information copies to the SOC Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1) and ASCC. The supporting PSCs use these reports to submit requisitions for individual replacements to the TA Personnel Command (PERSCOM).

7-50. The Army's casualty management system furnishes information to HQ, Department of the Army for notifying next of kin and for supporting casualty and survivor assistance programs. By name, casualty reporting has far-reaching effects on the morale and the image of the Army. Casualty reporting must be 100 percent accurate, even at the expense of speedy reporting. Still, reporting should be as rapid as possible. The losing SFOD submits casualty feeder reports and, if required, witness statements to the battalion or group S1. The S1 forwards them to the supporting PSC. The PSC manages open cases (for example, soldiers missing in action) until final disposition is made. It prepares letters of sympathy for the commander's signature. It verifies the information before sending a formal individual casualty report. The battalion S1 provides copies of all by-name casualty reports to the group S1.

7-51. SF replacement operations are the receipt, processing, and allocation of individual and small unit (SFOD) replacements. The SF group obtains its replacements from PERSCOM using normal replacement procedures. The SOC commander coordinates with USSOCOM, USASOC, and the ASCC to set priorities of personnel fill. The SPTCEN director receives, billets, and provides messing for replacements. The S1 and command sergeant major distribute replacements based on the base commander's priorities. The gaining SFOD's MOC isolates and orients replacements for deployed SFODs until the ISOFAC director certifies them as prepared for infiltration.

7-52. The ASCC can play a key role in requesting small unit replacements. The ASCC arranges an intratheater transfer of SFODs or coordinates to obtain SFODs from CONUS. Once the SFODs arrive at the gaining operational base, the ASCC assigns the SFODs to the SPTCEN as uncommitted detachments until the SPTCEN director certifies the SFODs are operationally ready for a mission.

OTHER PSS ACTIVITIES

7-53. Postal operations move, deliver, and collect personal and official mail. A DS postal platoon normally collocates with the supporting PSC. The group and battalion S1s set up internal procedures to collect and deliver mail. These procedures must include provisions for redirecting the mail of deceased, missing, and evacuated personnel. The S1s must also make provisions for deployed SF personnel who cannot, due to operational reasons, receive or send mail.

7-54. Finance operations provide normal finance support to SF personnel. They also provide the operational funds that SFODAs may need to execute their missions. A finance support unit normally collocates with the supporting PSC. The group and battalion S1s appoint Class A agents and set up internal procedures to meet the personal financial needs of their soldiers. The group budget officer sets up procedures for SFODAs to obtain and account for operational funds. Each SF officer appointed as a Class A agent must fully understand which payments are authorized and how to account for each transaction.

DEVELOPED THEATER COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT

7-55. Each SF group and battalion surgeon sets up and operates an SFOB or FOB dispensary capable of providing routine and emergency echelon I medical and dental treatment to assigned and attached personnel. Medical section personnel in the dispensary also provide sustainment training for combat lifesaver personnel and SF medics.

7-56. The SFOB and FOB dispensaries provide preventive medicine services, such as pest control, water quality surveillance, immunization, and drug prophylaxis activities. They also conduct the general surveillance of military environments to identify actual or potential health hazards. SF preventive medicine specialists train and provide technical supervision of unit field sanitation teams. They can also participate in military civic action programs.

7-57. The SFOB and FOB dispensaries provide veterinary services, such as food quality assurance inspections, dining facility sanitary inspections, and health services to military animals. SF veterinary specialists assist in the unit preventive medicine program. They can also participate in military civic action programs.

7-58. The ASCC, in coordination with the group surgeon, coordinates TSC CHS for the SFOB and FOBs. The TSC MEDCOM designates supporting medical treatment facilities and provides the SFOB and FOB dispensaries with—

- MEDEVAC capability.

- Additional preventive medicine, veterinary, and dental support.
- Medical laboratory services.
- Hospitalization.
- Medical intelligence.
- Medical supply and equipment maintenance.

UNDEVELOPED THEATER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

7-59. An undeveloped theater does not have a significant U.S. theater sustainment base. PWRMS, in-theater operational projects, and FNS agreements are minimal or nonexistent. When an SF unit deploys into an undeveloped theater, it must bring sufficient resources to survive and operate until the TA sets up a bare-base support system or makes arrangements for HN and third country support. The bare-base support system may function from CONUS, afloat (amphibious shipping or mobile sea bases), or at a third country support base. The bare-base support system relies heavily on strategic airlift and sealift for resupply.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPTIONS

7-60. Deployed SF units in an undeveloped theater may bypass normal CSS echelons. They may maintain direct contact with their parent units in CONUS, or they may request a tailored support package from the SOSB to accompany them into the theater. The SOSB can then request directly from the CONUS wholesale logistics system (through the SOSB) and provide support and sustainment to the SF units. They may also rely on the ASCC's contracting and CA expertise to obtain support and sustainment. In practice, the solution may be some combination of all four options.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

7-61. Support relationships must be developed before and during exercises, MTTs, and planning conferences. Support relationships identified in the theater support plan are a basis for habitual support relationships between the SF group and the TA elements providing its support package. The support package should be provisionally organized as a composite support battalion or company. The group commander need not deal with a collection of teams, detachments, and companies without a parent control HQ.

SUPPLY

7-62. Normal basic loads are inadequate for SF operations in an undeveloped theater. Units deploying into an undeveloped theater should recalculate these requirements based on the mission. For example, an SFOD may deploy with 30 days of supply (15-day order-ship time, 10-day operating level, 5-day safety level). Because this quantity of supplies exceeds the SF group's capacity to move and store them, the group and battalion S4s normally divide the loads into accompanying supplies and preplanned follow-on supplies. Accompanying supplies are normally limited to the unit's basic and prescribed loads, plus additional Classes I, III, and V supplies critical to the operation. The group and battalion S3s must include accompanying supplies in all their predeployment load planning.

7-63. Supply procedures vary in an undeveloped theater. The SF group can rely on local contract support for fresh Class I supplies and dining facility operation. The SFOD also routinely purchases Classes II, III, IV, and VI supplies locally or from third-party contractors. The SFOD normally receives Classes V and IX supplies through the standard U.S. system. The SFOD stocks low-density, high-dollar repair parts not normally authorized at unit maintenance level. Class VII supplies may include a combination of military and commercial equipment from U.S. and foreign sources. Replacement of equipment depends on the duration of the operation, theater GS repair capability, loss rates, and the availability of operational readiness float or PWRMS. The SFOB and FOB contracts or procures water locally.

FIELD SERVICES

7-64. The SF group normally receives field services through the SOSB until the TSC establishes these capabilities. The SF group may contract for various housekeeping services, including laundry services. If laundry services are unavailable, the group S4 must arrange for clothing exchange through the SOSB.

MAINTENANCE

7-65. Preventive maintenance checks and services are critical in tropical, arid, or arctic environments that typically exist in undeveloped theaters. The frequency of periodic services often differs in these regions. Repair facilities in an undeveloped theater are often unavailable as well. The SF group commander should review the MTOE to determine the items he needs to meet increased maintenance demands caused by operations in an undeveloped theater. For example, he may need repair parts, special tools, or diagnostic equipment for testing and measuring items. The SF group should identify maintenance support in the SOR before deployment. The group commander may also contract for HN maintenance support of its equipment.

TRANSPORTATION

7-66. Because undeveloped theaters have poor LOCs, Army aviation assets should deploy early, whenever possible, to support SOF CSS operations. These aviation assets must include an adequate maintenance support package for autonomous, continuous operations. The SF group commander should review HN (or any other) lift assets to meet his additional unresourced transportation requirements. Regardless of the source of aviation assets used to support an SF group, this support must be dedicated for administrative and logistical requirements in either an undeveloped or mature theater.

PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT

7-67. PSS remains essentially unchanged in an undeveloped theater. The ASCC, in coordination with the SOC, develops personnel replacement plans.

COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT

7-68. The SF group can deploy with a CHS package to provide dedicated support until normal TSC health services are set up. The SF group has extensive organic medical capabilities. At the SF-group level, a flight surgeon,

a dental officer, a veterinary officer, a medical operations officer, a medical logistics officer, and an environmental officer are all assigned to the SFOB. At the battalion level, each FOB has authorization for a flight surgeon and a physician's assistant. At the FOB, the surgeon and the physician's assistant can perform advanced trauma life support procedures and provide limited resuscitative care. The CHS package also includes a preventive medicine NCO capable of providing medical threat evaluation and limited direct preventive medicine support. The lowest level of the CHS package is the SF medical sergeant as an independent health care provider. (See Chapter 3 of this manual for a description of the SF medical sergeant's capabilities.)

7-69. In an undeveloped theater, the group surgeon may use U.S., HN, or a third country's medical facilities during normal operations to augment the medical capabilities of the group and battalion medical sections. In this case, a group or battalion aid station may set up away from the SFOB or FOB in a centrally located HN hospital or clinic supporting multiple deployed SFODs. MEDEVAC to the SFOB or FOB is unlikely because of the considerable distances that normally separate the SFODAs from the bases or other U.S. medical support.

RECONSTITUTION

7-70. Reconstitution operations are the actions taken to restore units to a combat-effective level. They involve more than a surge in normal sustainment operations. Unit and individual training, unit organization, and human factors heavily influence the reconstitution decision. The commander two levels above the nonmission-capable (NMC) unit makes the reconstitution decision. For example, the JFSOCC (SOC commander) and the ASCC decide how, or if, to reconstitute an NMC FOB. The SFOB or FOB commander decides how to reconstitute their subordinate SFODs.

7-71. Commanders have two reconstitution options: reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization refers to the measures taken within an NMC unit to restore its own combat effectiveness, such as restoring C2, cross-leveling resources, and combining two or more NMC subunits to form a composite mission-capable SFOD. The senior surviving member of the unit assumes command and quickly begins reorganization. Regeneration rebuilds an attrited unit through the wholesale replacement of personnel and materiel and mission-essential training. Replacement personnel and materiel may come from redistributed resources, reserves, or the resources of higher or supporting echelons. A commander can execute the options separately, but he most often executes them in combination.

7-72. When a commander determines he cannot obtain the resources to restore an NMC unit to combat effectiveness, he may resort to redistribution as an alternative to reconstitution. Redistribution reduces an NMC unit to zero strength and transfers its remaining resources to other units. Redistribution is the least desirable option.

7-73. If the JFSOCC (SOC commander) decides he cannot quickly restore the operational effectiveness of an SFOB or FOB, he must assign its mission to another SFOB or FOB. Surviving assets of the NMC base augment the existing SFOB or FOB. If the SF group commander decides he cannot quickly

restore the combat effectiveness of an attrited SFOD, the commander passes the mission to another SFOD.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT SUPPORT AND SUSTAINMENT

7-74. All units require services to sustain food, water, and clothing, as well as medical and personnel needs. Likewise, SFODs depend on other units for the same type of support. SFODs often use a combination of TSC CSS, organic support companies, the Special Operations Support Battalion(A), or other CSS systems to sustain their operations. SF commanders and their staffs task-organize their assets to work with the CSS procedures and mechanisms existing in the theater. FM 3-05 (FM 100-25) details SF support and sustainment procedures.

7-75. Sustainment operations conducted with deliberate planning adhere to normal CSS operations. Mission planners must consider theater—

- Medical capabilities.
- Transportation and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) capabilities.
- Resupply capabilities.
- Repair capabilities.

RESUPPLY OF THE SFOD IN A JSOA

7-76. SFODAs brief SFOB or FOB commanders and staffs on the quantity and types of equipment and supplies that will accompany the SFODs during infiltration. Factors that influence the selection of the accompanying supplies include the following:

- Assigned mission, as well as the scope and duration of operations.
- Size and capability of the resistance force, its logistics needs, and its responsiveness to U.S. control.
- Hostile capabilities.
- Availability of resources in the AO.
- Method of infiltration.
- Operational posture (low-visibility or clandestine).
- Difficulty in repairing or replacing critical items in the AO.

7-77. Based on these considerations, the SFOB or FOB staff sets supply levels for each class of supply in the JSOA. It then determines the sequence, method, and timing of delivery.

7-78. The SFOB or FOB plans for four types of resupply operations—automatic, emergency, on-call, and cache. The SFOB or FOB S4 requests the supplies and equipment for these missions through the SOSB to the TSC. Resupply missions are normally preplanned by SFODAs while in isolation.

- *Automatic resupply* provides items that could not go in with the SFODA during infiltration. Automatic resupply provides sustainment, training, and operational supplies to the SFODA and its indigenous force on a preset schedule. The delivery time, location, contents,

identification marking system, and authentication are preplanned. The SFOB or FOB sends supplies automatically unless the SFODA cancels, modifies, or reschedules the delivery.

- *Emergency resupply* has mission-essential equipment and supplies to restore operational capability and survivability to the SFODA and its indigenous force. The SFOB or FOB delivers an emergency resupply when—
 - Radio contact has not been established between the deployed SFODA and its supporting base within a set time after infiltration, **OR**
 - The deployed SFODA fails to make a preset consecutive number of scheduled radio contacts.
- *On-call resupply* provides equipment and supplies to a deployed SFODA to meet operational requirements that cannot be carried during infiltration or to replace equipment lost or damaged during the operations. The deploying element, rigger section, and S4 prepack on-call resupply bundles. The bundles are held in a secure location and then delivered when the SFODA requests them. SF uses the Catalog Supply System (a brevity code system) to expedite on-call resupply requests, to ensure accurate identification of supply items, and to minimize message length. The Catalog Supply System lists equipment and supplies by class of supply. It groups associated equipment and supplies into convenient unit sets. It then assigns code words to each catalog item and set. The SOC J4 prepares the theater supply catalog, and the SOC J6 reproduces it as an SOI item.
- *Caches* are an alternative form of resupply. SFODAs can stockpile material within the JSOA to support future operations. They can also use caches emplaced by other units on previous operations. Using caches from previous operations must be coordinated with the JSOA commander.

Appendix A

Special Operations Coordination Element

The SOCOORD is a functional staff element of the corps G3. As such, it has staff responsibility for SO integration in each of the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS) functional areas. The implementation of the SOCOORD organic to the corps staff establishes SO expertise for SO functions on the corps staff. As a functional staff element, the SOCOORD provides a focal point for SO-related activities within the corps staff. The SOCOORD is a staff element of the corps, not a part of the C4I structure of supporting SOF units. The SOCOORD is responsible to the corps commander through the corps G3.

NOTE: All references to SOF in this appendix refer directly to ARSOF, unless otherwise stated.

MISSION

A-1. The mission of the SOCOORD is to act as the primary advisor to the corps commander and his staff on the capabilities and limitations of SOF units. The SOCOORD advises the corps G3 of the COA that best allows the optimal use of the SOF units' capabilities. It develops target nominations and mission requirements for the corps to forward to the JFC. The result is the development of mission taskings appropriate for SOF units. If SOF units are attached or OPCON to the corps (normally on a mission-by-mission basis), the corps acts as the focal point of support the units require for synchronization of operations.

GENERIC TASKS

A-2. The SOCOORD performs certain generic tasks and operates within general guidelines. These generic tasks and guidelines are as follows:

- Provide staff expertise to the corps staff on SOF doctrine and TTP.
- Serve as part of the battle management center and corps tactical operations support element.
- Coordinate SOF support requirements with the corps staff.
- Coordinate with the SOCCE that may be collocated with the corps main TOC to interface with corps C4I systems.
- Identify specific requirements for, and conduct liaison with, the theater SOC or JSOTF.
- Provide expertise and advice to all corps staff elements on SOF employment and support requirements.

- Write the appropriate annexes to the corps OPORD, integrating the JFC-approved POEs for the OPCON elements into the corps concept of operations, when the corps is granted OPCON of supporting SOF units.

A-3. The SOCOORD is not designed to be a corps C2 element for controlling SOF units working in DS of the corps. The SOCCE provided by the supporting SF unit and collocated with the corps main TOC provides that capability to the corps.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-4. The SOCOORD is not resourced or designed to provide expertise in all aspects of joint SO. It may, however, provide a focal point for such forces.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A-5. PSYOP personnel organic to the corps G3 normally staff PSYOP actions. The SOCOORD may serve as the conduit for synchronization of PSYOP supporting SOF operating in support of the corps. For example, a PSYOP detachment supporting an SF team performing FID in an area into which a corps is planning to deploy may coordinate its activities with a PSYOP detachment supporting the corps. This coordination would be effected through a SOCCE to the SOCOORD. When PSYOP personnel are not present at the corps, the SOCOORD assumes limited staff responsibility for PSYOP. This limited staff responsibility consists of assisting the G3 in identifying potential PSYOP requirements and coordinating for appropriate staff augmentation. The SOCOORD is not staffed or resourced to perform PSYOP functions and should not be considered an adequate replacement for trained PSYOP personnel organic or attached to the corps. PSYOP detachments supporting other SOF that are supporting the corps are normally represented in the SOCCE.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

A-6. CA is the functional staff responsibility of the corps Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs (G5). The relationship of the SOCOORD to CA is the same as the relationship between the SOCOORD and PSYOP.

OTHER JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-7. Depending on the situation, SOF-fulfilling requirements in support of the corps may come from other Services. These SOF include Navy sea-air-land (SEAL) team elements and Air Force SOF. The SOCOORD recommends requirements to the corps commander and provides a focal point for appropriate liaison and staff coordination from the supporting SOF element.

GENERAL PEACETIME ACTIVITIES

A-8. As an integral part of the corps staff, the SOCOORD must become thoroughly familiar with the organizations and functions of the corps to which it is assigned. The SOCOORD must have a clear understanding of the staff section responsible for each activity that has a coordination requirement for SOF operations. The BOS provide a workable framework for this analysis. Listing responsible staff sections and specific POCs for each activity under

each of the seven functional operating systems results in a *road map* of where to coordinate each action. This effort helps to avoid overlooking functions and activities to be coordinated. Once a thorough understanding of the internal operations of the corps is attained, the SOCOORD can begin to operate. SOCOORD activities during routine peacetime garrison operations fall into the two areas of planning and training. The roles of USSOCOM and USASOC are described in a peacetime environment in which CHOP of forces to regional command structures has not occurred.

PLANNING

A-9. The SOCOORD is an integral part of the staff planning process outlined in FM 101-5. The following is a summary of the activities of the SOCOORD in each step of the staff planning process. The activities as listed assume that direct liaison authorization (DIRLAUTH) for planning has been granted. If not, the SOCOORD should recommend that the corps request DIRLAUTH for planning. If DIRLAUTH is not granted, all references to corps contact with USASOC must be routed to the supported CINC. The CINC in turn coordinates with the USCINCSOC, who then tasks USASOC.

STEP 1 - RECEIVE THE MISSION

A-10. The corps receives its mission as part of a joint force OPLAN or CONPLAN. The SOCOORD must coordinate with the corps G3 to receive the complete joint force OPLAN. The initial review of the OPLAN centers on tasking to the corps, the SO annex (and its specific taskings to SOF), the CINC or JFC targeting guidance, conventional and SOF C2 arrangements, and SOF force listings. The SOCOORD also reviews its database of ongoing SOF operations that may have an impact on corps operations.

STEP 2 - EXCHANGE INFORMATION

A-11. The commander and the various staff sections exchange information relating to the mission as received. The SOCOORD contributes any information (either from day-to-day activities or from the review of the OPLAN) on SOF operating in a location or manner that may have an impact on the corps. If the OPLAN specifies SOF operations in support of the corps, the SOCOORD identifies this support and recommends through the corps G3 that the corps request a SOCCE to assist in planning. The mechanism for the corps commander to request the SOCCE is a message (drafted by the SOCOORD) to USASOC (assuming DIRLAUTH is granted). The message should identify the OPLAN being supported. USASOC passes the requirement to the appropriate SOF element (either force listed or with operational experience in the area).

A-12. If SOF taskings do not directly relate to corps requirements, area orientation and recent operational experience in the AO could be of significant value to the corps during the planning process. The routing of the request from the corps to USASOC is a peacetime arrangement. Even in a peacetime configuration, the request to USASOC should be addressed for information to the JFC or CINC, the JFSOCC, and the USCINCSOC.

A-13. The message should specify the arrival time of the planning cell or SOCCE, the duration of the planning session, and any appropriate support information (such as lodging). Arrival should be coordinated for the earliest point in the planning process to ensure the optimization of SOF expertise. The basic principle is that SOF area expertise should be available to the corps, regardless of SOF involvement in the actual operation.

STEP 3 - REVIEW MISSION ANALYSIS, RESTATED MISSION, AND COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

A-14. This step is essentially a commander's step. The SOCOORD should use the time available in this step to request information from the appropriate theater SOC, USCINCSOC, and USASOC on SOC operations that may have an impact on the OPLAN. The SOCOORD should draft an appropriate message for the corps G3 and should review the joint OPLAN in detail.

STEP 4 - PREPARE STAFF ESTIMATES

A-15. The SOCOORD produces a SOF estimate that contains recommendations on the following:

- Target nominations and mission requirements to be forwarded to the JFC for consideration by the JTCB. (See JP 3-05.5.) These nominations are the result of the SOCOORD's knowledge of SOF capabilities. The JTCB might, however, decide to assign those targets nominated to non-SOF assets.
- The COA that optimizes the capabilities of SOF and is most supportable by SOF.
- Requirements for liaison with SOF (either performing missions in support of, or merely of interest to, the corps).
- Conditions under which the corps should request OPCON or TACON of supporting SOF.
- Requirements and means for the corps to support SOF.
- Requirements for the corps to request a SOCCE.
- Activities by corps and SOF, which—when properly synchronized—will produce a synergistic effect.

STEP 5 - DETERMINE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE AND DECISION OR CONCEPT

A-16. This step is a commander's action. The commander determines the estimate and decision or concept made in this step.

STEP 6 - PREPARE PLANS AND ORDERS

A-17. Once the commander's decision is complete, preparation of plans and orders begins. The primary responsibility of the SOCOORD in this step is to prepare the SO annex to the corps OPLAN or OPORD. The annex constitutes the SOF supporting plan to the corps commander's concept of operations. The annex must contain, at a minimum, the following information:

- List of all SO impacting or potentially impacting on the corps.

- C4I structures for SOF. The structures are not at the discretion of the SOCOORD. They are more descriptive in nature, with the information derived from SOF orders and the SO annex of the joint OPLAN.
- Specific support arrangements for SOF.
- Specific communications procedures and systems.
- Specific conditions for a CHOP of SOF from and to the corps (also from the joint OPLAN).
- A clear statement of the parameters of the OPCON (general mission guidance within which the corps is authorized to direct SOF operations as derived from JFC guidance).

A-18. In addition to the preparation of the SOF annex, the SOCOORD is responsible for making sure the SOF requirements are visible in all other portions of the order. At this point, the *road map* of who has responsibility for various staff functions becomes critical. Using the BOS as a guide, the SOCOORD determines all activities that need to be coordinated. The expertise residing in the SOCCE is critical to performing this task, as the SOCOORD is not resourced to contain all of the specialties required for comprehensive coverage. Primary responsibility, however, for all staff coordination remains with the SOCOORD. All SOCCE interfaces with the corps staff are conducted through the SOCOORD. Some common considerations include—

- Logistics support.
- Communications connectivity.
- Intelligence-passing procedures.
- Fire support deconfliction.
- Airspace management.

A-19. When OPSEC permits, the concept of operations and the POE supporting SOF are described in the SO annex. The SOCOORD does not develop POEs. SOCOORD participation in POE development is limited to making sure supporting SOF and SOF operations in the corps area are fully apprised of the corps plan of operations. The SOCOORD accomplishes this effort by direct liaison with the supporting SOF, normally through a SOCCE.

STEP 7 - APPROVE PLANS AND ORDERS

A-20. This step is a command function of the corps. For the SOCOORD, however, approval of the SO annex is slightly more complex. The supporting SOF uses the joint process described in JP 3-05.5 to obtain approval of the POEs described in the annex. Where the annex specifies CHOP of forces, approval is obtained from the JFC. The mechanics of this process are that the SOCOORD and JFSOCC through the SOCCE conduct informal coordination of the plan. If agreement is reached, the JFSOCC and corps commander forward the recommendation for circumstances of CHOP of OPCON to the JFC. (The SOCOORD drafts the message for the corps.) If agreement cannot be reached on circumstances of CHOP of forces, the SOCOORD briefs the G3 on both portions and makes recommendations as to the criticality of the issue. If the corps G3 believes the issue is critical, he briefs the corps commander.

The SOCOORD drafts the message outlining the corps position of transmission to the JFC (with an information copy to the JFSOCC). Final orders reflect the JFC decision. The underlying principle is that the JFSOCC recommends SOF activities to the JFC for approval. The corps commander does not have tasking or approval authority for SOF operations. The SOCOORD must be thoroughly familiar with and derive authority from the CINC's plan and the SOF supporting plan to the CINC's plan.

STEP 8 - TRANSMIT PLANS AND ORDERS

A-21. When the corps issues the order, the SOCOORD must make sure it is transmitted to the appropriate SOF elements. The transmittal is normally through the SOCCE. In the absence of a SOCCE, however, it may be through the JFSOCC. The SOCOORD should seek DIRLAUTH from the corps commander and JFSOCC to work directly with supporting SOF.

STEP 9 - PERFORM STAFF SUPERVISION

A-22. The SOCOORD exercises staff supervision, as described in FM 101-5, of SOF OPCON or attached to the corps. He has staff responsibility for synchronizing operations when SOF are operating in or near the corps area but are not under OPCON.

TRAINING

A-23. The other major peacetime activity of the SOCOORD is training. The SOCOORD obtains all scenarios for field exercises and command post exercises from the G3 training. After reviewing them for SOF participation, the SOCOORD matches exercise plans to OPLANs and CONPLANs and recommends to the corps G3 proper SOF involvement. Based on the corps G3 guidance, the SOCOORD prepares message traffic to USASOC requesting SOF involvement commensurate with related OPLANs. Information copies go to the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commander, the USCINCSOC, and the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander. When SOF under the combatant command (COCOM) of a theater CINC is involved, the message traffic includes the appropriate CINC. Planning cells or SOCCEs may assist in defining requirements.

DAY-TO-DAY LIAISON ACTIVITIES

A-24. The activities and relationships described in this section are those that exist in the peacetime environment in which USSOCOM exercises COCOM of CONUS-based SOF and USASOC exercises command of CONUS-based ARSOF. These relationships are altered significantly when forces are employed under the COCOM of a regional CINC. In addition to participating in the staff planning process, the SOCOORD maintains a routine working relationship with certain SOF HQ. These routine relationships are critical to maintaining the close, continuous relationship that facilitates effective light and heavy SOF integration.

LIAISON WITH USASOC

A-25. USASOC is a critical player, as the HQ responsible for training and providing ARSOF to the USCINCSOC for further provision to the warfighting CINCs. The SOCOORD should arrange periodic meetings with the USASOC staff to make sure both parties are aware of current planning and requirements. Arrangement of the meetings is by message from the corps commander to the USASOC commander, with an information copy to USCINCSOC. OPLAN requirements dictate that ARSOF will become attached to the corps at some point. The SOCOORD coordinates the appropriate SOTSE and USASOC DCSLOG with the corps Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (G4) to make sure the tasked SOF unit submits a thorough, accurate SOR. The SOCOORD, working with the same three elements, identifies the SOF-peculiar items the corps must obtain and maintain to support the attached SOF. The SOCOORD also makes sure the items are obtained and maintained.

LIAISON WITH THE THEATER SOC

A-26. The SOC in the supported theater is the key player in identifying supporting SOF. The SOCOORD activity seeks visibility in the planning process. The SOCOORD should attend theater planning and coordination conferences.

LIAISON WITH USCINCSOC

A-27. The supporting SOF from another Service coordinate their requirements directly through USSOCOM and the supporting CINC. They must include a complete SOR in their liaison actions.

LIAISON WITH IDENTIFIED FORCES

A-28. When individual SOF units are identified for an operation, special coordination is required. The SOCOORD requests DIRLAUTH through the corps commander to the appropriate major Army command (MACOM) and unified commander.

ADAPTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION

A-29. When SOF are under COCOM of a regional CINC and the corps is ordered to execute an operation (either with or without an existing OPLAN), the SOCOORD acts as a focal point for all SOF-related staff activities. It monitors the activities of other staff sections and units subordinate to the corps to verify implementation of the plan as it relates to SOF. Once forces are in an operational configuration, message routing is from the corps to the Army forces (ARFOR), to the JFC, to the JFSOCC. At this point, USSOCOM and USASOC revert to the role of a CONUS support base for deployed SOF. All coordination with USSOCOM and USASOC discussed in the section on peacetime activities is redirected to appropriate theater command, staff, and support structures. When the assistance of SOF is required, the JFC requests (on the advice of the JFSOCC) through the CINC (if he is not the same individual) to USCINCSOC assistance as a supporting CINC. USCINCSOC subsequently tasks USASOC, which tasks the appropriate subordinate unit.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION WITH AN OPLAN

A-30. When a completed OPLAN exists, the SOCOORD reviews planned SOF-related activities and monitors their progress. If some other type of liaison or a SOCCE is called for, it establishes contact with the appropriate unit to ensure timely, coordinated arrival. Through release of a preplanned message, the SOCOORD establishes itself with the activated JFSOCC as the corps POC for SOC- and JSOTF-controlled forces. The message requests all information on emerging or changing missions that may have an impact on the corps, either directly or indirectly. It establishes requirements to provide the SOCOORD with updated SO annexes and target lists consistent with OPSEC. Specific POEs on emerging targets are coordinated and synchronized with the corps as required. While the SOCOORD must be proactive in seeking information and making itself visible as the SOF entry to the corps, primary responsibility for making sure the coordination of SO impact on operations of conventional units clearly remains with the JFSOCC. The SOCOORD identifies developing problems and makes appropriate recommendations to the corps G3. As the operation develops and the plan is adjusted in response to the METT-TC, the SOCOORD must be alert to the impact of changes in either the corps plan or the plans of supporting SOF that must be coordinated and synchronized.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION WITHOUT AN OPLAN

A-31. In the rare instance when no OPLAN or CONPLAN exists, the decision-making cycle must be completed in a compressed time scenario. While the functions of the SOCOORD remain essentially the same, the importance of rapidly requesting liaison and planning assistance where appropriate is significantly increased. The SOCOORD prepares requests for appropriate liaison and SOF C2 elements, based on SOF expertise in the SOCOORD element, knowledge of SOF forward presence in potential target theaters, and OPORD or mission-tasking requirements.

ADAPTIVE PLANNING PROCEDURES

A-32. The coordination occurring between the SOCOORD and USASOC during peacetime requires special routing. This coordination is rerouted to pass through the JFSOCC.

POST OPERATION RESPONSIBILITIES

A-33. Upon completion of synchronized SOF or conventional operations, the SOCOORD has a variety of responsibilities. It assists SOF elements in returning to their parent units. The SOCOORD is a focal point for AARs and lessons learned relating to SOF and corps operations. The SOCOORD obtains input from SOF elements that have supported the corps, as well as the various staff agencies and subordinate units involved in SOF support of the corps. Coupled with the SOCOORD's own observations, these become the SOF portion of the corps' AAR. The SOCOORD has staff responsibility for making sure identified problems within the corps are addressed and corrected. The SOCOORD further ensures that—with the concurrence of the corps G3—appropriate SOF elements receive those portions of the AAR that identify problems the elements need to address. The parent SOF unit is

responsible for debriefing. The SOCOORD may access the debriefing information through the SOCCE.

SOCOORD AND SOCCE RELATIONSHIPS

A-34. The relationship of the SOCOORD to a SOCCE is neither mysterious nor extraordinary. When SOF is not OPCON or attached to the corps, the SOCOORD is the focal point for coordination between the corps and an independently operating element. Its function is to make sure appropriate liaison takes place. The SOCOORD makes sure all aspects of operations are coordinated and refers SOCCE personnel to the appropriate corps staff POCs. The SOCOORD serves as a point of entry to the corps staff, not as a buffer. The SOCOORD uses its SOF expertise, coupled with an intimate knowledge of corps internal operating procedures, to make sure the SOCCE's efforts are directed to the appropriate staff POC within the corps. While the SOCOORD does not layer itself between the SOCCE and the various corps staff POCs, the SOCCE must fully report the details of all direct coordination made with any corps staff POC to the SOCOORD. The SOCOORD stays abreast of all SOF-related activities within the corps and, when difficulties arise, is the primary agent to resolve them.

CORPS HAVING ARSOF ATTACHED

A-35. When the corps has ARSOF attached, the SOCOORD relationship to the SOCCE is the same as that of any functional staff officer to a subordinate commander. In this scenario, the SOCCE is a subordinate command element of the corps. The SOCOORD exercises staff supervision of SOCCE activities but has no command authority. See FM 101-5 for a complete description of the distinctions between command authority and staff responsibility and the relationship between staff officers with functional responsibility and unit commanders.

SOCOORD AND THE SOTSE

A-36. The SOCOORD coordinates with the SOTSE, which in turn coordinates to make sure the TA provides corps the assets to perform required combat support and CSS functions for SOF. If the TA is functioning as a numbered army (as component commander for operational maneuver of army forces), the relationship between the SOCOORD and the SOTSE is the same as any relationship of any other functional staff element to the equivalent functional staff element at the next higher level.

STAFF ROLES

A-37. FM 101-5 contains a thorough discussion of staff roles, responsibilities, and functions. Neither the SOCOORD nor the SOTSE is an operational C2 element for SOF.

SOCOORD OPERATIONS

A-38. The SOCOORD is an integral part of the corps staff. The conduct of all its operations is within the operating procedures of the corps. SOCOORD, even where DIRLAUTH exists, is never *off line*. It is conducted using corps communications assets with appropriate log entries and files. Results of direct

liaison are thoroughly reported and documented. The SOCOORD is an extension of the corps commander; SOF C2 elements are extensions of the JFSOCC.

G1

A-39. The SOCOORD coordinates appropriate soldier support through the Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel (G1). This coordination addresses the support requirement by SOCOORD members.

G2

A-40. The SOCOORD—

- Coordinates the transfer of reported intelligence and combat information from and to supporting SOF to the corps Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G2).
- Coordinates for the appropriate liaison or C2 elements from SOF to access relevant information.
- Coordinates with the appropriate SOF HQ intelligence section and the corps G2 to ensure the validation of required clearances, as well as the accessibility of facilities and information to corps and SOF elements, as the mission requires.
- Reviews PIR and IRs of the corps to identify requirements beyond the reach of the corps assets that SOF can fulfill. The SOCOORD then translates these into target nominations IAW JP 3-05.5 and forwards them through the corps G3 to the JFC.
- Identifies the PIR and IRs of SOF operating in support of corps that must be in the corps collection plan.
- Assists the corps G2 and G3 in establishing where tasked SOF assets no longer provide current information and the corps assets replace them—for example, when SF passes responsibility for target surveillance to other surveillance units.

G3

A-41. The SOCOORD—

- Reviews and deconflicts target lists and supporting fires.
- Coordinates corps fire support of SOF as requested by the appropriate SOF HQ element. Further, in the planning phase, identifies systems capable of providing supporting fires. Coordinates procedures for obtaining such support.
- Plans linkup operations for the corps.
- Coordinates use of airspace based on supporting SOF mission profile.
- Coordinates corps aviation support as required.
- Writes the SO annex to the corps order.
- Produces the SOF estimate.
- Deconflicts and coordinates synchronization of schemes of maneuver and POEs.
- Serves in the battle management center of the corps main TOC.

G4

A-42. The SOCOORD—

- Obtains an SOR from SOF programmed to support or be supported by the corps and provides it to the corps G4.
- Reviews corps supporting plans for visibility of SOF assets.
- Assists the corps G4 in coordinating with the SOTSE for SOF-peculiar items.

G5

A-43. The SOCOORD—

- Coordinates required FNS for SOF.
- Synchronizes CA-related activities of SOF with those of the corps.

COMMUNICATIONS

A-44. The SOCOORD—

- Makes sure SOF and the corps signal detachment coordinate to establish interoperability of communications systems and crypto devices.
- Identifies communications requirements not specified in OPLANs.

MEDICAL

A-45. The SOCOORD—

- Coordinates for medical support of SOF personnel.
- Coordinates Class VIII requirements identified by supporting SOF.

ENGINEER

A-46. The SOCOORD passes accurate barrier plans and minefield records to supporting SOF. This coordination helps to prevent fratricide and to ensure the safety of deployed SOF personnel.

HQ COMMANDANT

A-47. The SOCOORD coordinates for the lodging, messing, and housekeeping requirements of attached liaison and C2 elements. SOF-specific support items come from SOF support elements.

Appendix B

Special Operations Command and Control Element

This appendix provides doctrine to the members of a SOCCE. It does not relieve organizations of the need for a detailed, comprehensive SOCCE standing operating procedure (SOP). Rather than establish a SOCCE for every scenario, this appendix establishes a common element for SOCCE organization and deployment based on METT-TC. It provides general guidance on the missions, functions, and responsibilities of the SOCCE. It describes the relationship of the SOCCE to its higher HQ and its conventional forces. This appendix is useful for, although not specifically written for, the supported conventional forces commander and staff. It begins with a general description of the doctrinal SOF C2 structure, followed by an overview of the mission and role of the SOCCE. This appendix is consistent with the doctrine for the employment of SOF contained in JP 3-05; JP 3-05.3, *Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures*; JP 3-05.5; and FM 100-25.

DOCTRINAL SOF COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-1. An ARSOTF provides a SOCCE to its supported operational HQ. In some cases, these SOCCEs may have the role of representing both the JFSOCC and the ARSOTF. The JFC or JTF identifies the requirements for a SOCCE and directs its deployment to a supporting unit. Both the potentially supported unit commander and the supporting SOF commanders must be proactive, however, in identifying such requirements. A supported conventional force commander who anticipates operations requiring synchronization or physical integration with SOF at any point during his operation should request a SOCCE as soon as the requirement is identified. Within resource constraints, all such requests should be honored by the supporting SOF element. Similarly, SOF commanders who identify such requirements provide a SOCCE to the supported commander (conventional forces) at the earliest opportunity. Coordination for the deployment of the SOCCE to a supported unit is through the appropriate JFC.

B-2. SOF frequently operate with conventional forces. Physical contact between conventional forces and SOF is typically short term. It usually ends with a passing of responsibility, the passage of friendly lines, or the extraction of SOF. The focus, therefore, should be on synchronization (not physical integration) of conventional forces and SOF on the ground. Synchronization involves the simultaneous or sequenced execution of separate actions in time and space to achieve a synergistic effect. Physical integration may not occur, but the synchronization of effect is necessary in all cases. The focal point for this synchronization is the SOCCE. In cases of prolonged contact, the role of the SOCCE becomes critical. Operation JUST

CAUSE in Panama provides a historical example of prolonged SO to conventional force contact synchronized through SOCCEs.

B-3. The SOCCE is a C2 element based on an SFODB, augmented with a special communications package, equipment, and selected personnel as required by METT-TC. It may include a Ranger LNO team or representation, CA and PSYOP representation of such elements supporting SOF, special operations aviation (SOA) liaison, joint SOF liaison, or other elements as required. The SOCCE performs liaison or C2 as directed by its higher SOF HQ. The SOCCE may be an SFODB based on METT-TC. Any SFODB could be directed to conduct this mission.

B-4. The SOCCE operates in a manner similar to a TOC. It is not an operational base, nor does it deploy or recover SFODs or other SOF operational elements. It may, however, coordinate for such activity when required—for example, when an SFODA is recovered through linkup with conventional forces. The SOCCE is normally OPCON or TACON to the conventional forces at corps level. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished. The SOCCE is not deployed below corps. If approved by the SOCCE's higher SOF HQ, however, the SOCCE may temporarily support a division or brigade conducting independent mission-specific operations (such as in a JTF). Although, operations at division or brigade levels are normally addressed with an SFLE.

B-5. The SOCCE has OPCON of its assets. It performs all the functions of command minus support and is responsible for the planning, C2 of its personnel, augmentation, and attachments. It provides SOF C4I support to its personnel. The SOCCE advises and provides SOF SMEs to the conventional force commander and staff. It is not, however, a conventional force special staff element.

B-6. The SOCCE should arrive with a complete support package, including personnel, equipment, logistics, and communications to sustain operations for 30 days. All SOF-specific equipment, including prescribed load list (PLL), must accompany the unit.

B-7. The SOCCE may serve as a liaison between the JFSOCC and the corps commander for the entire spectrum of SO missions. The SOCCE is not responsible for the planning or execution of CA or PSYOP, except when such support is incidental to its own mission.

B-8. The SOCCE may exercise OPCON or TACON of deployed SOF operational elements from SF, Ranger, or sister Service elements, such as SEALs. These forces require augmentation from their respective HQ to be attached to the SOCCE. The SF elements could include the SFODAs, an SFODB, or even a SOT-A. If the forces controlled by the SOCCE exceed an SFODB commander's ability to control, an FOB commander or another SF lieutenant colonel may command the SOCCE. The SOCCE is a command element and should never be subordinated to a staff element.

B-9. A SOCCE is not a JSOTF, nor is it an ARSOTF. It is not a standing C2 organization, and it will be constituted and subsequently terminated as the mission dictates, based on METT-TC.

B-10. The composition of the SOCCE varies, depending on the JFSOCC mission, the tactical commander's mission, the operational environment, and the nature or echelon of the supported HQ. The common considerations, regardless of the situation, are for the SOCCE commander to—

- Understand the mission and intent of the supported conventional force commander.
- Be self-contained and self-sufficient on SOF-unique assets (the SOCCE will require some support from the supported HQ—for example, rations).
- Be able to communicate.

B-11. The SOCCE has five employment options, as follows:

- SOCCE members may collocate with their conventional force counterpart. For example, the company operations warrant officer collocates with the conventional force intelligence section, and the executive officer collocates with the conventional force OPCEN.
- The SOCCE may collocate with a corps SOCOORD.
- The SOCCE may form its own OPCEN in the conventional force TOC or OPCEN. All SOCCE members perform their duties from this OPCEN.
- The SOCCE may form its own OPCEN in the conventional force OPCEN and may collocate key SOCCE personnel to the conventional force major staff sections, such as the conventional force intelligence and OPCEN.
- No single correct employment option exists. The SOCCE may select, combine, or modify the employment options, based on METT-TC.

B-12. Whichever option is used, a small SOCCE OPCEN should be established to ensure the conduct of the duties and responsibilities outlined in this appendix.

MISSION

B-13. The mission of the SOCCE is to synchronize SO, MOOTW, and conventional force operations between SOF and conventional forces as follows:

- Keep the higher SOF commander and the conventional force commander informed and integrated into each other's operations, intelligence data, fire support coordination measures, unit locations, communications procedures, situations, status, and other activities based on the situation and METT-TC.
- Plan and coordinate linkup between SOF and the conventional forces.
- Exercise, when tasked by SOF higher HQ, OPCON and TACON of deployed SOF.
- Advise the conventional force commander and staff of the missions, capabilities, limitations, and employment of SOF (Army, Navy, and Air Force).

- Resolve conflicts between deployed SOF and conventional forces regarding terrain, airspace management, frequency management, intelligence requirements, targeting priorities, fire support activities, and other activities based on METT-TC.
- Advise the area commander, conventional forces, and deployed SOF on—
 - Demobilization.
 - Integration.
 - Planning.
 - CA and PSYOP support.
 - Synchronization of CMO, demobilization, and MOOTW among the area commander, conventional forces, and deployed SOF.

ORGANIZATION

B-14. An SFODB forms the nucleus of the SOCCE. An SF major commands the SOCCE. Based on METT-TC, the SOCCE may be an SFODC commanded by an SF lieutenant colonel. (Refer to Figure 3-9, page 3-26, for the composition of the SFODB under TOE 31807.)

B-15. Based on METT-TC, the SOCCE may have augmentation of equipment and operational personnel (Figure B-1).

| PERSONNEL | EQUIPMENT |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Additional SF ▶ Ranger LNOs ▶ PSYOP ▶ CA ▶ Radiotelegraph Operators (Radio Operators) ▶ SOF LNOs ▶ Weather ▶ Conventional Force LNOs ▶ SOT-A ▶ Intelligence Analysts ▶ SOAR LNOs ▶ Mechanics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Communications Systems ▶ PSYOP Package ▶ Helicopters ▶ Boats ▶ Vehicles ▶ ADP Systems ▶ PLL ▶ Tentage ▶ Sandbags ▶ Pioneer Tools ▶ Camouflage Nets ▶ Generators ▶ Concertina Wire ▶ Engineer Stakes |

Figure B-1. SOCCE Augmentation

B-16. Any augmentation, equipment, or resources must be requested in a SOR before deployment. The SOCCE submits the SOR to its higher SF HQ for staffing and resourcing. All augmentation and equipment should be attached early and integrated into SOPs, rehearsals, and premission training.

B-17. In the event that one or more SOT-As are deployed within the SOCCE's AOR, the SOCCE should receive a SIGINT or EW liaison team (MOS 98C) with the necessary equipment from the supporting TCAE.

B-18. The SOCCE may dispatch liaisons to the conventional forces. The liaisons may come from the SOCCE, the SOCCE's higher HQ, or other SOF. The size and composition of the liaison element are dependent on METT-TC. The SOCCE needs a minimum of 72 hours to coordinate and deploy a liaison element to the conventional forces. All requests for liaison from the conventional forces should go through the JFSOCC or JTF commander.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

B-19. The following duties and responsibilities are generic and may be modified and performed by any SOCCE member based on METT-TC:

SOCCE COMMANDER

- Permission.
 - Refines the METL based on specified tasks, implied tasks, and METT-TC.
 - Conducts deliberate and time-sensitive planning based on METT-TC.
 - Prepares the mission concept.
 - Prepares deployment OPLAN and OPORDs.
 - Conducts briefback.
 - Submits SOR based on METT-TC to higher SOF HQ.
 - Task-organizes based on METT-TC.
 - Deploys an advance party, if required.
 - Deploys with 30 days sustainment (with the exception of Class III, V, and so on).
 - Establishes command levels of authority.
 - Conducts preparation of requirements (POR) for overseas movement and preparation for overseas movement (POM) for the SOCCE.
 - Develops CCIR.
- Deployment.
 - Conducts movement to the mission site.
 - Commands and controls the SOCCE.
 - Establishes contact with the conventional forces.
 - Synchronizes SOF and conventional force operations.
 - Exercises, when tasked, OPCON and TACON of deployed SOF.
 - Resolves operational conflicts and issues between deployed SOF and the conventional forces.
 - Briefs the higher SOF commander and the conventional force commander on operations, intelligence data, fire support, unit locations, communications procedures, tactical situation, status, and other activities as indicated, based on METT-TC.

- Plans and coordinates linkups between deployed SOF and the conventional forces.
- Coordinates the linkup annex for conventional force linkup OPLAN or OPORD.
- Briefs the conventional force commander on the missions, capabilities, limitations, and employment of SOF.
- Attends conventional force meetings and briefings.
- Establishes priority of work SOP.
- Makes sure SOCCE members read and understand the conventional force field SOPs.
- Identifies message releasers and posts signatures.
- Synchronizes demobilization operations.
- Postmission.
 - Conducts debriefings for the SOCCE, conventional forces, and SOF higher HQ.
 - Redeploys the SOCCE.
 - Prepares AARs.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

- Pre-mission. Assists the commander as directed.
- Deployment.
 - Commands the advance party if deployed.
 - Establishes and serves as the SOCCE OPCEN director.
 - Task-organizes to provide 24-hour operations.
 - Ensures redundancy in the OPCEN.
 - Serves as the SOCCE plans and operations officer.
 - Coordinates and briefs the conventional force G3 or operations section.
 - Informs SOF higher HQ, SOCCE commander, and personnel on conventional force operations.
 - Assists in plans and coordinates linkups.
 - Assists in demobilization planning.
 - Anticipates future operational requirements for the SOCCE and deployed SOF, submitting appropriate requests to SOF higher HQ and conventional forces.
 - Plans CA, PSYOP, and other support for demobilization as required.
 - Monitors all SOCCE activities.
 - Prepares the deployed SOF and conventional force synchronization.
 - Provides overall supervision of SOCCE operations.

- Attends conventional force meetings and briefings.
- Conducts other missions as directed by the SOCCE commander based on METT-TC.
- Postmission.
 - Conducts area study briefing for the SOCCE.
 - Prepares operations portion of AAR.

OPERATIONS WARRANT OFFICER

- Premission.
 - Conducts area study briefing for the SOCCE.
 - Conducts threat briefing for the SOCCE.
 - Prepares, if required, E&R plan for the SOCCE based on METT-TC.
 - Briefs SOCCE on CCIR.
- Deployment.
 - Coordinates with the conventional force G2 or intelligence section on all intelligence requirements.
 - Monitors IRs, PIR, and CCIR of SOCCE, conventional forces, and deployed SOF.
 - Accesses Psychological Operations Automated Data Systems and SOCRATES for mission requirements.
 - Anticipates and plans for all intelligence requirements.
 - Conducts intelligence briefing and training for the SOCCE and conventional forces.
 - Responds to deployed SOF intelligence requests.
 - Integrates local FP and security plan into the conventional forces.
- Postmission.
 - Conducts intelligence debriefings for the SOCCE, conventional forces, and SOF higher HQ.
 - Prepares intelligence portion of the AAR.

COMPANY SERGEANT MAJOR

- Premission.
 - Serves as focal point for all administrative, logistics, operational, and support requests.
 - Assists commander as directed.
 - Opens and maintains operations or staff journal (premission through postmission).
- Deployment.
 - Is a member of the advance party if deployed.
 - Coordinates with the conventional force senior enlisted person.
 - Collocates with the executive officer in the SOCCE OPCEN.

- Organizes, supervises, and ensures maintenance of all OPCEN files, including—
 - Staff journal.
 - Incoming and outgoing message log.
 - Incoming and outgoing administrative and logistics requirements.
 - Incoming and outgoing mission orders.
 - Incoming and outgoing communications messages.
 - Other files, based on METT-TC.
- Serves as deputy director of the OPCEN.
- Organizes, maintains, monitors, and directs the following routine business of the OPCEN:
 - Work stations and shifts for 24-hour operations.
 - Guards, if applicable.
 - Messing.
 - Quarters.
 - Mail.
 - Use of conventional force facilities.
 - Parking, maintenance facilities, and refueling for vehicles.
 - Other business based on METT-TC.
- Supervises sensitive items, their accountability, and their storage.
- Requests air or sea missions, if applicable.
- Monitors deployed SOF operations.
- Maintains OPSEC.
- Makes sure supply and maintenance procedures are followed.
- Submits daily situation report (SITREP), messages, and other reports to SOF higher HQ as required or directed.
- Conducts other business as directed by commander or METT-TC.

OPERATIONS NCO

- Permission.
 - Assists the commander and the sergeant major as directed or based on METT-TC.
 - Makes sure map sheets are available for the SOCCE and any contingencies.
- Deployment.
 - Establishes and maintains the SITMAP (friendly and enemy situations) in the OPCEN.
 - Prepares messages, requests, and combat orders as required.
 - Advises the SOCCE commander on possible threat COAs.
 - Assists the commander and the sergeant major.

- Controls classified waste.
- Prepares access roster with guidance from the commander and the sergeant major.
- Maintains weather and light data for contingencies.
- Conducts debriefs of SOF operational elements, if applicable.
- Establishes and maintains destruction plan for classified documents and equipment.
- Establishes a physical security plan.
- Attends conventional force meetings and briefings daily.
- Coordinates maps, charts, and imagery to support operations.
- Performs other duties as directed by the commander or the sergeant major based on METT-TC.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefing.
 - Assists in preparing AARs.

COMMUNICATIONS NCO

- Premission.
 - Makes sure communications equipment is available for the mission and contingencies.
 - Makes sure communications frequencies are available for the mission and contingencies.
 - Tests communications equipment before deployment.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed by the commander or the sergeant major based on METT-TC.
- Deployment.
 - Coordinates with the conventional force communications section.
 - Establishes secure communications between SOCCE members and conventional forces, SOF HQ, and, if applicable, deployed SOF.
 - Establishes communications procedures for SOCCE.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed by the commander or the sergeant major based on METT-TC.
 - Establishes and maintains communications log.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefings.
 - Closes out communications log.
 - Writes communications AAR.

ASSISTANT OPERATIONS NCO

- Permission. Assists the operations NCO as directed.
- Deployment.
 - Assists the operations center director, deputy director, and operations NCO as directed.
 - Coordinates with the conventional force fire support cell and element located in the main command post for airspace and fire support missions and management.
 - Briefs SOCCE and SOF higher HQ on fire support missions of the conventional force.
 - Ensures the timely transfer of intelligence between the SOF unit and conventional units.
 - During linkups, establishes restricted fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs). Makes sure the linkup annex in the conventional force linkup OPLAN and OPORD has a fire support overlay with RFAs and NFAs depicted. Makes sure the SOCCE, SOF higher HQ, and deployed SOF receive a copy of the overlay. Develops fire support coordination measures and makes sure such measures protect deployed SOF and are not unnecessarily restrictive on the conventional forces.
 - Updates the SOCCE SITMAP daily on—
 - RFAs.
 - NFAs.
 - Target area of interest (TAI).
 - NAI.
 - Fire support coordination line (FSCL).
 - Conventional force airspace missions.
 - SOF airspace missions.
 - Represents the SOCCE at fire support briefings.
 - Briefs the SOCCE and higher SOF HQ on conventional force target priorities.
 - Briefs the conventional forces on the type, location, mission, and threat air avenues of approach if SOF are deployed with air defense weapons.
 - Identifies potential fratricide situations and coordinates measures to prevent such situations.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefing.
 - Assists in preparing the operations portion of AARs.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.

MEDICAL NCO

- Permission.
 - Conducts predeployment physicals for SOCCE members if required.
 - Updates immunizations.
 - Assists in the following POR and POM requirements:
 - Medical and dental records.
 - Wills and testaments.
 - Powers of attorney.
 - Identification tags.
 - Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) registration.
 - Shot records.
 - Military identification cards.
 - Passports, if applicable.
 - Disposition of privately owned vehicles and personal property and effects.
 - Briefs SOCCE on medical area study, preventive medicine, medical threat, and medical counterthreat measures.
 - Reviews the medical support plan or annex. Identifies support shortfalls and coordinates requirements. Requests and prepares medical equipment and supplies for the mission and contingencies.
- Deployment.
 - Coordinates with conventional force medical personnel.
 - Monitors health of SOCCE.
 - Establishes logistics for requisition of medical supplies.
 - Establishes medical treatment facilities for SOCCE and integrates them into conventional force medical treatment facilities.
 - Collects and disseminates medical intelligence.
 - Advises conventional forces on the medical capabilities and the needs of deployed SOF and resistance forces.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefings.
 - Prepares the medical portion of AARs.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.

ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS NCO

- Permission.
 - Assists the communications NCO.
 - Assists the sergeant major as directed.

- Deployment.
 - Assists the communications NCO as directed.
 - Assists the sergeant major as directed.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefings.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.

SUPPLY NCO

- Permission.
 - Plans and requests logistics for the mission and contingencies.
 - Prepares the SOR for the commander.
 - Is load planner for all movements—air, ground, rail, or sea.
 - Prepares movement orders.
 - Deploys with 30 days of rations, supplies, logistics, and resources.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.
- Deployment.
 - Coordinates with conventional force logistics section.
 - Anticipates SOCCE's logistic requirements and initiates requisitions.
 - Signs and maintains hand receipts for equipment, supplies, and logistics.
 - Conducts other tasks as directed.
- Postmission.
 - Assists in debriefings.
 - Prepares the logistics portion of AARs.

LIAISON AND COORDINATION CHECKLIST

B-20. SOCCE personnel represent the commander at the HQ of another unit to effect coordination and to promote cooperation between the two units. Before departing, each SOCCE member should—

- Become familiar with the situation of his own unit and, to the extent possible, with that of the unit to which he is being sent.
- Conduct mission analysis.
- Make sure arrangements for communication (signal and transportation) are adequate.
- Obtain credentials in writing, unless obviously unnecessary.

B-21. When arriving at the HQ, cell, or section to which sent, the SOCCE member should—

- Report promptly to the commander or supervisor, stating his mission and providing his directive or credentials, if in writing.
- Offer his assistance to the commander, if appropriate.

- Arrange for the transmission of messages he may be required to send.
 - Arrange to obtain information required by his mission.
 - Become familiar with the situation of the unit to which he is sent.
- B-22. During liaison and coordination, the SOCCE member should—
- Facilitate smooth operations between his headquarters and the one to which he is assigned or attached.
 - Accomplish his mission without interfering with the operations of the headquarters to which he is assigned or attached.
 - Keep informed of the operational situation of his detachment and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which he is sent.
 - Keep an appropriate record of his reports.
 - Report on those matters within the scope of his mission.
 - Inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the SOCCE.
 - Report promptly to the SOCCE if he is unable to accomplish his liaison mission.
 - Report his departure to the visited unit commander on the completion of his mission.
- B-23. Upon return to the SOCCE, the member—
- Reports on his mission.
 - Transmits any requests of the visited commander promptly.

SOCCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-24. SF operates under varied C2 arrangements. Requirements of the commander at each echelon of command determine the exact C2 structure, based on the situation and METT-TC.

B-25. The SOCCE is under OPCON or TACON of the supported conventional forces. It is the primary and often the only direct link from the conventional forces to the SOF C2 structure. Command levels of authority for the SOCCE and the deployed SOF must be established before deployment. The only exception is in instances where SOF have ongoing operations in a specified AOR long before a conventional force has any responsibilities or interest in the area. At that time, higher SOF HQ determines the conventional force's need for SOCCE augmentation and adjusts as the situation and METT-TC dictate. The SOF higher HQ always retains OPCON of the SOCCE and deployed SOF. The actual situation dictates whether the SOCCE or the higher SOF commander exercises OPCON and TACON of the deployed SOF elements. In extreme cases, such as when the conventional force commander requests dedicated SOF support for a specific mission of short duration that only SOF can conduct, the theater CINC may pass TACON of deployed SOF to the conventional force commander. This situation leaves the higher SOF HQ with ADCON less TACON of the deployed SOF elements. The TACON of deployed SOF by the conventional forces is temporary, and the SOF higher

HQ regains full OPCON of the deployed SOF when the mission or operation is completed. OPCON of the SOCCE and deployed SOF is rarely passed to the conventional force commander.

B-26. During conflict, the SOCCE can support a conventional force commander either directly or indirectly. The role of the SOCCE, when tasked to support in an indirect manner, is that of a liaison between the ARSOTF or the JFSOCC and the supported conventional force commander. Total mission responsibility for the deployed SOF rests with the higher SOF HQ. Informal coordination, most importantly the passing of PIR and combat information, takes place regularly between the SOCCE and the higher SOF HQ.

B-27. The SOCCE may exercise OPCON of the deployed SOF on a specified mission basis. The higher SOF HQ retains the responsibility for mission preparation, isolation, deployment, aerial resupply if necessary, and aerial recovery (if by SOA). The deployed SOF communicate with the SOCCE, providing intelligence and situation reports. The deployed SOF receive such information as fragmentary orders, intelligence requirements, targeting requirements, or priorities from the SOCCE.

B-28. During MOOTW, a SOCCE may exercise OPCON or TACON of deployed SOF. If a conventional force encompasses the MOOTW AO, the SOCCE exercises OPCON or TACON of deployed SOF and ensures synchronization between the deployed SOF and the conventional forces. Command levels and relationships should be established before the deployment. During MOOTW, OPCON of the SOCCE and deployed SOF is rarely passed to the conventional force commander.

LINKUP OPERATIONS

B-29. SOF and conventional forces that conduct joint operations in war or MOOTW may require a linkup. This linkup may occur in ground, airborne, or amphibious operations. Linkup operations are often one of the most difficult operations to conduct because of the differences in the SOPs of the units conducting linkup. As linkup becomes imminent, coordination and control are intensified. Units conducting linkup must adhere to emplaced control measures to ensure successful operations and to prevent fratricide. The two types of linkup operations are physical linkup operations and communications linkup operations.

PHYSICAL LINKUP OPERATIONS

B-30. Physical linkup operations occur when the conventional forces link up with and establish physical contact with a deployed SOF element or a resistance element, if applicable (as in a UW scenario). During war in a JSOA or region, a physical linkup occurs at a specified contact point. During MOOTW, a physical linkup may occur in the rear area, JSOA, or AO.

B-31. A physical linkup is the most difficult to plan, conduct, and control effectively. It requires detailed, centralized coordination and planning at a planning conference between the conventional forces, the SOCCE, and the deploying SOF element if available.

B-32. Physical linkups are conducted for—

- Any instance where a conventional force operation requires physical interaction with a SOF unit already deployed or deploying into the same AO for offensive operations, defensive operations, or MOOTW.
- Resupply and logistics.
- Intelligence.
- Exfiltration of the sick and wounded.
- Exfiltration of very important people and prisoners of war.
- Infiltration of U.S. and resistance replacements.
- Coordination and planning.
- Transferring guides and liaisons to the conventional forces.

COMMUNICATIONS LINKUP OPERATIONS

B-33. Communications linkup operations take place when operations are conducted between the conventional forces and deployed SOF element and a physical linkup is not required or desirable. Communications linkups may take place when—

- The conventional forces conduct offensive operations, and a SOF element already in operation or the resistance force functions as a blocking or screening force.
- The conventional forces conduct a deep raid, and a SOF element already deployed or the resistance force conducts security missions.
- The conventional forces conduct offensive operations, and a SOF element already deployed or the resistance force conducts deception operations.
- The conventional forces conduct offensive operations, and a SOF element already deployed or the resistance force conducts tactical reconnaissance and surveillance of the intended conventional force target.

B-34. A communications linkup requires coordination between all linkup forces. It also requires compatible communications equipment and current SOI. The SOI must be exchanged at the planning conference. Whenever possible, all linkup forces must rehearse the SOI, complete their planning, and implement coordinating instructions NLT 24 hours before the start of the linkup operations.

B-35. As a linkup between the SOF and the conventional forces becomes imminent, the linkup forces must conduct detailed, centralized planning. They should develop linkup planning and contingencies during premission training or isolation by the deploying SOF elements if possible.

B-36. A variety of considerations govern linkup planning. TACON of the deployed SOF or resistance force may or may not pass from the unified command to the conventional force commander during conflict when linkup is conducted in a JSOA, a region, or an AO. The planning conference should establish command relationships. The resistance force may continue to conduct UW operations under the unified commander, or the resistance force

(or a part of the resistance force) may be under TACON of the conventional forces for specified operations or times.

B-37. When linkup is imminent in the JSOA, a SOCCE should be the focal point for centralized planning. The SOCCE's higher SOF HQ monitors the linkup and provides administrative and logistics support to the deployed SOF unit until physical linkup is complete, unless otherwise specified. After linkup, the conventional forces normally assume this support responsibility. The support and time of TACON must be determined in the linkup planning conference.

B-38. The SOCCE is the primary planner for the linkup in conjunction with the corps G3, due to the SOCCE's familiarity with both the conventional forces and the deployed element. The planning conference should include commanders and operational personnel from the conventional forces and the SOF or resistance elements that are conducting the linkup or their representatives. Because of operational requirements or physical limitations, the SOF or resistance elements may be unable to attend such planning conferences. In such instances, the SOCCE represents their interests to the conventional forces. The SOCCE's higher SOF HQ may direct that a liaison party consisting of deployed SOF and resistance representatives be exfiltrated from the JSOA to the conventional force location to assist in linkup planning. This party can provide timely intelligence on the threat and can recommend linkup control measures and missions for the resistance forces. The conventional forces, the SOCCE commanders, and the operational personnel may infiltrate into the JSOA to conduct the planning conference. This decision is based on the situation and METT-TC. The conventional forces infiltrate into the JSOA or establish physical or communications linkup with deployed SOF or resistance forces without the SOCCE.

B-39. The SOCCE advises the conventional forces and deployed SOF of each other's current operations, organization, and contingencies. It synchronizes conventional forces and deployed SOF operations and intelligence requirements. The SOCCE coordinates and exchanges conventional forces and deployed SOF communications plans, SOI, and other pertinent information. It develops control measures, such as contact points, phase lines, and corridors or lanes. The SOCCE establishes command relationships and logistics requirements. It develops and provides fire support coordination measures and contact procedures.

B-40. Simple contact procedures and control measures must be established for physical linkups. At a precoordinated date and time, both linkup forces move toward a contact point on a specified azimuth in a specified corridor or lane. The contact point should be near a well-defined, easily located, and easily identifiable terrain feature. Both contact elements should stop 500 meters (or one masking terrain feature) short of the contact point and send forward a small contingent displaying a far-recognition signal. The contact element should be no less than two persons. A security detail should provide security to cover the forward element by overwatch. When both parties approach to a reasonably close distance, they should display a near-recognition signal. In addition to far- and near-recognition signals, both elements should employ safe signals as well. This safe signal indicates that neither element is operating under duress. Absence of a safe signal is

customarily a danger signal that the element is operating under duress and contact should be broken by the other element. An exchange of bona fides or challenge words and passwords may also be integrated as part of the linkup plan.

B-41. If an extraction from the JSOA has taken place, SOF representatives may be included in both contact parties. Resistance members may guide the conventional forces to the linkup site. When the situation and METT-TC permit, linkup operations should take place during daylight. Both forces should establish and maintain communications NLT 24 hours before linkup. They also should plan alternative communications methods. They may use deceptions and feints as a cover for linkup operations.

B-42. The type of linkup planned and conducted and the command relationships in the JSOA with the conventional forces, airborne, or air assault forces depend on the ground tactical plan. The airborne or air assault task force commander and the SOCCE must conduct a planning conference. The resistance force may act as a reception committee and mark the drop zone or landing zone. The reception committee links up with the airborne or air assault force at a precoordinated landing zone or drop zone marker and guides them to the resistance commander or to an objective. All friendly forces should wear an easily identifiable armband, scarf, or similar device to facilitate identification during linkup. SOCCE personnel may participate in the operation to facilitate linkup. Resistance personnel should never be committed prematurely because their presence or operations may be discovered by the threat and may compromise future resistance operations.

B-43. During an amphibious assault that culminates in a linkup, a SOCCE should deploy early to make sure joint planning is complete. Linkup is established when the conventional force commander links up with the SOF or resistance element on or near the beach landing zone. SOCCE personnel may participate in the beach landing to facilitate the linkup. Resistance personnel may act as guides and provide security for the beach landing.

B-44. Although several linkups may be conducted simultaneously, it is difficult to conduct several linkups at one time. Not all of the resistance forces should be involved in the linkup. During a linkup, deception and interdiction should continue. A physical linkup with a large resistance force or a commander may not be required or desirable. A small reception committee may conduct the linkup and act as guides or liaisons for the conventional forces.

POSTLINKUP EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

B-45. Conventional force commanders should be aware of a variety of factors when employing SOF and resistance forces after linkup. They must—

- Know the organization, concept of operations, capabilities, and limitations.
- Make sure subordinate leaders appreciate the value of SOF and resistance forces and know how to use them.
- Anticipate possible language and political problems in establishing liaison.

- Anticipate the problems of providing administrative, logistic, and operational support to the SOF or resistance force.
- Maintain unit integrity of SOF and resistance forces as much as possible.
- Work through existing channels of SOF and resistance command, without imposing a new organizational structure—which may disrupt the effectiveness and responsiveness of the unit.
- Respect resistance ranks—that is, except in cases where the rank of the resistance officer is clearly out of order, give him the same consideration given regular officers of the same rank.
- Maintain resistance morale by awarding decorations and letters of commendation and by expressing appreciation for justified actions.
- Make no political commitments or promises to resistance units unless authorized by higher HQ.
- Recognize when the value of resistance units has ended and promptly return those units to the control of the unified commander or to the host country.

THE LINKUP OPERATIONS ANNEX

B-46. The conventional forces prepare their OPLAN or OPORD. The SOCCE prepares the linkup annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. The linkup annex contains the linkup procedures. The following sample linkup annex (Figure B-2, page B-19) is useful when planning physical or communications linkups. It is generic and serves as guidance. It may be modified, based on METT-TC. No format is prescribed for annexes; however, the five-paragraph OPORD format should be used if appropriate.

B-47. The conventional force commander normally prepares the concept for the linkup using the standard OPLAN or OPORD format procedures. The planning stage is implemented once the conventional force commander and the SOCCE's higher SOF HQ have established the missions. An operations overlay should accompany this document as an appendix.

B-48. The linkup annex describes the locations, times, contact plan, and procedures necessary to accomplish the linkup. The following appendixes may be added to amplify the linkup annex:

- Intelligence appendix, which contains all the latest operational information, previously unknown or unpublished, concerning enemy forces, enemy defenses, and the local population.
- Fire support appendix, which prescribes the uses of available fire support during the linkup for the deployed SOF, resistance forces, and the conventional forces. Types of fire support available are also listed.
- Consolidation appendix, which describes the use of the deployed SOF or resistance force before, during, and after linkup as determined by the linkup planning conference.
- Employment appendix, which describes the role of the conventional forces before, during, and after the linkup as determined by the linkup planning conference.

| |
|---|
| Copy No ___ of ___ Copies SFODB-090, Co C, 1st Bn, 9th SFG(A) Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000 011700Z OCT 98 Reference No ___ |
| ANNEX ___ Linkup to OPORD No ___ References: Maps, charts, and other documents pertaining to the linkup operational area. Time Zone Used Throughout the Annex: ZULU Task Organization: Omitted |
| 1. SITUATION. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Enemy Forces: Current enemy situation and intelligence reports. b. Friendly Forces: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Mission of the conventional force commander. (2) Mission of the SOCCE. (3) Mission of the deployed SOF element or resistance element. (4) All civilians considered to be friendly (if applicable). (5) Units, individuals, and liaisons attached or detached and the effective time of their attachment and detachment—for example, SOCCE liaison elements attached to the conventional force linkup element NLT 72 hours before linkup. |
| 2. MISSION. The U.S. V Corps conducts a physical linkup with SFODA 911 and resistance representatives at grid coordinates PL35061327 at 031100Z FEB 99 to conduct joint or combined operations. |
| 3. EXECUTION. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Intent: The Corps will conduct a movement to contact. The 1st Armored Division will conduct the main attack and a physical linkup with SFODA 911 and resistance representatives. After the linkup, the resistance will guide the division to objective Blue and provide a blocking force. b. Scheme of Maneuver: State in general terms the overall scheme of maneuver. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Conventional forces. (2) SFODA 911 and resistance force. c. Fire Support Plan: Coordinate with conventional force fire support element (FSE). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Conventional force: Types of fire support available. (2) SFODA 911 and resistance force: Types of fire support available. (3) Naval fire support, if available. (4) Priority of fires: All fires must be synchronized and coordinated with the conventional force FSE. (5) Fire support coordination measures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) FSCLs. (b) NFAs. |

Figure B-2. Sample Linkup Annex

- (c) Coordinated fire lines (CFLs).
- (d) Other measures based on METT-TC.
- d. Air Support: Coordinate with conventional force air coordinator.
- e. Subunit Missions:
 - (1) SOCCE liaison element. Rehearse conventional force linkup element on linkup procedures.
 - (2) SFODA 911. Rehearse resistance linkup element on linkup procedures.
- f. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) DTG of linkup.
 - (2) Location of primary contact point. Include eight-digit grid coordinate and description.
 - (3) Location of alternate contact point. Include eight-digit grid coordinate and description.
 - (4) Corridors, lanes, and routes, if used.
 - (5) Far-recognition signal.
 - (6) Near-recognition signal.
 - (7) Safety signal. Use this signal to indicate if either element is operating under duress.
 - (8) Danger signal. Is always the absence of the safety signal.
 - (9) Bona fides, challenge words, and passwords, as needed.
 - (10) Length of time to wait at the primary contact point.
 - (11) Length of time to wait at the alternate contact point.
 - (12) Contingency, if no contact.
 - (13) Uniform of linkup elements.
 - (14) Rally points.
 - (15) Actions at linkup site.
 - (16) Time of transfer of command relationships, if required.
 - (17) Actions and missions after linkup.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.
 - (c) Joint and combined.
- g. Actions on enemy contact.
 - (1) Before linkup.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.
 - (2) During linkup.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.
 - (3) After linkup.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.

Figure B-2. Sample Linkup Annex (Continued)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

- a. Rations.
- b. Arms and ammunition.
- c. Uniform and equipment.
- d. Method of handling dead and wounded. Conventional forces must understand burial requirements unique to the resistance, if any.
- e. Conventional force MEDEVAC on call for resistance forces 24 hours before linkup.

NOTE: METT-TC dictates whether this support is feasible in all situations.

- f. Method of handling prisoners and captured equipment. State a plan and priorities.
- g. Any plans for resupply. At linkup, the conventional forces may resupply the SOF element or resistance with the following:
 - (1) POL and PLL for any resistance vehicles.
 - (2) New uniforms.
 - (3) Weapons and ammunition.
 - (4) Transportation for the resistance.
 - (5) Other resupplies, based on situation and METT-TC.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

- a. Command.
 - (1) Chain of command.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.
 - (2) Location of leaders during linkup.
 - (a) Conventional forces.
 - (b) SFODA 911 and resistance force.
- b. Signal.
 - (1) Frequencies and call signs. Must be synchronized 24 hours before linkup. Communications systems must be compatible.
 - (a) Frequency of conventional forces.
 - (b) Frequency of SFODA 911 and resistance force.
 - (c) Linkup frequency.
 - (d) Frequency of SOCCE.
 - (e) Frequency of SOCCE liaison, if used.
 - (f) MEDEVAC frequency.
 - (2) Pyrotechnics and signals, including hand and arm signals, as needed.
 - (3) Challenge words and passwords, as needed.
 - (4) Codes and reports, as needed.

NOTE: Appendixes, overlays, and sketches may amplify any portion of this annex.

Figure B-2. Sample Linkup Annex (Continued)

Acknowledgment is requested.

Signature Block

Preparing Official:

Appendixes:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Fire Support
- C - Consolidation
- D - Employment of Resistance
- E - Others, based on METT-TC

Distribution:

Figure B-2. Sample Linkup Annex (Continued)

Appendix C

Army Special Forces Liaison Element

This appendix provides the doctrinal foundation for conducting SFLE activities. It highlights key planning considerations during each phase of the mission. SF units should use this appendix with individual soldier's manuals and other SF doctrinal materials that describe SF operations, particularly UW and FID missions. The inclusive elements of liaison coordination activities are not unique. These elements are a combination of key aspects from several functional areas, ranging from standard LNO responsibilities to UW and FID tasks. Combined, they represent a new role for SF that is unique and challenging. This appendix also includes a section on rapport in SFLE relationships with a foreign nation and an SFLE unit assessment outline.

MISSION

C-1. The SFLE conducts liaison and coordination activities among U.S., allied, or coalition military organizations to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort, cooperation between commanders and staffs, and tactical unity and mutual support by operational units. Basic SFLE functions are to—

- Monitor the operations of the JTF and the impact of those operations on the HN, as well as the HN's impact on the JTF. The SFLE must be thoroughly familiar with the current situation and the future operations and plans for the HN, the JTF, and sister components.
- Coordinate the synchronization of the HN's and other components' plans and operations to create a synergistic effect.
- Advise the JTF commander and staff on the HN's capabilities and limitations, while advising the HN on joint procedures.
- Assist staff processes to make sure JTF-HN interaction occurs.

ORGANIZATION

C-2. SF units are well suited to conduct liaison operations because of their broad array of capabilities, such as—

- Cultural and area orientation.
- Nonverbal communications ability.
- Interpersonal skills.
- Foreign language.
- Ability to operate in austere environments.
- Excellent staffing and coordination skills.
- Communications equipment and technology.

C-3. Historically, SFLEs provide a critical link between higher, lateral, subordinate, supported, and supporting HQ. SFLEs offer the JTF commander and components many benefits when executing operations with coalition or allied forces. These benefits include—

- Providing immediate ground assessment and enabling rapid coordination through communications connectivity.
- Developing rapport with HN units.
- Advising, assisting, or training HN units in tactics, techniques, or procedures that promote mission success in the joint arena.

C-4. The SFODA normally conducts the SFLE mission. Key planning factors include language, religious, and cultural differences; incompatibility of communications and weapons systems; and TTP. Considering METT-TC, an SFODA split team or an SFODB may conduct the mission. Joint, conventional, and other army attachments may be assigned. SFLEs do not provide any CSS to coalition forces. Logistics and administration are the responsibility of the host unit.

PREMISSION ACTIVITIES

C-5. Preparation of the SFLE to conduct liaison and coordination activities is key to mission success. Standard premission planning and isolation procedures are conducted IAW this manual and FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*. Detailed mission analyses must be conducted for SFLE activities. Key planning considerations for the SF battalion and the SFODA involve C2, organization for employment, selection criteria, information availability, and deployment.

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

C-6. As previously discussed, SFLEs are employed to strengthen the C2 links between SOF and the multinational conventional and HN forces. C2 is strengthened and synchronized by providing accurate information and communications connectivity based on a thorough understanding of the command structure and the command relationships between differing units. In most situations, the SFLE reports to a higher multinational HQ through an SFOB, or an FOB, or a JSOTF. In some cases, an SFLE may report to an AOB or a SOCCE serving as the area command or sector command for U.S. ARSOF. The FOB normally maintains TACON of deployed SFLEs. The SFLE also may report directly to the JTF if required to do so.

ORGANIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

C-7. An SFODA forms the nucleus for a liaison detachment. Based on the METT-TC, the liaison detachment may be augmented with additional personnel and equipment. Refer to Figure 3-10, page 3-29, for the organization of the SFODA under TOE 31807.

C-8. An SFODA, using the split-team concept, may provide two SFLEs. The SFLE should not deploy with less than six SF personnel. The two SFLEs

would come from the same SFODA using the split-team concept. Unit SOP determines the split-team configuration.

C-9. The SFODA SFLE may be augmented with personnel or equipment to meet a particular mission’s requirement, as shown in Figure C-1.

| PERSONNEL | EQUIPMENT |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Additional SF ▶ PSYOP ▶ CA ▶ Radiotelegraph Operators (Radio Operators) ▶ SOF LNOs ▶ Conventional Force LNOs ▶ Weather ▶ SOT-A ▶ Intelligence Analysts ▶ SF Chemical Team ▶ Ranger LNOs ▶ Mechanics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Communications Systems ▶ PSYOP Package ▶ Helicopters ▶ Boats ▶ Vehicles ▶ ADP Systems ▶ PLL ▶ Tentage ▶ Sandbags ▶ Pioneer Tools ▶ Camouflage Nets ▶ Generators ▶ Concertina Wire ▶ Engineer Stakes ▶ MOPP Equipment ▶ SOCA |

Figure C-1. Personnel and Equipment of SFODA SFLE

C-10. Any augmentation, equipment, or resources must be requested in an SOR before deployment. The SFODA SFLE submits the SOR to its higher HQ for staffing.

SELECTION CRITERIA

C-11. Language proficiency, cultural skills, and experience or previous training with host units are the most important qualifications for members of an SFLE. The SFOB, FOB, or AOB selects and tasks an SFODA to conduct the SFLE mission. Any SFODA may conduct the SFLE mission. Once the SFODA receives the mission, it should be isolated or semi-isolated to conduct detailed planning, mission analysis, and premission activities. Based on METT-TC, the SFODA may require more than 96 hours to isolate. In emergencies, the SFODA may use the time-sensitive process. Knowledge of the host unit’s operating procedures gives the members of an SFLE an edge in the critical rapport-building process.

INFORMATION AVAILABILITY

C-12. Complete, detailed information on the operational environment, as well as background information on the host unit, is critical. Experience has shown that SFLEs deployed without benefit of adequate information and planning have difficulty establishing initial rapport and maintaining credibility. With adequate intelligence, the SFLE normally establishes

rapport quickly and successfully with the host unit. The types of information the SFLE should have include—

- Personalities of key host unit leaders.
- Equipment and weapons available.
- Organizational diagrams.
- Communications equipment and procedures.
- Doctrinal and operational procedures.
- Familiarity of host unit with U.S. procedures and doctrine.
- Culture-specific traits.
- Political and military orientation.
- Unit disposition.
- Unit mission.
- Adjacent units' mission.
- Logistics and sustainment.
- Transportation.
- MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures.
- Personnel service.
- Theater plan (if available).

C-13. During preparation and planning, the deploying SFLE should attempt to include personnel who have trained with the host unit and with units from the same country.

C-14. The SFLE should conduct a site survey. Like every SF mission, the best personnel to send on a site survey are those from the tasked unit. If personnel from the tasked unit cannot go, then the SFLE should send specific IRs to the team conducting the site survey.

C-15. SFLEs are employed throughout the operational continuum; therefore, before SFLEs deploy, the SF battalion should brief them on the operational environment and ROE. Detailed intelligence briefs help prepare the team for potential threats.

C-16. ROE are unique to each mission. SFLE commanders must make sure every soldier knows and understands the ROE. Members of the Staff Judge Advocate, specializing in operational law, can assist the commander and clear up confusing or misunderstood points. In addition, the SFLE must understand the limits of involvement with both the population and the host unit in the operational area. For example, SFLE medics may or may not be allowed to provide medical assistance to the local populace or host force soldiers. All members of the team must understand these points.

LINKUP

C-17. A linkup plan is established to make sure the SFLE successfully links up with the host unit on schedule. SFLE operations characteristically occur in three distinct phases: linkup, employment, and redeployment. During

isolation, SFLEs must carefully consider the linkup plan. Making good initial contact and establishing rapport are instrumental in establishing solid relationships for the long-term success of the mission. Depending on the situation, the SFOB, FOB, AOB, or SOCCE may coordinate and organize the SFLE's initial contact with the host unit. In some cases, the JTF may dictate the initial linkup plan. Before linkup, the JTF briefs the host unit on all information regarding the SFLE and the linkup plan. This information includes the SFLE's—

- Time of arrival.
- Employment.
- Support requirements.
- Command relationships.

C-18. In addition, the SFOB, FOB, AOB, or SOCCE should brief the SFLE on all information available regarding the host unit. If possible, the JTF prebriefs the SFLE on the broad operational plan and what the host unit is expected to accomplish within that plan. The SFLE must be completely familiar with the OPLAN. Also, higher HQ provides any new information regarding the host unit. This briefing focuses on information that was unavailable to the SFLE during the planning phase. If one SFLE is replacing another, the outgoing and incoming SFLEs meet face-to-face.

C-19. Soon after the initial contact, the SFLE commander schedules an inbrief with the commander and staff of the host unit. Every SFLE member should attend. The overall purpose of this briefing is to establish a cooperative relationship, assess the host unit's situation, and define the SFLE's capabilities and mission. During the inbrief, the SFLE introduces its members and discusses critical items of information. This information includes the SFLE's—

- Organization and mission.
- ROE.
- Capabilities, limitations, and requirements.
- Role as liaison, not as a tactical unit, between the host unit and the multinational unit.

C-20. Above all, members of the SFLE must be aware of their status as guests of the host unit and must behave accordingly to achieve the best results. (See Figures C-2 and C-3, page C-6.) The SFLE begins its overall assessment of the host unit during its initial meeting.

DEPLOYMENT

C-21. Upon deployment, the SFLE processes through an intermediate staging base (ISB) to receive additional planning guidance, equipment, or supplies, such as communications equipment and vehicles. At the ISB or FOB, the SFLE asks pertinent questions to fill in information gaps on the host force and its AO. It then prepares to link up with representatives of the host force.




Figure C-2. Battle Tasks for Conducting Liaison




Figure C-3. Battle Tasks for Deployment

EMPLOYMENT

C-22. Employment begins upon linkup with the host unit. Determining the attitude of the host unit at the initial meeting is the starting point for establishing a working relationship for the conduct of the SFLE's mission. The tasks inherent to SFLE employment are to conduct an assessment, monitor and review operations, provide communications connectivity, report findings and the situation to higher HQ, conduct FP, and sustain the force.

C-23. SFLEs constantly assess their host unit's capabilities, operations, and assigned sector. JTF PIR and IRs are reported as obtained. Information—such as mine threat or minefield data, trafficability, and civilian living conditions—is important to higher and adjacent HQ. Timely, accurate, and complete reporting is the key to mission success. In addition, the SFLE assesses the host unit's structure, capabilities, routines, and receptiveness. This assessment information is important to the U.S. conventional force commander. (See Figure C-4, page C-7.)

C-24. The SFLE maintains 24-hour communication with its designated higher HQ. Depending on the maturity of the theater AO, this communication could be by HF or TACSAT equipment or even MSE from the U.S. conventional forces to the SFLE.

C-25. Certain observations require immediate reporting, while more routine information may be included in daily SITREPs. Clearly, force-protection information is reported immediately. All information cleared for dissemination is reported up the host unit chain of command and up the SOF

or SOCCE chain of command. The host unit relies upon the SFLE for an accurate report. The SFLE manages the priority and importance of spot reports to the commander based upon his CCIR, essential elements of information (EEI), and EEFI.

| MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Conduct assessment of AOR. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitor roads (trafficability, choke points, bridges). - Monitor and report mine status and maintain limited mine deception capability. - Monitor NBC and ADA status. - Monitor population status (refugees, sympathizers). ▶ Conduct assessment of the host unit's capabilities and operations. |

Figure C-4. Battle Tasks for Conducting Assessment

C-26. To stay accurately informed of the host unit's activities, SFLE representatives attend all host unit staff meetings, commander's updates, and intelligence updates. Depending on the time the host unit has been operating in the AO, much intelligence information may be available for the U.S. conventional forces.

C-27. Communication is a two-way street. For the SFLE to keep the host unit accurately informed, the SFLE higher HQ must keep the SFLE accurately informed. The kind of information that helps the SFLE's credibility with the host unit includes—

- Other SFLE and host unit activity within the AO.
- Daily SITREPs of conventional forces. (See Figure C-5.)

| MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Provide accurate daily reports. ▶ Provide CCIR, EEI, and EEFI. ▶ Process flash and priority reports quickly. |

Figure C-5. Battle Tasks for Providing Communications Connectivity

C-28. The SFLE must be prepared to defend itself, if required. Although the overall threat may be fairly low, threats may exist from rogue units, disenchanted individuals or small groups, and terrorism. SFLE personnel assess the threat level before every mission and take appropriate actions to moderate the risks. They may, for example, use alternate routes and increase the alert posture of vehicle guards.

C-29. SFLEs do not patrol independently. Rather, they may accompany units or monitor the patrols within their host command that are on patrol. The U.S. conventional force commander most likely dictates the force-protection posture of the SFLE in such matters—for example, uniform (probably Kevlar

helmet and body armor) and travel numbers and formations (four-vehicle movement policy). To establish and maintain rapport and credibility, the SFLE follows the force-protection policies of the host unit. If these policies differ from the U.S. conventional force commander's policies, the JSOTF, SFOB, or FOB secures a waiver from the U.S. conventional force commander for the SFLE to adhere to the policies of the host unit. (See Figures C-6 and C-7.)

| MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ Conduct tactical road march (mounted and dismounted).▶ Conduct reconnaissance (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to ambush (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to mine encounter (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to sniper (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to field artillery (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to air attack (mounted and dismounted).▶ React to civilian disturbance.▶ Conduct airmobile operations.▶ Conduct counterambush. |

Figure C-6. Battle Tasks for Conducting Force Protection

| MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ Conduct supply operations.▶ Conduct preventive maintenance checks and services operations.▶ Modify maintenance program for environmental conditions.▶ Safeguard and account for equipment and supplies. |

Figure C-7. Battle Tasks for Sustaining the Force

C-30. The host unit must provide for SFLE sustainment. It should be able to provide most sustainment items to the SFLE. Items not available in the host command's supply system are requested through the SFLE's higher HQ. Depending on when conventional U.S. units arrive in theater, establishing a functioning U.S. supply system could take 45 days or longer. The use of suitable unit command supplies is the most responsive means of sustainment.

REDEPLOYMENT

C-31. The SFLE either withdraws on order, or one SFLE replaces another SFLE in country for ongoing operations or until the operations end. In any

case, the SFLE plans its departure and keeps the host unit completely informed. (See Figure C-8.) The departing SFLE—

- Prepares equipment and hand receipts, as necessary, for handover to the incoming SFLE.
- Outbriefs the host unit, SFOB, FOB, AOB, or SOCCE and the incoming SFLE.
- Constructs in-depth AARs with well-thought-out lessons learned.
- Schedules an inbrief for the incoming SFLE with the host unit.

| MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Prepare for transition operations. ▶ Conduct battle handover. ▶ Conduct postmission activities. ▶ Clear equipment hand receipt. |

Figure C-8. Battle Tasks for Redeployment

RAPPORT IN SFLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH A FOREIGN NATION

C-32. This section provides a brief discussion of the need to establish and maintain rapport while engaging in SO activities. The information that follows applies not only to SFLE missions but also to any activity that involves contact with HN personnel—for example, FID, FNS, and UW.

C-33. Rapport is a *harmonious or sympathetic relation or connection*. In other words, rapport is a relationship between people in terms of mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Establishing effective rapport is important in the SO environment. SFLE personnel, because of their close relationship to HN personnel, must establish effective rapport for overall mission success. The development of personal relationships with counterparts can produce results that normally would not be achieved strictly on the basis of authority or rank. Before SFLE personnel can establish effective rapport, however, they must understand human nature and motivation. In addition, they must be knowledgeable of the HN culture and society, rank structure, and attitudes toward different ranks. This information can be obtained in part from interpretative area studies, operational area studies, and other research. If a large diversity in rank between HN and SFLE members exists, SFLE members may need to be *frocked* to equal rank with HN counterparts.

C-34. An SFLE member establishes effective rapport when he obtains results without coercion by advising his counterparts, setting the example, and seeking a compromise when necessary.

- *Advising the counterpart* to select a particular COA is only effective if the counterpart perceives the SFLE member to be competent enough to give sound advice. The SFLE member must be able to explain to his counterpart the advantages of what he is proposing.

- *Setting the example* for his counterpart in the desired behavior must be a continuous effort to avoid the *do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do* attitude. In setting the example, the SFLE member should make every effort to explain to his counterpart that what he is doing is the most effective form of behavior for the situation. This action is especially true when the counterpart does not understand the actions of the SFLE member. This action also reinforces the counterpart's perception of the SFLE member's competence.
- *Seeking a compromise* with his counterpart is a desired COA or form of behavior. The SFLE member can put his counterpart in a position where he has a personal stake in successful execution. In some cultures, seeking a compromise may be necessary to help the counterpart *save face*. Because of practical experience, a counterpart may have a better COA to offer. In this case, the SFLE member is the one who must compromise, but he must not alter the perception of his competence. In the process of settling differences, however, two major areas of concern must never be compromised for the sake of maintaining rapport. They are force security and human rights issues.

C-35. The SFLE member must be careful not to force his counterpart into action intentionally. He must be aware of the chance that as an American soldier he may have a privileged status in the HN. His presence alone may garner personal benefits for his counterpart through that counterpart's position as an acquaintance or friend of an American. On the other hand, if his counterpart feels intimidated, he may comply with every suggestion. The SFLE member will establish long-lasting, good rapport if he can convey to his counterpart that he—

- Is sincerely interested in him, his nation, and its cause.
- Is not there to belittle his efforts or to take over from him but is there to help him because he believes his goals are just, fair, and deserving of success.
- Is a competent professional who can help him achieve his goals.

C-36. Group or battalion commanders should also consider social contact between unit personnel and the HN populace as it affects differences in cultural beliefs and resistance by one another to accept different social practices. Commanders may need to make conscious decisions not to engage in certain activities or conduct or to limit their conduct to areas out of sight from the HN populace. These considerations are based on the HN cultural practices.

SFLE UNIT ASSESSMENT OUTLINE

C-37. The purpose of a unit assessment is to document information gained by the assigned SFLE and to provide an evaluation of the host unit's operational capabilities and a description of the unit's current procedures. SFLEs are task-organized to evaluate and describe the host unit's capabilities. (See Figure C-9, page C-11.)

1. Operations and C2 activities.
 - a. HQ and staff organization.
 - b. Information dissemination.
 - c. Compatibility with U.S. C2.
 - d. Adherence to task force orders and commander's intent.
 - e. Initiative.
 - f. Effects of multinational staff on operations.
 - g. Maneuver capabilities and limitations.
2. Intelligence activities.
 - a. Methods of collecting, updating, and reporting intelligence.
 - b. Collection efficiency.
 - c. Methods of evaluating analysis and reporting.
 - d. Operations security.
 - e. Vulnerability to collection from factions or civilians.
 - f. Use of assets provided by task force.
 - g. Effects of multinational staff on intelligence operations.
 - h. Overall assessment of capabilities and limitations.
3. PSYOP and CA activities.
4. Medical activities.
 - a. Administrative activities.
 - b. Medical support plan.
 - c. Follow-on to CHS to include resuscitative support, as required.
 - d. MEDEVAC and CASEVAC procedures.
 - e. Medical assets and task organization.
 - f. Overall evaluation of medical capabilities and limitations.
 - g. Personnel accounting process.
 - h. Task organization and personnel strength.
 - i. Means of identification.
 - j. Legal and contracting procedures.
5. Logistics activities.
 - a. Logistics system task organization.
 - b. Means of requesting supplies.
 - c. Means of accounting for supplies.
 - d. Storage and transport of supplies.
 - e. Maintenance.
 - f. Unique aspects of multinational logistics system.

Figure C-9. Unit Assessment Outline

6. Security and fire support activities.
 - a. Physical security at HQ camp.
 - b. Personal security procedures.
 - c. Fire support task organization and C2.
 - d. Fire support procedures.
 - e. Fire support restrictions.
 - f. Unique aspects of multinational fire support system.
7. Communications activities.
 - a. Communications equipment.
 - b. System compatibility.
 - c. COMSEC.
 - d. Terrain.
 - e. Overall communications assessment.
8. Commander's summary.

Figure C-9. Unit Assessment Outline (Continued)

Appendix D

Special Forces Mission Briefback Format

The briefback is the final decision brief presented by the SFOD to its commanders. This appendix provides a format (Figure D-1) that systematically addresses major areas of mission planning. The format helps deploying SFODs to convey detailed information about their mission to their chain of command. A group or battalion staff can also use the format to prepare an initial mission briefing. This basic outline covers the planning areas required to develop a complete plan, to prevent conflict with other efforts, and to meet the commander’s intent. Users should modify the outline by adding or deleting the portions that do not apply. At the commander’s discretion, the briefback may be modified for a particular mission to reflect the five-paragraph OPORD.

1. Commander.
 - a. Purpose of briefing.
 - b. Mission as stated in the OPORD.
 - c. Higher commander’s intent.
 - d. Detachment commander’s intent.
 - e. Organization of team’s chain of command and assigned responsibility.
 - f. Attachments and detachments.
2. S2 or intelligence sergeant.
 - a. Description of the JSOA.
 - b. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace.
 - (1) Threat evaluation.
 - (a) Threat identification.
 - (b) Additions to the initial threat database.
 - (c) Determination of current order of battle (overlay).
 - (d) Disposition, composition, and strength of committed forces and reinforcements (identify each unit by category).
 - (e) Hostile force capabilities, intentions, and activities (air, ground, water, NBC).
 - (f) Hostile populace and resource control measures.
 - (2) Civilian population.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format

- (3) Capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and activities of supported indigenous force.
- (4) The effects of terrain and weather on friendly and hostile forces in the JSOA. (Use terrain overlays as appropriate.)
- (5) Threat integration and probable course of hostile action.
- (6) Human rights considerations.
- c. Priority PIR and IRs.
- d. EEFI.
- e. Team intelligence activities in the JSOA (include defensive CI activities).
- f. E&R plan.
- g. OPSEC plan.
- h. Unanswered RFIs.
- 3. S3 or operations sergeant.
 - a. Command and support relationships in the JSOA.
 - b. Concept of operations.
 - c. ROE.
 - d. Infiltration plan.
 - (1) Deception plan.
 - (2) Route.
 - (3) Point of no return.
 - (4) Contingency plan.
 - (a) In-flight abort plan (including recall procedures).
 - (b) Crash or forced landing.
 - 1. Before point of no return.
 - 2. After point of no return.
 - (5) Primary and alternate points of entry.
 - (6) Contingency plan at entry points.
 - (7) Assembly plan.
 - (a) Primary and alternate points of entry.
 - (b) Disposition of excess items (for example, scuba and air items).
 - (8) Contact plans.
 - (a) Primary.
 - (b) Alternate.
 - (c) Contingency.
 - (9) Movement plans.
 - (a) From points of entry to contact site (if needed).
 - (b) From contact site to operations area.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

- (10) Security plans.
 - (11) Specific duties of contact team, bundle recovery team, and other specialized teams.
 - e. Training plan.
 - (1) Tentative plan to train indigenous force.
 - (2) Program of instruction.
 - (a) Individual.
 - (b) Collective.
 - (c) Leader.
 - f. Combat operations (only if preplanned targets are included).
 - (1) Concept of the operation.
 - (2) Routes to and from the target.
 - (3) Security plan.
 - (4) Actions at the objective (overall concept). (If a demolition target, the demolition sergeant briefs. If a raid or an ambush, the weapons sergeant briefs.)
 - (5) Withdrawal.
 - g. Linkup or exfiltration plan.
 - (1) Primary.
 - (2) Alternate.
 - (3) Contingency.
 - h. Demobilization plan.
 - (1) PSYOP.
 - (2) Deception.
 - (3) OPSEC.
4. S1 or personnel and administration sergeant.
- a. Personnel Status.
 - (1) Assigned strength.
 - (2) Shortage by MOS.
 - (3) Cross-trained personnel.
 - b. Discipline, law, and order.
 - (1) Court martial and Article 15 jurisdiction, if an exception to SOP.
 - (2) Known indigenous force policy on discipline and law and order.
 - (3) Legal status of team in the JSOA.
 - c. Disposition of EPWs in the JSOA.
 - d. Graves Registration.
 - (1) U.S. personnel.
 - (2) Indigenous personnel (state local customs).
 - e. Morale and personnel services (if other than SOP).

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

- (1) Personnel records check.
 - (2) Mail handling.
 - (3) Promotions.
 - (4) Comfort items.
 - (5) Replacements and augmentations.
 - (6) Pay and allowances.
 - f. Operational fund.
 - g. Indigenous force strength.
 - h. Indigenous force discipline and law and order.
 - i. Processing of the indigenous force.
 - (1) Oath of allegiance.
 - (2) Records to be kept.
 - (a) Pay.
 - (b) Training.
 - (c) Miscellaneous.
 - (3) Identification photographs.
5. S4 or supply sergeant.
- a. Supplies and equipment.
 - (1) Disposition of equipment and personal items not accompanying the team.
 - (2) Special mission equipment issued to the team.
 - (3) Cross-load plan (overall).
 - b. Resupply plans.
 - (1) Automatic resupply.
 - (a) Schedule.
 - (b) Drop zone data and delivery means.
 - (c) Recovery plan.
 - (2) On-call resupply.
 - (a) Schedule.
 - (b) Drop zone data or delivery means.
 - (c) Recovery plan.
 - (3) Emergency resupply and conditions for implementation.
 - (4) Existing logistics nets in the JSOA.
 - (5) Indigenous logistics plan.
6. S5 or CA NCO.
- a. Political-military implications of mission.
 - b. Status of local government in the JSOA.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

- c. Status of shadow resistance government in the JSOA.
 - d. Requirements for interagency coordination in the JSOA.
 - e. Plans to minimize civilian interference with the mission.
 - f. Plans to protect cultural properties in the JSOA.
 - g. Plans to develop the auxiliary in the JSOA.
 - h. Plans to develop civil defense groups in the JSOA.
 - i. Humanitarian and civil assistance plans.
 - j. Military civic-action plans.
 - k. Displaced personnel.
 - l. Compensation to HN for support or contracts.
7. PSYOP officer or NCO. Present the psychological actions (PSYACTs) to be executed by the force to facilitate mission accomplishment and minimize adverse impacts on military operations. Also address restrictions on military operations. The PSYACTs and restrictions may have political, cultural, ethnic, religious, historical, geographic, economic, military, ideological, regional, national, or demographic origins.
- a. Target audiences.
 - (1) Uncommitted.
 - (2) Hostile sympathizers.
 - (3) Hostile military forces.
 - (4) Resistance sympathizers.
 - b. Approved themes and messages for each target audience.
 - c. Themes and messages to be avoided.
 - d. Media production and dissemination means available in the JSOA.
 - e. PSYOP materiel to accompany team.
8. Communications sergeant.
- a. Signal equipment and supplies to accompany detachment.
 - (1) Status of equipment.
 - (2) Cross-load plan.
 - b. Communications plan and procedures.
 - (1) Scheduled contacts.
 - (2) Mandatory reports to the SFOB or the FOB.
 - (3) Alternate encryption system.
 - (4) Emergency communications system and procedures.
 - (5) Security.
 - (a) Site security.
 - (b) Transmission security.
 - (c) Cryptographic security.
 - (6) Internal team communications.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

- c. Communications training plan.
 - d. Existing communications in the JSOA.
9. Medical sergeant.
- a. Health status of team.
 - b. Medical supplies and equipment to accompany team.
 - (1) Cross-load plan.
 - (2) Individual medical equipment and supplies.
 - c. Estimate of the medical situation in the JSOA.
 - (1) Indigenous force health.
 - (2) Preventive medicine.
 - (3) Health hazards in the JSOA.
 - (4) Food and nutrition in the JSOA.
 - (5) Indigenous medical personnel and facilities.
 - (6) Medical intelligence and information.
 - (7) Medical threat and counterthreat measures.
 - d. Medical support plan and annex.
 - e. Medical training plan.
 - (1) Indigenous soldiers.
 - (2) Indigenous medics.
 - (3) Clandestine treatment center personnel.
10. Engineer sergeant.
- a. Engineer equipment and supplies to accompany team.
 - (1) Status of equipment.
 - (2) Cross-load plan.
 - b. Estimate of area potential to support demolitions and engineer requirements.
 - c. Mission planning folder (CARVER overlay).
 - d. CARVER analysis of potential targets.
 - e. Availability of supplies in the JSOA.
 - f. Engineer training plan.
 - (1) Individual.
 - (2) Collective.
 - (3) Leader.
11. Weapons sergeant.
- a. Weapons and tactical equipment to accompany team.
 - (1) Status of weapons and tactical equipment.
 - (2) Basic load of ammunition.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

- (3) Cross-load plan.
 - b. Estimate of area potential to provide additional weapons, ammunition, and tactical equipment.
 - c. Security.
 - (1) Assembly area (if not in SOP).
 - (2) Contact areas (if not in SOP).
 - (3) Tentative base camp security plans.
 - d. Weapons and tactics training plan.
 - (1) Individual.
 - (2) Collective.
 - (3) Leader.
12. Commander.
- a. Closing statement.
 - (1) Readiness posture of team.
 - (2) Unresolved issues or concerns (if none, so state).
 - b. Questions.

Figure D-1. Briefback Format (Continued)

Appendix E

Sample Group Operation Order

The SF group prepares OPORDs that provide authoritative direction to subordinate units for planning training efforts. The OPORD conveys the group commander's intent, formalizing C4I agreements, and task organization. It is the primary reference document for preparing the unit METL.

NOTE: The following acronyms are fictitious acronyms and as such are not a part of the Glossary to this manual. The fictitious acronyms were created specifically for the sample group OPORD (Figure E-1, page E-2).

- AFSOB: Air Force Special Operations Base
- AFSOD: Air Force Special Operations Detachment
- AFSOF: Air Force Special Operations Forces
- ARSOFATL: Army Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- ATLDEFCON: Atlantica Defense Command
- CINCUSATL: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantica Command
- COMARSOFATL: Commander, Army Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- COMSOCATL: Commander, Special Operations Command Atlantica
- FLN: National Liberation Front
- NAVSOFATL: Naval Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR: Naval Special Warfare Task Group Four
- NSWTU: Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
- PDRA: Peoples' Democratic Republic of Atlantica
- SACATLDEFCON: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantica Defense Command
- SOCATL: Special Operations Command Atlantica
- SRN: Socialist Republic of Nubia
- TASOC: Theater Area Special Operations Command
- USATLCON: United States Atlantica Command

| | |
|--|--|
| CLASSIFICATION | |
| COPY__ OF __ COPIES 9TH SFG(A) FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000 231230Z SEP 99 YZ51-MESSAGE REF. #__ | |
| OPORD 2640 (NORTH PINE) | |
| () REFERENCES. | |
| a. () Maps and Charts. Annex I (Service Support) for GI &S (U) | |
| b. () Annex W (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) (U) | |
| c. () SACATLDEFCON OPORD XXXX, ATLDEFCON Combined Theater Campaign Plan (U) | |
| d. () CINCUSATL OPORD XXXX, USATLCON Subordinate Campaign Plan (U) | |
| e. () COMSOCATL OPORD XXXX, SOCATL Subordinate Campaign Plan for Special Operations in the USATLCON AOR (U) | |
| f. () 9th SFG(A) Readiness SOP, dated 18 Dec 98 (U) | |
| g. () 9th SFG(A) Field SOP, dated 15 Jan 98 (U) | |
| TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE PLAN: ZULU | |
| () TASK ORGANIZATION. | |
| 9th SFG(A) (-) | 2/9th SFG(A) |
| A/3/9th SFG(A) | A/551st Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) |
| 2 SFODA, B/3/9th SFG(A) | B/99th CA Battalion (FID/UW) |
| HQ, C/2/9th SFG(A) | DS Team and Civic Action Team |
| HQ, B/3/9th SFG(A) | C/99th CA Battalion |
| HHC | 865th Medical Company |
| Support Company | 2/1118th MP Company |
| Operations Support Company, 2d PSYOP Battalion | Team/2d PSYOP Battalion |
| 99th CA Battalion (FID/UW) (-) | Decontamination Team, 5589th Chemical Detachment |
| 1118th MP Company (-) | USAF SOWT |
| 5589th Chemical Detachment (-) | |
| USAF SOWT | |
| Liaison Team, 7th Special Operations Wing (SOW) | |
| Liaison Team, NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR | |
| 1/9th SFG(A) | 3/9th SFG(A) (-) |
| CLASSIFICATION | |

Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD

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| | |
|---|--|
| A/99th CA Battalion (FID/UW) | C/99th CA Battalion (FID/UW) |
| 1/1118th MP Company | 3/1118th MP Company |
| Team/2d PSYOP Battalion | Team/2d PSYOP Battalion |
| Decontamination Team, 5589th Chemical Detachment | Decontamination Team, 5589th Chemical Detachment |
| USAF SOWT | USAF SOWT |
| Liaison Team, 7th SOW | |
| Liaison Team, NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR | |

1. () SITUATION.

a. () Enemy Forces () Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) () This OPOD provides for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of the 9th SFG(A) in the USATLCOM AOR during a regional crisis or conflict that threatens U.S. national interests or in a global crisis or conflict between the United States and the regional powers.

(2) () The regional powers have a limited capability to project their power and influence into the AOR from two client states, the PDRA and the SRN. Through the Blazing Torch Movement, the PDRA actively supports terrorism and insurgency in Nuevo Basque, Camargo, and Costa Oro. The PDRA and SRN both actively support the FLN insurgency in Southern Nubia. The PDRA also has international drug trafficking ties with the Brotherhood crime syndicate in Agricola.

b. () Friendly Forces.

(1) () The U.S. national security strategy seeks to promote collective security and to protect U.S. interests in the region. Specific regional U.S. military strategic objectives in a regional or global crisis or confrontation are as follows:

(a) () Deter, and if necessary, successfully oppose PDRA and SRN attempts to achieve geopolitical gains by aggression and coercion.

(b) () Deny threat opportunities to expand its presence and influence.

(c) () Preserve and protect U.S. and allied access to Atlantica oil reserves.

(2) () Three variables complicate the attainment of these objectives, as follows:

(a) () In the event of a regional crisis or conflict, will the conflict be confined to the Atlantica continent, or will it be before, concurrent with, or subsequent to a crisis or conflict in other theaters?

(b) () In the event of a regional or global crisis or conflict, will the hostile regional powers commit major forces in the theater?

(c) () Will the NCA consider committing major forces in the theater feasible or will the USATLCOM AOR be a secondary, economy-of-force theater?

(3) () The SACATLDEFCON combined theater campaign plan and USATLCOM subordinate campaign plan envision a three-phase approach to military operations in the AOR, as follows:

(a) () First (minimum force), CINCUSATL employs 1/9th SFG(A) and other forward-deployed forces to plan, conduct, and support SA and other military operations in the AOR.

CLASSIFICATION**Figure E-1. Sample Group OPOD (Continued)**

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(b) () Second (deterrence), the NCA allocates additional forces to USATLCOM to convey the U.S. intent credibly to oppose any aggression by the PDRA or SRN against an allied or friendly nation successfully. During this phase, the entire 9th SFG(A) deploys into the AOR. COMSOCATL expands Phase I activities. On order, he initiates SO to provide early warning of hostile aggression and to disrupt hostile preparations for attack. In the event that deterrence fails and open hostilities commence, COMSOCATL conducts SO against hostile forces to support the combined defense of key oil facilities in the region. COMSOCATL prioritizes to interdict LOC, to disrupt the movement of second-echeloned forces from the PDRA or the SRN into the oil-rich Aciete Triangle area, and to divert as many hostile forces as possible to rear-area security missions.

(c) () Third (warfighting), major U.S. forces deploy into the AOR to oppose an attack successfully by the PDRA to achieve geopolitical gains or to disrupt U.S. and allied access to Atlantica oil resources. During this phase, COMSOCATL conducts the full range of SO to support conventional military operations and to pursue conflict termination on terms favorable to U.S. and allied interests.

c. () Attachments and Detachments (Task Organization).

(1) () SOCATL.

(a) () In the ongoing Phase I, COMSOCATL operates and maintains a joint FOB at San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque, and conducts joint and combined SO activities to accomplish the following:

1. () Deter PDRA and SRN aggression and coercion.
2. () Assist friendly Atlantica Pact governments to defend themselves against insurgency.
3. () Combat terrorism in the region.
4. () Support selected resistance movements that enhance U.S. interests in the region.
5. () Support regional activities to interdict and eliminate drug trafficking.

(b) () On order, COMSOCATL conducts SO activities to neutralize threats to U.S. regional interests from the PDRA, SRA, and any other source. In the event of regional or global hostilities, the COMSOCATL's intent is to harass and disrupt the regional power's exploitation of the region's resources or geopolitical position. This action occurs to divert as many hostile combat forces as possible to rear-area security and to cause the regional powers or its client states to rely on force to impose and maintain control over any occupied territory.

(2) () The 6th TASOC (ARSOFATL) provides support and sustainment for all assigned ARSOF in the AOR.

(3) () The 7th SOW (ARSOFATL) deploys into the AOR from home station at Hurlburt Field, Florida; establishes AFSOB at Sargasso AFB, Camargo, and AFSOB at New London, Camargo; assumes command of forward-deployed AFSOF at AFSOD, San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque; and conducts and supports the full range of SO as directed.

(4) () NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR (NAVSOFATL) deploys into AOR from home station at Little Creek, Virginia; establishes operating base at Nordon Point, Camargo; assumes command of forward-deployed NSWTU at San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque; and conducts and supports the full range of SO as directed.

d. () Assumptions.

- (1) () The 9th SFG(A) (-) will deploy into the AOR in time to conduct prehostilities SO.

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Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)

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(2) () The NCA will grant border-crossing authority for prehostilities SO, and the Atlantica Pact will permit COMSOCATL to conduct these SO from bases in their territory.

(3) () FNS will be available as described in Appendix 6 (Foreign Nation Support) of Annex I (Service Support) of this OPORD.

(4) () Military airlift and sealift will be available to support 9th SFG(A) deployment, employment, and sustainment.

(5) () PWRMS and operational project stocks will be available to sustain 9th SFG(A) operations.

e. () Legal Considerations.

(1) () Executive Order 12333 requires Presidential approval of all special activities, except during war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

(2) () For ROE, see Annex E (Rules of Engagement).

2. () MISSION.

The 9th SFG(A) deploys into AO on D-day, H-hour, to conduct SO to protect U.S. interests.

3. () EXECUTION. Commander's Intent.

a. () Concept of Operations (See Annex M [Deep Operations]).

(1) () General. (See Appendix 2 [General] to Annex M [Deep Operations].) In the ongoing Phase I, 9th SFG(A) and other forward-deployed elements of the group conduct joint or combined SO activities in support of U.S. national interests and objectives in the AOR. On order, the 9th SFG(A) conducts the full range of SO activities to neutralize threats to U.S. regional interests from the PDRA, SRN, and any other source. In the event of regional or global crisis or conflict, the intent of the Commander, 9th SFG(A) is to provide CINCUSATL with intelligence on hostile capabilities and intentions in the AOR, to harass and disrupt any hostile attack against friendly nations in the region, to divert as many hostile combat forces as possible to rear area security, and to cause the regional powers or its client states to rely on force to impose and maintain control over occupied territory.

(2) () Plan of Fire Support.

(a) () The 1/9th SFG(A) establishes FOB1 at San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque, in 24 hours (N+1), prepares to execute preplanned SO missions commencing N+4, and fully commits all operational elements NLT N+10.

(b) () The remainder of the group deploys an advance party in 24 hours (N+1), the 3/9th SFG(A) in 48 hours (N+2), and the 9th SFG(A) (-) in 72 hours (N+3); establishes SFOB and FOB3 collocated at Atlantica, Camargo, and FOB2 at New London, Camargo, NLT N+5; prepares to execute preplanned SO missions from FOB3 commencing N+7 and from SFOB and FOB2 commencing N+8; and fully commits all operational elements NLT N+14.

(3) () Employment: In the ongoing Phase I, Commander, 9th SFG(A) augments 1/9th SFG(A) as required to conduct peacetime joint or combined SO activities in the AOR. Upon the earliest possible strategic warning, the 9th SFG(A) (-) deploys into the AOR. Initial prehostilities SO activities provide early warning and other critical intelligence to CINCUSATL, disrupt hostile preparations for attack, and convey U.S. intent to oppose aggression against the Atlantica Pact nations successfully. If deterrence fails, the 9th SFG(A) conducts the full range of SO activities to support conventional military operations in the AOR and

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Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)

CLASSIFICATION

to pursue conflict termination on terms favorable to U.S. and allied interests. The main effort is the 1/9th SFG(A) in Phase I, shifting to the 3/9th SFG(A) (-) upon its deployment into the AOR. On order, priority shifts to the A/3/9th SFG(A) for specific missions.

b. () Subunit Missions.

(1) () The 1/9th SFG(A)—

- (a) () Conducts SA operations in Nuevo Basque and Camargo IAW CINCUSATL OPOORDs XXXX and XXXX.
- (b) () Provides in-theater CT response force IAW CINCUSATL OPOORD XXXX.
- (c) () Supports regional drug interdiction activities IAW CINCUSATL OPOORD XXXX.
- (d) () Supports resistance IAW CINCUSATL OPOORD XXXX.
- (e) () Establishes caches and trains Basque stay-behind forces to support UW in occupied Basque in the event that the nation is overrun and occupied.
- (f) () On order, establishes FOB1 at San Sebastian; accepts attachment of PSYOP team, CA Company, and MP platoon; and, on order, displaces FOB1 to La Cruz, Agricola.
- (g) () On order, conducts FID operations to assist Nuevo Basque in defending itself against insurgency.
- (h) () On order, conducts SO in response to actual or threatened PDRA or SRN aggression against Nuevo Basque. Planning priorities, in order of precedence, are as follows:
 - 1. () Continue FID operations in Nuevo Basque.
 - 2. () Conduct SR in the SRN to provide early warning of hostile attack.
 - 3. () Conduct DA operations in the SRN to disrupt enemy preparations for attack and to convey U.S. intent to oppose aggression against Nuevo Basque successfully.
 - 4. () Conduct SR and DA operations in support of conventional military operations. Planning priority, in order of precedence, is given to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of hostile LOC from PDRA to Aciete Triangle and from SRN to San Sebastian.

(2) () The 2/9th SFG(A)—

- (a) () Provides forces on a rotational basis to conduct SA operations in Camargo under OPCON of SAO Camargo.
- (b) () On order, deploys to New London, Camargo, and establishes FOB2; accepts attachment of engineer company, PSYOP team, CA company, medical company, and MP platoon.
- (c) () On order, conducts FID operations to assist Camargo in defending itself against insurgency.
- (d) () Upon commitment of the 21st Airborne Corps into the AOR, releases Company C HQ to serve as SOCCE at 21st Airborne Corps HQ under OPCON of Commander, 9th SFG(A).
- (e) () On order, conducts SO in response to actual or threatened regional power or PDRA aggression against Camargo. Planning priorities, in order of precedence, are as follows:
 - 1. () Advises, assists, and supports Camargan armed forces when they shift to conventional military operations.

CLASSIFICATION**Figure E-1. Sample Group OPOORD (Continued)**

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2. () When relieved by conventional advisory assistance teams, releases engineer company and medical company to 21st Airborne Corps and conducts full range of SO in support of conventional military operations. Planning priority, in order of precedence, is to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of enemy LOC from PDRA to Atlantica, and from PDRA to Sargasso Air Force Base.

(3) () The 3/9th SFG(A)—

(a) () Provides forces on a rotational basis to conduct SA operations in Camargo under OPCON of SAO Camargo.

(b) () On order, deploys to Atlantica, Camargo, and establishes FOB3 collocated with the SFOB and accepts attachment of the PSYOP team, CA company, and MP platoon.

(c) () On order, releases Company A and two SFODAs from Company B for employment under OPCON of Commander, 9th SFG(A).

(d) () On order, releases Company B HQ to establish and operate group ISOFAC under OPCON of Commander, 9th SFG(A).

(e) () On order, conducts SO in response to actual or threatened regional power or PDRA aggression against Nuevo Basque or Camargo. Planning priorities, in order of precedence, are given to the following missions:

1. () Conducts SR in the PDRA to provide early warning of hostile attack.

2. () Conducts DA operations in the PDRA to disrupt hostile preparations for attack and convey U.S. intent to successfully oppose aggression in the region.

3. () Conducts SR and DA operations in support of conventional military operations. Planning priority, in order of precedence, goes to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of enemy LOC from the PDRA to Aciete Triangle and from the PDRA to Atlantica.

(f) () On order, conducts UW operations with selected resistance elements in the PDRA.

(4) () The A/3/9th SFG(A)—

(a) () On order, accepts attachment of two SFODAs from the B/3/9th SFG(A) and deploys to the SFOB for employment under OPCON of Commander, 9th SFG(A).

(b) () On order, conducts SO in response to actual or threatened PDRA or SRN aggression against Nuevo Basque or Camargo. Planning priorities, in order of precedence, apply to the following missions:

1. () Prepares to execute up to six simultaneous special munitions strikes.

2. () Supports E&R activities in the PDRA, including the preparation and servicing of SAFEs.

3. () Conducts or supports special infiltration and recovery operations as directed by COMSOCATL.

4. () Conducts special activities as directed by COMSOCATL.

5. () Assesses resistance potential in the PDRA.

(5) () Support Company GS SFOB accepts attachment of 5589th Chemical Detachment (-).

CLASSIFICATION

Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)

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- (6) () Operations Support Company, 2d PSYOP Battalion.
 - (a) () Company (-): GS SFOB.
 - (b) () Detaches one team each to 1/9th SFG(A), 2/9th SFG(A), and 3/9th SFG(A).
 - (c) () See Annex R (PSYOP).
 - (7) () 99th CA Battalion.
 - (a) () Battalion (-): GS SFOB.
 - (b) () Detaches one company to 1/9th SFG(A), one company (+) to 2/9th SFG(A), and one company (-) to 3/9th SFG(A).
 - (c) () Detaches one DS team each to SOCATL and 6th TASOC.
 - (d) () See Annex U (Civil-Military Operations).
 - (8) () 1118th MP Company.
 - (a) () Company (-): GS SFOB with company HQ and one platoon.
 - (b) () Detaches one platoon each to 1/9th SFG(A), 2/9th SFG(A), and 3/9th SFG(A).
 - c. () Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) () Conduct operations IAW 9th SFG(A) Readiness SOP and Field SOP.
 - (2) () NBC (Annex J [Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations]). Prepare to execute all activities in an NBC environment.
 - (3) () EW (See Annex H [Signal]).
 - (4) () PSYOP (See Annex R [Psychological Operations]).
 - (5) () Deception (See Annex S [Deception]).
 - (6) () OPSEC (See Annex Q [Operations Security]).
 - (7) () FP.
 - (8) () This plan is effective for planning upon receipt.
4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT.
- a. () Concept of Sustainment: The 9th SFG(A) obtains its service support from designated ASGs. FOB1 maintains 15 days of supplies and continues to receive its support from the Joint Support Activity, San Sebastian. The SFOB and FOB3 deploy with 30 days of supplies and receive their support from the 48th ASG, Atlantica, commencing D+20. FOB2 deploys with 25 days of supplies and receives its support from the Naval Support Activity, New London, commencing D+14.
 - b. () Logistics (See Appendix 1 [Service Support Overlay] to Annex I [Service Support]).
 - c. () Personnel (See Appendix 3 [Personnel] to Annex I [Service Support]).
 - d. () Public Affairs (See Annex V [Public Affairs]).
 - e. () CA (See Annex U [Civil-Military Operations]).
5. () COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
- a. () Command.

CLASSIFICATION**Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)**

CLASSIFICATION

(1) () COMSOCATL exercises OPCON of all SOF deployed into the AOR, less those elements under the OPCON of an in-country SAO.

(2) () In Phase III, most USATLCOM forces pass to OPCON of SACATLDEFCON, but SOCATL and its assigned SOF remain under the OPCON of CINCUSATL. COMSOCATL exchanges LNOs with allied SOF to effect mutual coordination of SO in the region.

(3) () The Commander, 6th TASOC, is COMARSOFATL and exercises command less OPCON of all ARSOF deployed into the AOR.

(4) () The main command post is SFOB, Atlantica.

(5) () The alternate command post is FOB 2, New London.

(6) () Succession of command is IAW 9th SFG(A) Field SOP.

b. () Signal (See Annex H [Signal]).

HOFFMAN
COL, SF
Commander

NOTE: The sequence of annexes shown here are in accordance with FM 101-5. This sequence is required for all OPODs for the purpose of interoperability between different commands. Units not requiring a particular annex indicate this nonrequirement by stating "Annex __ omitted." Additional annexes needed for local command requirements will use the next letter, W, continuing through X, Y, Z, AA, AB, AC, and so forth as needed.

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Annex B. Intelligence

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Tab A. Intelligence Systems in Theater

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Annex C. Operation Overlay

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Figure E-1. Sample Group OPOD (Continued)

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| Annex R. Psychological Operations | |
| Annex S. Deception | |
| Annex T. Electronic Warfare | |
| Annex U. Civil-Military Operations | |
| CLASSIFICATION | |

Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)

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|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;">CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>Annex V. Public Affairs Annex W. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</p> <p>DISTRIBUTION: (List of units to receive OPORD)</p> <p>OFFICIAL:</p> <p>MEADOWS MAJ, SF S3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CLASSIFICATION</p> |
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Figure E-1. Sample Group OPORD (Continued)

Appendix F

Sample Battalion Operation Order

The battalion OPORD is derived from its group's OPORD. It further refines the battalion's role in the overall operation. The SFODAs in the battalion use this OPORD as the primary document for developing OPORDs and training.

NOTE: The following acronyms are fictitious acronyms and as such are not a part of the Glossary to this manual. The fictitious acronyms were created specifically for the sample battalion OPORD (Figure F-1, page F-2).

- AFSOB: Air Force Special Operations Base
- AFSOD: Air Force Special Operations Detachment
- AFSOF: Air Force Special Operations Forces
- ARSOFATL: Army Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- ATLDEFCON: Atlantica Defense Command
- CINCUSATL: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantica Command
- COMARSOFATL: Commander, Army Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- COMSOCATL: Commander, Special Operations Command Atlantica
- NAVSOFATL: Naval Special Operations Forces Atlantica
- NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR: Naval Special Warfare Task Group Four
- NSWTU: Naval Special Warfare Task Unit
- PDRA: Peoples' Democratic Republic of Atlantica
- SACATLDEFCON: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantica Defense Command
- SOCATL: Special Operations Command Atlantica
- SRN: Socialist Republic of Nubia
- TASOC: Theater Area Special Operations Command
- USATLCON: United States Atlantica Command

| | |
|---|--|
| CLASSIFICATION | |
| COPY__ OF __ COPIES | |
| 2D BATTALION, 9TH SFG(A), 1ST SF | |
| FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-5000 | |
| 121530Z MAY 99 | |
| YX52 | |
| OPORD 2641 - 2D BATTALION, 9TH SFG(A) | |
| () REFERENCES. | |
| a. () Maps and Charts. Annex I (Service Support) for GI&S (U) | |
| b. () 9th SFG(A) OPORD 2640, Operation Order for Special Operations in the USATLCOM AOR (U) | |
| c. () 9th SFG(A) Readiness SOP, dated 18 Dec 98 (U) | |
| d. () 9th SFG(A) Field SOP, dated 15 Jan 98 (U) | |
| () TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE PLAN: ZULU | |
| () TASK ORGANIZATION. | |
| A/2/9th SFG(A) | 2/9th SFG(A) (-) |
| SFODA, C/1/9th SFG(A) | A/551st Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) |
| 2 SOT-As, Support Company, 1/9th SFG(A) | B/99th CA Battalion (-) |
| DS Team, A/99th CA Battalion | Civic Action Team |
| DS Team, C/99th CA | C/99th CA Battalion |
| B/2/9th SFG(A) 2d Battalion/9th SFG(A) (-) | Team/2d PSYOP Battalion (-) |
| SFODA, C/2/9th SFG(A) | Decontamination Team, 5589th Chemical Detachment |
| SOT-A, Support Company, 2/9th SFG(A) | USAF SOWT |
| 2 DS Teams, A/99th CA Battalion | 1/118th MP Company |
| DS Team, C/99th CA Battalion | |
| 865th Medical Company | |
| C/2/9th SFG(A) | |
| DS Team, A/99th CA Battalion | |
| 1. () SITUATION. | |
| a. () Enemy Forces (Annex B [Intelligence].) | |
| b. () Friendly Forces. | |
| (1) () In the ongoing Phase I, the 1/9th SFG(A) and other forward-deployed elements of the group conduct joint or combined SO activities to support U.S. national interests and objectives in the AOR. On order, the 9th SFG(A) conducts the full range of SO activities to neutralize threats to U.S. regional interests from regional powers and the PDRA, SRN, and any other source. In the event of regional or global | |
| CLASSIFICATION | |

Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD

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crisis or conflict, the intent of the Commander, 9th SFG(A), is to provide CINCUSATL with intelligence on hostile capabilities and intentions in the AOR, to harass and disrupt any hostile attack against friendly nations in the region, to divert as many hostile combat forces as possible to rear area security, and to cause the regional powers and their client states to rely on force to impose and maintain control over any occupied territory.

(2) () The 1st Battalion, 9th SFG(A), continues ongoing SO activities in the AOR; on order, establishes FOB1 at San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque; and conducts the full range of SO in Nuevo Basque and the SRN.

(3) () The 3d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), on order, deploys to Atlantica, Camargo; establishes FOB3 collocated with the SFOB; and when directed, conducts the full range of SO in the PDRA.

(4) () The 7th SOW (ARSOFATL) deploys into AOR from home station at Hurlburt Field, Florida; establishes AFSOB at Sargasso Air Force Base, Camargo, and AFSOD at New London, Camargo; assumes command of forward-deployed AFSOF at AFSOD, San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque; and conducts and supports the full range of SO as directed.

(5) () NAVSPECWARTASKGROUP FOUR (NAVSOFATL) deploys into AOR from home station at Little Creek, Virginia; establishes operating base at Norden Point, Camargo; assumes command of forward-deployed NSW TU at San Sebastian, Nuevo Basque; and conducts and supports the full range of SO as directed.

c. () Assumptions.

(1) () The 9th SFG(A) (-) will deploy into the AOR in time to conduct prehostilities SO.

(2) () The NCA will grant border-crossing authority for prehostilities SO, and the Atlantica Pact will permit COMSOCATL to conduct these SO from bases in their territory.

(3) () FNS will be available as described in Appendix 6 (Foreign Nation Support) of Annex I (Service Support) of this plan.

(4) () Military airlift and sealift will be available to support 9th SFG(A) deployment, employment, and sustainment.

(5) () PWRMS and operational project stocks will be available to sustain 9th SFG(A) operations.

d. () Legal Considerations.

(1) () Executive Order 12333 requires Presidential approval of all special activities, except during war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution.

(2) () For ROE, see Annex E (Rules of Engagement).

2. () MISSION. The 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), continues to support ongoing SO activities in the AOR; when directed, deploys to establish and operate FOB2 at New London, Camargo; and on order, conducts the entire range of SO activities in its assigned JSOA.

3. () EXECUTION. Commander's Intent.

a. () Concept of Operations.

(1) () General. When directed, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), advises, assists, and supports the Camargan armed forces to defeat the PDRA-sponsored insurgency and to establish a level of internal security that permits balanced internal development. In event of a regional or global crisis or

CLASSIFICATION

Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

CLASSIFICATION

confrontation, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), continues to advise, assist, and support the Camargan armed forces when they shift to conventional military operations. When properly relieved, battalion operational elements regroup for recommitment to the full range of SO activities in support of conventional military operations in Camargo and conflict termination on terms favorable to U.S. and allied interests.

(2) () Deployment. The 2/9th SFG(A) deploys the advance party in 24 hours (N+1) and the main body in 60 hours (N+3) to establish FOB2 at New London, Camargo, NLT N+5; prepares to execute preplanned SO missions, commencing N+8; and fully commits all operational elements NLT N+14.

(3) () Employment. In the ongoing Phase I, Commander, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), augments the 1/9th SFG(A) as required to conduct peacetime joint and combined SO activities in the AOR. When directed, the 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), deploys into the AOR and conducts FID operations to assist Camargo in defending itself against insurgency. Upon the earliest possible strategic warning of a regional or global crisis or confrontation, the 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), deploys into the AOR. Initial prehostilities SO activities focus on advising, assisting, and supporting Camargan armed forces. If deterrence fails, the 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), continues to advise, assist, and support Camargan armed forces engaged in conventional military operations and SO activities. As conventional advisory assistance teams become available to relieve committed SFODs, battalion operational elements consolidate at FOB2 and prepare for recommitment to the full range of SO in support of conventional military operations. The main effort is the forward-deployed elements in Phase I, shifting to Company A upon its deployment into the AOR. On order, priority shifts to Company B.

b. () Tasks.

(1) () Company A.

(a) () Provide forces on a rotational basis to conduct SA operations in Camargo under OPCON of SAO Camargo.

(b) () On order, deploy to New London, Camargo, and prepare operational elements for commitment under OPCON of Commander, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A). Accept attachment of two SOT-As from Support Company.

(c) () On order, accept attachment of two CA DS teams and one SFOD from Company C and conduct FID operations in south central and southeastern Camargo (5th, 7th, and 8th Military Regions) to assist Camargo in defending itself against insurgency. Priority of effort to the 7th Military Region.

(d) () On order, conduct SO in response to actual or threatened regional powers or PDRA aggression against Camargo. Planning priorities, in order, to following missions:

1. () Continue FID operations in south central and southeastern Camargo.

2. () Conduct DA and SR operations in support of conventional military operations.

Give planning priority to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of hostile LOC in south central and southeastern Camargo from PDRA to Atlantica.

(2) () Company B.

(a) () Provide forces on a rotational basis to conduct SA operations in Camargo under OPCON of SAO Camargo.

(b) () On order, deploy to New London, Camargo, and prepare operational elements for commitment under OPCON of Commander, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A). Accept attachment of three DS CA teams and one SOT-A from Support Company.

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Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

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(c) () On order, accept attachment of one SFOD from Company C and conduct FID operations in northeastern and north central Camargo (4th, 9th, and 10th Military Regions) to assist Camargo in defending itself against insurgency. Priority of effort to the 9th Military Region.

(d) () On order, conduct SO in response to actual or threatened regional powers and PDRA aggression against Camargo. Planning priorities, in order, to following missions:

1. () Continue FID operations in north central and northeastern Camargo.

2. () Conduct DA and SR operations in support of conventional military operations.

Give planning priority to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of hostile LOC in north central and northeastern Camargo from PDRA to Atlantica and from PDRA to Sargasso Air Force Base, in that order.

(3) () Company C.

(a) () Provide forces on a rotational basis to conduct SA operations in Camargo under OPCON of SAO Camargo.

(b) () On order, deploy to New London, Camargo, and prepare operational elements for commitment under OPCON of Commander, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A).

(c) () On order, detach one SFOD each to Company A and Company B, accept attachment of one DS CA team, and conduct FID operations in western Camargo (1st, 2d, 3d, and 6th Military Regions) to assist Camargo in defending itself against insurgency. Priority of effort to Camargan SOF in 1st Military Region.

(d) () Upon commitment of 21st Airborne Corps into the AOR, release Company C HQ to serve as a SOCCE at 21st Airborne Corps HQ under OPCON of Commander, 9th SFG(A). Pass OPCON of operational elements to Commander, 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A). (Note: The corps will have a SOCOORD embedded in its staff.)

(e) () On order, conduct SO in response to actual or threatened regional powers or PDRA aggression against Camargo. Give planning priorities, in order, to the following missions:

1. () Advise, assist, and support Camargan SOF in the conduct of SO in support of conventional military operations. Give planning priority to battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, and interdiction of hostile LOC from PDRA to Atlantica and from PDRA to Sargasso Air Force Base, in that order.

2. () Continue FID operations in western Camargo.

(4) () Support Company GS. Accept attachment of one MP platoon from 1118th MP Company and one decontamination team from 5589th Chemical Detachment.

(5) () Engineer Company GS. Priority of support to main effort.

(6) () PSYOP Team GS. Provide PSYOP staff element to S3, 2d Battalion.

(7) () CA Company (-) GS. Priority of support to main effort.

(8) () Medical Company GS. Priority of support to main effort.

c. () Coordinating Instructions.

(1) () Time zone used: ZULU.

(2) () Conduct operations IAW 9th SFG(A) Readiness SOP and Field SOP.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

CLASSIFICATION

(3) () NBC (Annex J [Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations]). Prepare to execute all activities in an NBC environment.

(4) () EW (Annex H [Signal]).

(5) () PSYOP (Annex R [Psychological Operations]).

(6) () Deception (Annex S [Deception]).

(7) () OPSEC (Annex Q [Operations Security]).

(8) () FP.

(9) () This order is effective for planning upon receipt.

4. () SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. () Concept of Sustainment. The 2d Battalion, 9th SFG(A), deploys with 25 days of supplies. It receives its support from Naval Support Activity, New London, commencing D+14. It coordinates with 6th TASOC to obtain support and sustainment unavailable from Naval Support Activity, New London, or FNS.

b. () Logistics (Annex I [Service Support]).

c. () Personnel (Appendix 3 [Personnel] to Annex I [Service Support]).

d. () Public Affairs (Annex V [Public Affairs]).

e. () CA (Annex U [Civil-Military Operations]).

5. () COMMAND AND CONTROL.

a. () Command Relationships.

(1) () COMSOCATL exercises OPCON of all SOF deployed into the AOR, less those elements under the OPCON of an in-country SAO.

(2) () In Phase III, most USATLCOM forces pass to the OPCON of SACATLDEFCON, but SOCATL and its assigned SOF remain under the OPCON of CINCUSATL. COMSOCATL exchanges LNOs with allied SOF to effect mutual coordination of SO in the region.

(3) () The Commander, 6th TASOC, is COMARSOBATL and exercises command less OPCON of all ARSOF deployed into the AOR.

b. () Command Posts.

(1) () Main command post is FOB2, New London.

(2) () Alternate command post is FOB3, Atlantica.

(3) () FOB2 is alternate SFOB.

c. () Succession of Command. 9th SFG(A) Field SOP.

d. () Signal (Annex H [Signal]).

HEALY

LTC, SF

Commander

CLASSIFICATION

Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

CLASSIFICATION

NOTE: The sequence of annexes shown here are in accordance with FM 101-5. This sequence is required for all OPORDs for the purpose of interoperability between different commands. Units not requiring a particular annex indicate this nonrequirement by stating "Annex ___ omitted." Additional annexes needed for local command requirements will use the next letter, W, continuing through X, Y, Z, AA, AB, AC, and so forth as needed.

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Annex B. Intelligence

Appendix 1. Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Tab A. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

Tab B. Doctrinal Template

Tab C. Enemy Situation Template

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Annex E. Rules of Engagement

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Annex G. Air Defense

Annex H. Signal

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Appendix 2. Traffic Circulation and Control

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Tab B. Road Movement Table

Tab C. Highway Regulations

Appendix 3. Personnel

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Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

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- Appendix 5. Religious Support
- Appendix 6. Foreign Nation Support
- Annex J. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
- Annex K. Provost Marshal
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Figure F-1. Sample Battalion OPORD (Continued)

Glossary

| | |
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| AAR | after-action report |
| ACO | airspace control order |
| ACT | analysis and control team |
| ADA | air defense artillery |
| ADCON | administrative control —Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02) |
| ADP | automated data processing |
| adversary | Anyone who contends with, opposes, or acts against one's interest. An adversary is not necessarily an enemy. |
| AFSOC | Air Force special operations component |
| ALO | air liaison officer |
| AO | area of operations —An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02) |
| AOB | advanced operational base |
| AOR | area of responsibility —The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02) |
| area assessment | The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02) |
| area command | In unconventional warfare, the organizational structure established within an unconventional warfare operational area to command and control resistance forces. Usually it will integrate the Special Forces operational detachment and the resistance force. (AR 310-25) |

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| area of influence | A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 1-02) |
| ARFOR | Army forces |
| ARNG | Army National Guard |
| ARSOA | Army Special Operations Aviation |
| ARSOF | Army special operations forces —Those active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02) |
| ARSOTF | Army special operations task force —A temporary or semipermanent grouping of ARSOF units under one commander and formed to carry out a specific operation or a continuing mission. |
| ARTEP | Army Training and Evaluation Program |
| ASCC | Army Service Component Command |
| ASG | area support group |
| ASO | advanced special operations |
| ASP | ammunition supply point |
| ASPS | all-source production section |
| asset (intelligence) | Any resource (person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply) at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (JP 1-02) |
| assign | 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02) |
| assisted recovery | The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. (JP 1-02) |
| AT | antiterrorism —Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02) |
| ATO | air tasking order |
| attach | 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are |

secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02)

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| AUTODIN | Automatic Digital Network |
| auxiliary | In unconventional warfare, that element of the resistance force established to provide the organized civilian support of the resistance movement. (AR 310-25) |
| BDA | battle damage assessment |
| BDOC | base defense operations center |
| BE | basic encyclopedia |
| BOS | battlefield operating systems |
| BSC | battalion support company |
| C2 | command and control —The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02) |
| C3I | command, control, communications, and intelligence |
| C4 | command, control, communications, and computers |
| C4I | command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| cache | In evasion and recovery operations, source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support evaders in current or future operations. (JP 1-02) |
| campaign | A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) |
| campaign plan | A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) |
| capability | The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02) |
| CARVER | criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability |
| CASEVAC | casualty evacuation —Evacuation of casualties taking place by expedient, nonstandard means of conveyance such as conventional ground transport and cargo airframe backhaul. |

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| CBT | combatting terrorism —Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02) |
| CCIR | commander's critical information requirements |
| CD | counterdrug |
| C-E | communications-electronics |
| cell | Small group of individuals who work together for clandestine or subversive purposes. (JP 1-02) |
| CFL | coordinated fire line |
| chain of command | The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. |
| CHOP | change of operational control —The date and time (Coordinated Universal Time) at which a force or unit is reassigned or attached from one commander to another where the gaining commander will exercise operational control over that force or unit. (JP 1-02) |
| CHS | combat health support —Health support services required on the battlefield to maintain the health of the soldier and to both treat and evacuate casualties in an expedient manner to preserve life. |
| CI | counterintelligence —Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02) |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CI-HUMINT | counterintelligence-human intelligence |
| CINC | commander in chief |
| civil assistance | Military necessity may require a commander to provide life-sustaining services, maintain order, or control distribution of goods and services within his assigned operational area. Civil assistance differs from other forms of civil administration because it is based on the commander's decision. All other forms of civil administration require NCA approval. (FM 41-10) |
| CJCS | Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJSOTF | Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force |
| clandestine operation | An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the |

operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. See also covert operation; overt operation. (JP 1-02)

- CM&D** collection management and dissemination
- CMF** career management field
- CMO** **civil-military operations**—Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (JP 1-02)
- CMOC** **civil-military operations center**—An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. See also civil-military operations; international organization; nongovernmental organizations; private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)
- COA** course of action
- coalition** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)
- COCOM** **combatant command**—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)
- COIN** **counterinsurgency**—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)
- collateral activities** The inherent capabilities of all military forces may periodically be applied to accomplish missions other than those for which the forces are principally organized, trained, and equipped. Collateral activities in which special operations forces, by virtue of inherent capabilities, may be tasked to participate include humanitarian assistance, security assistance, search and rescue, counterdrug, antiterrorism and other security activities, and special activities. (JP 3-05)
- collateral damage** Unintended and undesirable civilian personnel injuries or material damage adjacent to a target produced by the effects of demolition weapons.

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| combatant command (command authority) | Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through the subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02) |
| combat area | A restricted area (air, land, or sea) which is established to prevent or minimize mutual interference between friendly forces engaged in combat operations. See also combat zone. (JP 1-02) |
| combat information | Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02) |
| combat zone | 1. That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations. 2. The territory forward of the Army rear area boundary. See also combat area; communications zone. (JP 1-02) |
| combined | Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (JP 1-02) |
| COMCEN | communications center |
| COMJSOTF | commander, joint special operations task force |
| command | 1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. (JP 1-02) |

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| communications intelligence | Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. (JP 1-02) |
| COMMZ | communications zone —Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (JP 1-02) |
| compromise | The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets, or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (JP 1-02) |
| computer network attack | Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. (JP 1-02) |
| COMSEC | communications security |
| COMSOC | Commander, Special Operations Command |
| conditions | Those external elements that affect a target audience but over which they have little or no control. Conditions may be man-made or environmental in nature. (FM 3-05.30) |
| CONOPS | concept of operations —A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (JP 1-02) |
| CONPLAN | concept plan (operation plan in concept format) |
| contingency | An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02) |
| CONUS | continental United States |
| conventional forces | Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (JP 1-02) |
| Country Team | The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02) |
| covert operation | An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert |

operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. See also clandestine operation; overt operation. (JP 1-02)

- CP** counterproliferation
- CPT** captain
- CPWMD** counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- CQB** **close quarters battle**—Sustained combative TTP employed by small, highly trained SOF units using special-purpose weapons, munitions, and explosives to recover specified personnel, equipment, or material. Characteristics of CQB include surprise, speed, and violence of action, and the application of precise discriminatory engagement of targets to gain specific, short-term objectives. This type of operation requires highly advanced detailed planning, synchronization, and integrated assault skills, including advanced marksmanship, explosive entry techniques, and special tactics and procedures to gain surprise. CQB may be conducted in peacetime operations in highly sensitive environments. Prevention of collateral damage is a critical consideration. (The term CQB is synonymous with close quarters combat [CQC].)
- CRD** chemical reconnaissance detachment
- CRDL** collateral-recurring document listing
- crisis** An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)
- critical information** Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)
- CS** combat support
- CSAR** **combat search and rescue**—A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. (JP 1-02)
- CSEL** **combat survivor evader locator**—The CSEL system is a survival-evasion radio that transmits on VHF and FM and has a built-in GPS that is accurate to 21 meters.
- CSS** combat service support
- CT** **counterterrorism**—Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; terrorism. (JP 1-02)

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| DA | direct action |
| DAR | designated area of recovery |
| data | Representation of facts, concepts, or instruction in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned. (JP 1-02) |
| DCO | deputy commanding officer |
| DCSLOG | Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics |
| DCSOPS | Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans |
| D-day | unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence. (JP 1-02) |
| deception | Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02) |
| defensive information operations | The integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems. Defensive information operations are conducted through information assurance, physical security, operations security, counterdeception, counterpsychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and special information operations. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes. (JP 1-02) |
| denied area | An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. (JP 1-02) |
| DFT | deployment for training |
| DIRLAUTH | direct liaison authorized —That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (JP 1-02) |
| diversion | The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. (JP 1-02) |
| DNA | deoxyribonucleic acid |
| DOD | Department of Defense |

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| DOS | Department of State |
| DS | direct support —1. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer to the supported force's request for assistance. 2. In NATO, the support provided by a unit or formation but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. (FM 101-5-1) |
| DSN | Defense Switched Network |
| DSU | direct support unit |
| DTG | date-time group |
| E&R | evasion and recovery —The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. See also evader; evasion; hostile; recovery force. (JP 1-02) |
| EALT | earliest anticipated launch time |
| EEFI | essential elements of friendly information |
| E EI | essential elements of information |
| electronic intelligence | Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JP 1-02) |
| EP | electronic protection (term replaces ECCM) |
| EPW | enemy prisoner of war |
| ER | electronic reconnaissance |
| evader | Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (JP 1-02) |
| EW | electronic warfare —Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 1-02) |
| executive order | Order issued by the President by virtue of the authority vested in him by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. It has the force of law. (AR 310-25) |
| exfiltration | The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (JP 1-02) |
| EXORD | execute order |
| FARC | Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces |
| FEBA | forward edge of the battle area |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FID | foreign internal defense —Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs |

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| | taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02) |
| FIS | foreign intelligence services |
| FM | field manual; frequency modulation |
| FNS | foreign nation support —The identification, coordination, and acquisition of foreign nation resources, such as supplies, material, and labor, to support U.S. military forces and operations. (FM 41-10) |
| FOB | forward operational base —In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. The forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit controlled or supported by a main operational base. (JP 1-02) |
| force multiplier | A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02) |
| foreign instrumentation signals intelligence | Technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-US aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence is a subcategory of signals intelligence. Foreign instrumentation signals include, but are not limited to, telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links. (JP 1-02) |
| FORSCOM | United States Army Forces Command |
| FP | force protection —Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02) |
| FPWG | Future Plans Working Group |
| FSC | forward support company |
| FSCL | fire support coordination line |
| FSE | fire support element |
| functional component command | A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular |

operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

- G1** Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel
- G2** Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
- G3** Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans
- G4** Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics
- G5** Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GI&S **geospatial information and services**—The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling data bases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. (JP 1-02)

GMF ground mobile forces

GS **general support**—Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (FM 101-5-1)

GSC group support company

guerrilla A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla force A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

HA humanitarian assistance

- hazard** Any actual or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, damage to or loss of equipment, property or mission degradation. (FM 101-5)
- HD** **humanitarian demining**—Activities performed by ARSOF in support of a DOD program to help selected host nations (HNs) establish their own demining organizations capable of conducting long-term and self-sustaining operations to reduce or eliminate the suffering and threats to the safety of its civilian populations caused by landmines and associated battlefield unexploded ordnance. SF teams train the HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance. PSYOP teams assist HN governments develop and implement mine awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and report locations of landmines and unexploded ordnance until these threats are removed. CA teams train the HN demining headquarters in management and command and control of its subordinate elements. CA assets also provide liaison with the U.S. Government, the United Nations, and international and local nongovernmental organizations to coordinate support of the HN demining infrastructure.
- HDO** humanitarian demining operations
- HF** high frequency
- HHC** headquarters and headquarters company
- H-hour** specific time an operation or exercise begins (JP 1-02)
- HMSC** headquarters and main support company
- HN** **host nation**—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02)
- HNS** **host nation support**—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02)
- hostile environment** Operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (See operational environment.) (JP 1-02)
- HQ** headquarters
- HSS** health service support
- HUMINT** **human intelligence**—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02)
- I&W** indications and warning
- IA** **information assurance**—Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and

nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (JP 1-02)

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| IAW | in accordance with |
| IDAD | internal defense and development —The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 1-02) |
| IDP | immediate deployment package |
| IEW | intelligence and electronic warfare |
| IIR | Intelligence Information Report |
| IMINT | imagery intelligence |
| indicator | In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. |
| infiltration | The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made either by small groups or by individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. (JP 1-02) |
| information | Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. (JP 1-02) |
| insurgency | 1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 2. A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. (FM 41-10) |
| insurgent | Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership. See also antiterrorism; counterinsurgency; insurgency. (JP 1-02) |
| intelligence | 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02) |
| intelligence requirements | Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence. (JP 1-02) |
| interagency coordination | Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an |

- objective. See also international organization; nongovernmental organizations; private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)
- international organization** Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. See also nongovernmental organizations; private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)
- INTSUM** intelligence summary
- IO** **information operations**—Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. (JP 1-02)
- IPB** **intelligence preparation of the battlespace**—An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. IPB builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. IPB is a continuing process. (JP 1-02)
- IR** information requirement
- IROL** imagery reconnaissance objective list
- ISB** **intermediate staging base**—A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation.
- ISOFAC** isolation facility
- IW** **information warfare**—Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. (JP 1-02)
- J1** Manpower and Personnel Directorate
- J2** Intelligence Directorate
- J3** Operations Directorate
- J4** Logistics Directorate
- J5** Plans Directorate of a joint staff
- J6** Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate
- JCET** joint combined exchange training
- JCS** Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JDISS** Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
- JFAC** joint force air component
- JFACC** joint force air component commander
- JFC** joint force commander
- JFSOC** joint force special operations component

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| JFSOCC | joint force special operations component commander |
| JIC | Joint Intelligence Center |
| joint | Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02) |
| joint force | A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02) |
| joint operations | A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02) |
| joint search and rescue center director | The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. (JP 1-02) |
| JP | joint publication |
| JSOA | joint special operations area —A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. (JP 1-02) |
| JSOAC | joint special operations air component |
| JSOACC | joint special operations air component commander |
| JSOTF | joint special operations task force |
| JSOTMPP | joint special operations targeting and mission planning process |
| JSRC | joint search and rescue center —A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force |

component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. (JP 1-02)

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| JTCB | Joint Targeting Coordination Board |
| JTF | joint task force —A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02) |
| JTL | joint target list —A consolidated list of selected targets considered to have military significance in the joint operations area. (JP 1-02) |
| JTMD | joint theater missile defense —The integration of joint force capabilities to destroy enemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence measures. Enemy theater missiles are those that are aimed at targets outside the continental United States. (JP 1-02) |
| JWICS | Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System |
| LDC | lightweight deployable communications |
| LNO | liaison officer |
| LOC | line of communications |
| low-visibility operations | Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-02) |
| MACOM | major Army command |
| MAJ | major |
| MDCI | multidisciplined counterintelligence |
| MEDCOM | medical command |
| MEDEVAC | medical evacuation |
| media | Transmitters of information and psychological products. |
| MEDLOG | medical logistics |
| MEF | Marine expeditionary force |
| METL | mission-essential task list |
| METOC | meteorological and oceanographic |

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| METT-TC | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations |
| MFFP | military free-fall parachuting |
| MI | military intelligence |
| MID | military intelligence detachment |
| military civic action | The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02) |
| MILPO | military personnel office |
| MMC | Materiel Management Center |
| MOC | mission operations cell |
| MOOTW | military operations other than war —Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. (JP 1-02) |
| MOPP | mission-oriented protective posture |
| MOS | military occupational specialty |
| MOUT | military operations in urbanized terrain —Includes all military actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where man-made construction impacts on the tactical options available to the commander. These types of operations involve relatively large-scale offensive or defensive actions. The primary objectives are to seize or hold ground using all available means at hand. These actions often result in extensive collateral damage to the area. Conventional infantry units often perform this type of operation. |
| MP | military police |
| MPA | mission planning agent —The subordinate special operations force commander designated by the joint special operations component commander to validate, plan, and execute a particular special operations mission. (JP 3-05.5) |
| MSC | major subordinate command |
| MSE | mobile subscriber equipment |
| MSG | master sergeant |
| MSU | major subordinate unit |

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| MTF | message text format |
| MTOE | modified table of organization and equipment |
| MTT | mobile training team —A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. (JP 1-02) |
| MTW | major theater war |
| multinational operations | A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02) |
| NAI | named area of interest |
| NAR | nonconventional assisted recovery —All forms of personnel recovery conducted by an entity, group of entities, or organizations that are trained and directed to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate U.S. military and other designated personnel from enemy-held or hostile areas to friendly control through established infrastructure or procedures. NAR includes unconventional assisted recovery conducted by special operations forces. (DOD Directive 2310.2) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NBC | nuclear, biological, and chemical |
| NCA | National Command Authorities —The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JP 1-02) |
| NCO | noncommissioned officer |
| NFA | no-fire area |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization —Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. See also private voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02) |
| NIMA | National Imagery and Mapping Agency |
| NIPRNET | Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network |
| NLT | not later than |

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| NMC | nonmission capable |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NSWTG | naval special warfare task group |
| O&M | operations and maintenance |
| OCONUS | outside the continental United States |
| offensive information operations | The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers to achieve or promote specific objectives. These capabilities and activities include, but are not limited to operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could include computer network attack. (JP 1-02) |
| OGA | other government agency |
| OIC | officer in charge |
| OPCEN | operations center |
| OPCON | operational control —Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02) |
| operational continuum | The general states of peace, conflict, and war within which various types of military operations are conducted. |
| operational environment | A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are: a. permissive environment—operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have |

control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment—operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. c. hostile environment—operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

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| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPORD | operation order |
| OPSEC | operations security —A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02) |
| OPSUM | operation summary |
| OPTEMPO | operating tempo |
| OSS | Office of Strategic Services |
| overt operation | An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02) |
| PACE | primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (plan) |
| paramilitary forces | Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02) |
| partisan | Member of an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an occupying power through the use of subversion or armed conflict. See also insurgent; insurgency; resistance movement. |
| partisan warfare | Not to be used. See guerrilla warfare. |
| PDE | plan, decide, execute |
| peace building | Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02) |
| peace enforcement | Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace building; peace operations; peacekeeping; peacemaking. (JP 1-02) |

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| peacekeeping | Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peace operations; peacemaking. (JP 1-02) |
| peacemaking | The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace operations. (JP 1-02) |
| peace operations | A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking. (JP 1-02) |
| permissive environment | Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and the capability to assist the operations that a unit intends to conduct. (See operational environment.) (JP 1-02) |
| PERSCOM | Personnel Command (Army) |
| PERSTEMPO | personnel tempo |
| PFC | private first class |
| PIR | priority intelligence requirements —Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making. (JP 1-02) |
| PLL | prescribed load list |
| PME | peacetime military engagement |
| POC | point of contact |
| POE | plan of execution |
| POL | petroleum, oils, and lubricants |
| POM | preparation for overseas movement |
| POR | preparation of requirements |
| power | The ability or capacity to perform effectively or target audience effectiveness. |
| PR | personnel recovery |
| PRC | populace and resources control |
| private voluntary organization | Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” is often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organizations.” Also called PVOs. See also nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02) |

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| product | Any visual, audio, or audiovisual item generated and disseminated in support of a PSYOP program. |
| propaganda | Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02) |
| PSC | personnel service company |
| PSS | personnel service support |
| PSYACT | psychological action |
| PSYOP | Psychological Operations —Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of Psychological Operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02) |
| PW | prisoner of war |
| PWRMS | pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks |
| RC | Reserve Component |
| recovery mechanism | Designated infrastructure in enemy-held or hostile areas that is trained and directed to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate U.S. military and other designated personnel to friendly control through established indigenous or surrogate networks operating in a clandestine or covert manner. RMs include, but are not limited to unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and may involve the use of a recovery team. RM replaces the DOD term and definition of E&E nets. |
| recovery team | An entity, group of entities, or organizations designated, trained, and directed to operate in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner in enemy-held or hostile areas for a specified period to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate U.S. military and other designated personnel to friendly control. |
| refugee | A civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety elsewhere. (JP 1-02) |
| resistance movement | An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02) |
| RFA | restricted fire area |
| RFI | request for information —1. Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational |

requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures. 2. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service uses this term to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. See also information; intelligence. (JP 1-02)

- RII** request for intelligence information
- risk** Chance of hazard or bad consequences; the probability of exposure to chance of injury or loss from a hazard; risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity. (FM 101-5)
- risk assessment** Identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process); an identified hazard is assessed to determine the risk (both the probability of occurrence and resulting severity) of a hazardous incident due to the presence of the hazard.
- ROE** rules of engagement
- S1** personnel officer
- S2** intelligence officer
- S3** operations and training officer
- S4** logistics officer
- S5** civil-military operations officer
- S6** signal officer
- SA** security assistance
- sabotage** An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02)
- SAEDA** Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army
- SAF** security assistance force
- SAFE** **selected area for evasion**—A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. See also escapee; evader; hostile. (JP 1-02)
- SAO** **security assistance organization**—All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02)
- SAR** **search and rescue**—The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search

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| | for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (DOD) (JP 1-02) |
| SCI | sensitive compartmented information |
| SCIF | sensitive compartmented information facility |
| SCIRDL | sensitive compartmented information-recurring document listing |
| SDR | source-directed requirement |
| SEAL | sea-air-land |
| security assistance | Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02) |
| service component command | A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02) |
| SF | Special Forces |
| SFAUC | Special Forces advanced urban combat —Refers to training encompassed by precision combative techniques used on urban or complex terrain. These techniques include SOF unique explosive breaching, selective and discriminatory target engagement, and emergency assault methods utilizing special, nonstandard equipment and SOF TTP. SFAUC is characterized by offensive operations where clearing built-up areas is necessary, but minimal collateral damage is a primary consideration and noncombatants are or may be present. Operations are characterized by SOF special purpose weapons and equipment, a special personnel selection process, and advanced marksmanship on linear structures. These operations are conducted by ARSOF. |
| SFC | sergeant first class |
| SFG(A) | Special Forces group (airborne) |
| SFLE | Special Forces liaison element |
| SFOB | Special Forces operational base |
| SFOD | Special Forces operational detachment |
| SFODA | Special Forces operational detachment A |
| SFODB | Special Forces operational detachment B |
| SFODC | Special Forces operational detachment C |
| SFQC | Special Forces Qualification Course |

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| SGM | sergeant major |
| SHF | superhigh frequency |
| SIDS | Secondary Imagery Dissemination System |
| SIGCEN | signal center |
| SIGINT | signals intelligence —1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. (JP 1-02) |
| SIGINT operational tasking authority | A military commander's authority delegated by the director of the NSA to operationally direct and levy collection requirements on designated SIGINT/EW resources. This includes the authority to deploy and redeploy all or part of the SIGINT/EW resources for which SIGINT operational tasking authority has been delegated. (Note: This term is not to be confused with SOT-A, special operations team A.) |
| SII | statement of intelligence interest |
| SIPRNET | SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network |
| SIR | specific information requirement |
| SITMAP | situation map |
| SITREP | situation report |
| SME | subject matter expert |
| SMU | special mission unit —A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities. (JP 1-02) |
| SO | special operations —Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 1-02) |
| SOA | special operations aviation |
| SOAR | special operations aviation regiment |

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| SOC | special operations command |
| SOCA | special operations communications assemblage |
| SOCCE | special operations command and control element |
| SOCOORD | special operations coordination element |
| SOCRATES | Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System |
| SOF | special operations forces —Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. See also Air Force special operations forces; Army special operations forces; naval special warfare forces. (JP 1-02) |
| SOFA | status-of-forces agreement |
| SOI | signal operating instructions |
| SOLE | special operations liaison element |
| SOMPF | special operations mission planning folder —The package that contains the materials required to execute a given special operations mission. It will include the mission tasking letter, mission tasking package, original feasibility assessment (as desired), initial assessment (as desired), target intelligence package, plan of execution, infiltration and exfiltration plan of execution, and other documentation as required or desired. (JP 1-02) |
| SOP | standing operating procedure |
| SOR | statement of requirements |
| SOSB | special operations support battalion |
| SOSCOM(A) | special operations support command (airborne) |
| SOT-A | special operations team A —SOT-As are low-level SIGINT collection teams that intercept and report operational and technical information derived from tactical threat communications through prescribed communications paths. The mission of a SOT-A is to conduct signals intelligence-electronic warfare in support of information operations (unilaterally or in conjunction with other SOF elements to support existing and emerging special operations forces missions worldwide). |
| SOTSE | special operations theater support element |
| SOW | special operations wing |
| SOWT | special operations weather team |
| special information operations | Information operations that by their sensitive nature, due to their potential effect or impact, security requirements, or risk to the national security of the United States, require a special review and approval process. (JP 1-02) |

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| special operations weather team and tactical element | A task-organized team of Air Force personnel organized, trained, and equipped to collect critical weather observations from data-sparse areas. These teams are trained to operate independently in permissive or semipermissive environments, or as augmentation to special operations elements in nonpermissive environments in direct support of special operations. (JP 1-02) |
| SPTCEN | support center |
| SR | special reconnaissance |
| SROE | standing rules of engagement —The rules of engagement that are always in effect. |
| SRTD | signals research and target development |
| SSC | small-scale contingency |
| SSCE | signal support coordination element |
| SSG | staff sergeant |
| SSO | special security officer |
| STAMMIS | Standard Army Multi-command Management Information System |
| stay-behind force | A force which is left in position to conduct a specified mission when the remainder of the force withdraws or retires from the area. (JP 1-02) |
| STU-III | secure telephone unit III |
| subversion | (DOD) Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength, or morale of a regime. |
| supported commander | The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02) |
| supporting commander | A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02) |
| SWO | staff weather officer |
| SYSCON | systems control |
| TA | theater Army |
| TACON | tactical control —Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is |

inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (JP 1-02)

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| TACP | tactical air control party |
| TACSAT | tactical satellite |
| TAI | target area of interest |
| TAMCA | Theater Army Movement Control Agency |
| TAMMC | Theater Army Material Management Command |
| target | A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. (JP 1-02) |
| target audience | An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of Psychological Operations. (JP 1-02) |
| TASKORD | tasking order |
| TCAE | technical control and analysis element |
| TDA | table of distribution and allowances |
| technical control | The executive authority to regulate and supervise technical activities by providing specialized or professional guidance and direction. |
| TENCAP | Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program |
| TEP | theater engagement plan |
| terrorism | The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) |
| theme | A theme is a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective. |
| threat | The ability of an enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current or projected mission organization or item of equipment. (TRADOC Regulation 381-1) |
| TIP | target intelligence package |
| TMO | transportation movement office |
| TOC | tactical operations center |
| TOE | table of organization and equipment |
| TRADOC | United States Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| TSC | Theater Support Command |
| TTP | tactics, techniques, and procedures |
| UAR | unconventional assisted recovery —Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery |

mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; authenticate; evader; recovery. (JP 1-02)

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| UARCC | unconventional assisted recovery coordination center |
| UARM | unconventional assisted recovery mechanism —That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; recovery; unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02) |
| UART | unconventional assisted recovery team —A designated SOF RT that is trained and equipped to operate for a specified period in hostile territory in support of PR. |
| UBL | unit basic load |
| UCMJ | Uniform Code of Military Justice |
| UHF | ultrahigh frequency |
| UMT | unit ministry team |
| uncertain environment | Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. (See operational environment.) (JP 1-02) |
| unconventional recovery operation | Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. See also evader; recovery operations. (JP 1-02) |
| underground | A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces. (AR 310-25) |
| unified command | A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components or two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02) |
| unified command plan | The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. (JP 1-02) |
| UNITA | National Union for the Total Independence of Angola |
| U.S. | United States |
| USACAPOC(A) | United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) |

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| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAJFKSWCS | United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School |
| USAR | United States Army Reserve |
| USARCEN | United States Army Forces, United States Central Command |
| USAREUR | United States Army Forces, United States European Command |
| USARPAC | United States Army Forces, United States Pacific Command |
| USARSO | United States Army Forces, United States Southern Command |
| USASFC(A) | United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) |
| USASOC | United States Army Special Operations Command |
| USC | United States Code |
| USCENTCOM | United States Central Command |
| USCINCSOC | Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command |
| USEUCOM | United States European Command |
| USPACOM | United States Pacific Command |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| USSOUTHCOM | United States Southern Command |
| UTM | universal transverse mercator |
| UW | unconventional warfare —A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02) |
| UWO | underwater operations |
| UWOA | Replaced by joint special operations area (JSOA) |
| VHF | very high frequency |
| VTC | video teleconferencing |
| WARNORD | warning order |
| WMD | weapons of mass destruction |
| WO | warrant officer |
| WRMS | war reserve materiel stocks |
| WW II | World War II |

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